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Policy Summary
Work and retirement patterns of older Americans, especially men, have 
undergone major changes during the past two decades. Policymakers need to 
understand how economic incentives embedded in Social Security and employer 
pension plans influence the short- and long-term decisions of older workers 
in order to craft new policy initiatives or adjustments to existing policy.
Life-cycle analysis shows that pension rights are a component of compensa 
tion and that workers base labor market participation decisions throughout their 
lives on retirement income at the close of a career. Research on the quantitative 
effects of policy, both public and private, on individual decisions of older workers 
shows that workers behave as though they understand and respond to the in 
centives they face.
A central finding of the study is that many older workers seek alternate 
employment after leaving career jobs that span many years. The authors show 
that incentives affect the way older workers leave career jobs for one of several 
options: self-employment, part-time work, a full-time second career, or full 
withdrawal from the labor force. Correlates of the various retirement transi 
tions include health, pension and mandatory retirement status, industry and 
occupation, earnings and wealth.
Labor force participation rates of older workers have fallen dramatically over 
the last two decades, and attempts to modify that trend by changing Social 
Security rules alone are not likely to have more than a modest effect. Most 
defined benefit pension plans continue to encourage workers to leave the career 
job at the earliest possible retirement age. How these employer pensions re 
spond to future labor market conditions will have a major effect on work and 
retirement decisions. The authors are convinced that "older Americans would 
respond to changed incentives in the future as they have in the past. What re 
mains to be seen is whether the market firms responding to labor shortages 
on the horizon will introduce the appropriate changes themselves, or whether 
a more active government role is required."
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Introduction and Overview
The artful policymaker can anticipate future crises and develop plans 
to ameliorate them. These plans may seem puzzling to those concern 
ed with present and past problems who do not foresee what lies ahead. 
No demographic phenomenon has provided a greater continuing 
challenge to the policy makers' skills than the aging of the postwar 
babyboomers. During the 1950s, they created a demand for maternity 
beds and four-bedroom houses in the suburbs. As they entered school, 
they forced a massive increase in educational facilities and then left some 
painful contractions in their wake. In the 1970s, they sorely tested the 
economy's ability to create jobs for young adults, and they may soon 
clog promotion paths as they progress up the occupational ladders. In 
the early part of the next century, they will contemplate leaving the 
labor force. Their decisions on when and how to retire will have dramatic 
implications for the structure of society, the economy, and the finan 
cial well-being of our public and private retirement income schemes.
The demographic projections are startling. In the United States, the 
population aged 65 and over about 30 million today will nearly double 
over the next 40 years. In stark contrast, the population under 65 is 
estimated to increase by only 12 percent. As a result, the proportion 
of the population over age 64 is projected to rise from 12 percent today 
to nearly 20 percent by the year 2030. The nation then will look like 
Florida today. 1
Those interested in issues of retirement finance often emphasize the 
aged-dependency or support ratio the ratio of those of prime working 
age (20 to 64) to those of traditional retirement age (65 and over). In 
the United States, this ratio is nearly 5 to 1 today, but is estimated to 
drop to about 2.6 to 1 by the year 2030 and to 2.4 to 1 by 2060 (Aaron, 
Bosworth, and Burtless 1989). In fact, the actual story is even more
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significant because 65 is no longer the age of normal retirement. As 
we will see, older workers have been leaving the labor force earlier 
and earlier, decreasing further the ratio of those employed to those 
retired. 2 The ratio of Social Security-covered workers to old-age and 
survivor beneficiaries is forecast to drop from about 3.3 to 1 today to 
only 2 to 1 by the year 2030 (Tobin 1988).
These changes are dramatic and extremely important. But some can 
be predicted like the number of older Americans and others like 
retirement patterns can be influenced by current and future public policy 
decisions. The future is not exogenous. It depends on what we foresee 
and how we respond to it. We will argue that individual retirement deci 
sions depend in large part on the financial structures we have built into 
our public and private retirement systems. These structures frequently 
penalize workers who stay on the job too long or leave too early  
and thereby influence labor supply decisions in important ways. The 
financial incentives that currently exist may have made sense in the past, 
but demographic trends suggest that they will not in the future. 3 Our 
ability to forestall crisis depends critically on an understanding of how 
these financial structures work, how they affect labor supply decisions, 
and how they can be changed to alter retirement trends in the years ahead.
Dramatic changes in attitudes and public policy toward retirement 
and in the employment patterns of older workers have occurred in the 
United States over the past several decades. Americans are leaving the 
labor force earlier than ever before. As recently as 1950, nearly half 
of all American men aged 65 and over were employed. By 1960, this 
figure had dropped to a third, and by 1970 to a quarter. Today, only 
about one in six older men continue to work for pay.
These long-term trends in the age distribution of the population, 
together with large increases in real Social Security benefits and adverse 
economic conditions, led to a Social Security financial crisis in the 
1970s. 4 Trust funds declined and were projected to disappear by the 
mid-1980s, and the long-run financial stability of the system was 
threatened. 5 As a result, the National Commission on Social Security 
Reform, headed by Alan Greenspan, was appointed to analyze the ex 
pected flows of funds into and out of the system and to propose changes
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to bring these two streams into balance. Major legislation followed in 
1983, which raised the level of future Social Security contributions, 
scheduled an increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 while 
increasing the benefit reduction associated with retirement at age 62 
(the equivalent to an across-the-board benefit cut), and made up to half 
of the benefits taxable for certain higher income recipients.
At the same time, Social Security, traditionally an extremely popular 
program among recipients and contributors alike, was subject to increas 
ed scrutiny and criticism. Some younger workers, reacting to the in 
creased tax levy and the lower rate of return they expected to receive 
on their contributions, complained about continued participation in the 
program. Confidence in the system's ability to pay benefits in the future 
waned and some analysts suggested that participation in the Social Securi 
ty system should be made voluntary. 6
Retirement trends and retirement policy leapt from the back to the 
front page. They continue to be matters of public debate. Interest has 
further intensified with concern over the federal budget deficit. Since 
the outlay on old-age, survivors, disability and health insurance 
(OASDHI) constitutes almost a quarter of all federal expenditures, Social 
Security is part of the deficit discussion, even though many politicians 
consider it off limits.
Too often in this public policy debate, specific reforms are proposed 
without an adequate understanding of how such changes will affect labor 
supply and retirement decisions. A major goal of this book is to pro 
vide an overview of the American retirement system and how it in 
fluences work across the life cycle. We will do so by reviewing what 
economists have learned about the retirement process over the past two 
decades.
As we will see, much of our increased understanding comes from 
two outstanding longitudinal surveys of older Americans the National 
Longitudinal Survey of older men (NLS), financed by the Department 
of Labor, and the Retirement History Study (RHS), conducted by the 
Social Security Administration. 7 Because of studies based on these and 
other data, we now have a much better understanding of the nature and 
magnitude of the financial incentives facing older workers. We are
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convinced that Social Security and employer pensions do influence retire 
ment decisions and that people respond to these incentives in ways that 
are consistent with economic theory and common sense.
We also have learned that public and private pension systems affect 
labor market behavior throughout the life cycle—not only at retirement, 
but before and after as well. As we will see, the literature on the actual 
retirement decision is voluminous. Much less has been written, however, 
on how pensions influence younger workers long before retirement  
and those who have already left career jobs. We will show that work 
after "retirement" (after departure from a career job) is a very com 
mon event and suggest that it may become even more so in the future. 
Relatively little research exists on labor force behavior during this grow 
ing portion of the life cycle the years after departure from the career 
job. 8
Our review of the literature is selective. We focus on the economic 
determinants of retirement within a public policy framework. We chose 
to do so for several reasons. This is the area, we believe, in which the 
most important new insights have occurred. In addition, this is the arena 
in which we have worked and which we feel most qualified to discuss. 
And finally, these economic incentives can be changed through legisla 
tion. These are the policy levers that affect aggregate behavior. Our 
focus, however, should not imply that we think that other factors are 
unimportant. Mental and physical health, social support networks, at 
titudes toward work and leisure, and previous employment experience 
obviously influence the retirement decision. But we, as authors, know 
less about them and we, as a society, are less able to change them through 
direct public policy initiatives.
A substantial portion of this book, then, is a detailed review of the 
recent and current work of a select group of social scientists. We discuss 
how views about the retirement decision have changed and where we 
now stand. In the second part of the book we describe some shortcom 
ings of this research and point out one direction that we think future 
research should take.
Most of the retirement literature focuses on who retires, when, and 
why. Retirement is usually modeled as a dichotomous concept an
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individual is either retired or not. Definitions of retirement vary great 
ly. Some researchers use labor force participation and label as retired 
only those who are completely out of the labor force. Others base their 
definitions on the receipt of Social Security or employer pension benefits, 
regardless of the recipient's labor force status. To others, retirement 
means a substantial and discontinuous drop in earnings or hours work 
ed. Finally, some analysts rely on subjective self-descriptions by in 
dividuals themselves. Most researchers, however, use whatever defini 
tion they adopt to classify people into two or sometimes three categories 
and then analyze the determinants of their retirement status.
A major theme of this book is that these traditional classifications 
are inadequate to describe the wide variety of labor market changes 
that older Americans are making. Although the abrupt transition from 
full-time work to complete labor force withdrawal (traditional retire 
ment) is still the most common occurrence, many older workers are 
utilizing intermediate steps between the two. Some first reduce their 
hours of work to part-time status. Others leave a career job and then 
start on another, either full or part time. Sometimes this new job is in 
the same industry and occupation, but more often it represents a new 
line of work altogether. Still others decide to retire completely, but then 
change their minds and return to work.
Because of these diverse exit routes, the word "retirement" may well 
conceal more than it reveals. There are too many variations for one 
word to describe. The different definitions of retirement lead to confu 
sion and seemingly contradictory research results. Our approach is not 
to pose the question in terms of retirement, but rather to ask how and 
when people leave their career jobs and what they do afterwards.
Career jobs are a very important part of most Americans' lives. Many 
workers spend a substantial number of years on a single job. It is the 
transition from this job that we will study. If this exit were to take place 
at age 45, few would call it retirement. The behavioral patterns of many 
older workers suggest the same thing that much of what we observe 
does not look like the traditional concept of retirement.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the growth of our Social 
Security and pension systems in the postwar period and the simultaneous
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changes in the employment behavior of older Americans. We docu 
ment the changes in the labor force participation rates of older men and 
women. We also discuss patterns in full-time and part-time work and 
changes in the importance of self-employment. Finally, we document 
the importance of career jobs in America in order to motivate the ap 
proach we have chosen to take.
Growth of Social Security and Private Pension Plans
In 1935, the Social Security Act was passed to provide compulsory 
retirement insurance for workers in commerce and industry about two- 
thirds of the workforce in those days. It was financed by a flat rate payroll 
tax of 1 percent, paid by both employees and employers on the first 
$3,000 of annual earnings. The act also mandated federal participation 
in the state-run old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, and 
unemployment insurance systems.
The American Social Security system grew directly out of the ex 
periences of the Great Depression, when more than a quarter of the 
labor force was officially out of work. 9 Many of its features were bor 
rowed from older systems in Europe. The program is government run 
and mandatory for most workers. The benefits are earnings-related (and 
weighted in favor of lower income workers) and financed by specifically 
earmarked contributions. Benefits are paid as a matter of right, and there 
is no means or overall income test.
Much of the motivation for retirement insurance in 1935 was to per 
mit older workers to leave the labor force and thereby to create job 
opportunities for the younger unemployed. For this reason, Social Securi 
ty payment criteria included an earnings or retirement test. The original 
legislation eliminated the entire monthly benefit for anyone with any 
"covered wages from regular employment" (Schulz 1988). This was 
soon replaced by a modest monthly disregard ($15), which retirees could 
earn without loss of benefits. Today, as we will see, the rules are more 
complex, but the earnings-test philosophy remains intact.
Over the subsequent half century, this social insurance system has 
grown in both scope and coverage, much of which was anticipated by the
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founders (Ball 1988). In 1939, the survivors' and dependents' programs 
were added. Disability insurance, which had been discussed in the 1930s, 
was introduced in 1956, and health insurance (Medicare) followed in 
1965. Over these same years, compulsory coverage was extended to 
regularly employed farm and domestic workers (1950), the self- 
employed (1950 through 1965), members of the armed services (1956), 
the clergy (1967), and newly hired federal employees (1984). State and 
local government employees may enroll if both the employer and a ma 
jority of the employees agree. Mandatory coverage now includes 91 
percent of all workers (Yeas and Grad 1987). Over 96 percent of all 
wage and salary disbursements are covered by Social Security or by 
analogous railroad or federal and state civil service programs. 10
At the same time that coverage was being extended, eligibility rules 
were being liberalized. Beginning in 1956 for women and 1961 for men, 
insured workers could claim retirement benefits at age 62. (Monthly 
payments were reduced by about 7 percent for each year they were claim 
ed prior to age 65.) Benefit calculation rules were adjusted frequently 
after 1950, usually to reflect recent changes in the cost of living. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, following a decade of economic growth, 
a series of benefit increases was passed that far exceeded the recent 
inflationary experience, resulting in large real increments. 11 These in 
creases were then frozen in place by the introduction of automatic cost- 
of-living adjustments in 1975.
In the years since its initial passage, the Social Security program has 
grown dramatically, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall 
economy. Social Security payments are now the single most important 
source of income to aged households, providing over a third of their 
money income in 1987. 12 For those in the lowest income quintile, the 
proportion is about 80 percent (Grad 1989). Table 1.1 provides some 
summary statistics, at five-year intervals, on the retirement, disability, 
and survivors components of Social Security (OASDI).
In constant (1989) dollars, annual expenditures have grown from about 
$5 billion in 1950 to over $235 billion today. The benefits are distributed 
to nearly 40 million Americans. The initial surges of the program, as 
it matured, can be seen in the real annual growth rates (averaged over
Table 1.1
Summary Statistics
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program 
(dollar amounts in billions) I
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1989
OASDI 
expenditure 
(current $$)
0.06
0.3
1.0
5.1
11.8
19.2
33.1
69.2
123.6
190.6
236.2
OASDI/GNP
(percent)
0.06
0.14
0.35
1.25
2.3
2.7
3.3
4.3
4.5
4.7
4.5
OASDI/federal 
expenditure 
(percent)
0.65
0.33
2.4
7.4
12.8
16.2
16.9
20.8
20.9
20.1
20.7
OASDI 
expenditure 
(1989 $$)
5.2
23.5
49.4
75.5
105.8
159.5
185.9
219.7
236.2
Annual real
growth rate 
previous 5 years 
(percent)
35
16
9
7
9
3
3
2a
5'
and Overview
SOURCES: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1990 (tables 4.A1 and 4. A3) and Economic Report of the President (1990, tables
C-1, C-58, andC-76).
a. Growth rate over the previous 4 years.
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five-year periods) in the last column. In the early 1950s, real expen 
ditures were growing at 35 percent per year as the coverage of the pro 
gram expanded and disability insurance was introduced. The real an 
nual growth rate then dropped to about 9 percent in the 1960s and ear 
ly 1970s, and to about 3 percent, and recently 2 percent, since then. 
But even until very recently, this has been faster than the economy has 
grown, as can be seen in the third column. The retirement, survivors, 
and disability expenditures of the Social Security system have grown 
to equal 4.5 percent of the gross national product, and over 20 percent 
of all federal government expenditures. 13
Social Security is a major institution in the United States. Nearly all 
workers are covered by it or by an analogous public program, and nearly 
all are eligible for retirement benefits when they reach age 62. The 
system transfers a quarter of a trillion dollars annually (excluding 
Medicare) from contributors to beneficiaries. As we will see below, 
it does so with some very interesting incentives that penalize workers 
who remain in the labor force too long.
Concurrent with this growth of Social Security has been the develop 
ment of the private pension system in the United States. Summary 
statistics for the past four decades are shown in table 1.2.
Since 1950, the number of private pension plans in the United States 
increased from about 12,000 to well over 800,000, while the propor 
tion of the wage and salary population covered by a private pension 
plan doubled from a quarter to a half. 14 Coverage of state and local 
government employees increased from 60 to 90 percent (Kotlikoff and 
Smith 1983). Most of this growth in coverage occurred in the 1950s 
and 1960s; the coverage ratio has increased only modestly since then. 
Since 1950, real private pension assets increased 25-fold, from 80 billion 
to almost two trillion dollars (in 1987). Private pensions now own over 
a quarter of the corporate and foreign bonds and a sixth of the corporate 
equities held by pensions, households, and other institutions in the United 
States (Turner and Beller 1989).
Because pension members do not receive benefits until the end of 
their work careers, the recipient statistics lag behind the coverage 
numbers. The number of pension benefit recipients has continued to
10 
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Introduction and Overview 11
increase up to the present. In 1986, nearly 30 percent of Americans 
aged 65 and over received a benefit from a private pension plan. 15 The 
average annual amount was about $5,000 (Turner and Beller 1989). 
In 1987, pension benefits constituted about a sixth of all the cash in 
come of households with a head aged 65 or over (Social Security Bulletin 
Annual Statistical Supplement, 1988).
Private pension plans are of two basic types. In defined benefit plans, 
the employer promises to pay a particular benefit, with the amount deter 
mined by an agreed-upon formula, usually based on some combination 
of earnings (often over the last few years of work) and years of service 
and age at retirement. In defined contribution plans, the employer makes 
an annual contribution to a retirement account for the worker. These 
funds are then invested and form the basis for benefits at retirement. 
The size of the benefit depends on the size of the annual contributions, 
but also on the performance of the fund over the years. As we will see 
below, the retirement incentives that economists have emphasized oc 
cur primarily in the defined benefit plans.
A new book on American pensions by John Turner and Daniel Beller 
(1989) documents recent trends in the coverage and composition of these 
plans. Between 1975 and 1985, the total number of plans more than 
doubled, and the number of active participants increased by about 60 
percent. 16 Despite this growth, there was almost no change in the pro 
portion of the working population with pension coverage. This is because 
of growth in the labor force and because, as seen in table 1.3, about 
two-thirds of the growth in participants stemmed from supplementary 
coverage. Supplemental pensions, such as profit sharing and employee 
stock ownership plans, provided additional benefits to workers already 
covered by a primary plan. Between 1975 and 1987, the number of 
workers participating in two or more plans increased from 21 to 40 
percent.
Most pension plans in America are small, covering fewer than 100 
workers. But these small plans include only about one in 10 covered 
workers. In 1985, the 6 percent of the plans with 100 or more workers 
covered 88 percent of all participants.
12 
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In primary pensions, defined benefit plans still dominate, covering 
over 70 percent of all participants in 1985. But this proportion has fallen 
significantly. The proportion of participants whose primary coverage 
was in a defined contribution plan increased from 13 to 29 percent be 
tween 1975 and 1985. 17 And virtually all of the supplementary coverage 
(which is growing more quickly) is defined contribution. Overall, the 
proportion of active participants (double counting those with more than 
one plan) in defined benefit plans fell from 71 to 47 percent by 1985.
As we will see next, the dramatic growth of the Social Security and 
private pension systems coincided with a significant decrease in the labor 
force participation rates of older American men. There are several 
reasons for believing that these trends are related. While the Social 
Security system was maturing, the demographic structure of the popula 
tion permitted the relatively small number of recipients to receive benefits 
that far exceeded, in an actuarial sense, the current value of the con 
tributions they had made. 18 These intergenerational transfers were financ 
ed by the relatively large number of Social Security contributors and 
resulted in a net increase in the wealth of older Americans. At the same 
time, real wages were rising, pension rights were accumulating and home 
equity was increasing in value. Older Americans reached normal retire 
ment age wealthier than had earlier generations. According to economic 
theory, this should increase their demand for leisure and, among other 
things, result in earlier retirement.
In addition to this income or wealth effect, however, is a substitution 
effect. The benefit calculation rules of both Social Security and many 
private pension schemes alter the compensation patterns of older workers 
over time, and therefore change the terms of the tradeoff between work 
and leisure. At some ages, the rules subsidize work and provide a wage 
supplement. At other ages, they penalize continued employment by im 
posing a subtle pay cut. Much of the recent research that we discuss 
below focuses on understanding the nature and magnitude of the finan 
cial incentives that are embedded in these retirement systems. It strongly 
suggests that the growth of Social Security and employer pensions and 
the trend toward early retirement are related. There remains considerable 
disagreement, however, on the size of the effects that these incentives
14 Introduction and Overview
have had and on their importance in explaining aggregate retirement 
trends.
Trends in Employment Among Older Americans
Much of the research interest in the retirement decision stems from 
the dramatic changes that have occurred in the employment patterns 
of older American workers during the past 50 years. Among these 
changes are decreases in the labor force participation rates of older men, 
a movement from wage and salary work to self-employment, and in 
creases in the importance of part-time employment late in the work 
career.
Labor Force Participation Rates
Historical Data
It is well-known that American men are leaving the labor force much 
earlier than they did in the past. We will document recent trends below. 
What is less well-known is how long these changes have been under 
way; in particular, whether they began prior to the growth and develop 
ment of our Social Security and pension systems.
According to the conventional wisdom, employment rates among older 
Americans were high as recently as the late nineteenth century, but have 
been dropping steadily since then. Official data originally reported by 
the Social Security Administration show rates of "gainful occupation" 
among men aged 65 and over exceeding 80 percent in 1870 and drop 
ping to below 60 percent by 1930 (Ransom and Sutch 1986). The cur 
rent labor force participation rate for this group is now about 17 per 
cent. A graph of these long-run trends (ibid.) suggests a very steady 
decline over the past 110 years, from a time when retirement was ex 
tremely rare, and over 80 percent of older American men continued 
to work, to one today in which the proportions are almost exactly revers 
ed. In this scenario, Social Security and employer pensions could not 
have started the movement toward earlier retirement, since it had
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been underway for at least 50 years prior to their development. At most 
they might have accelerated a trend with roots much older than their own.
Recent work by Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch (1986, 1988), 
however, casts doubt on the accuracy of this generally accepted story. 
Their evidence indicates that there was virtually no change in retire 
ment rates among American men from 1870 to 1937 and, therefore, 
that nearly all of the change in retirement patterns has occurred during 
the past 50 years, after the inception of Social Security and the dramatic 
growth of private pensions.
Ransom and Sutch's findings follow from two assertions: that the 
definition of occupation changed significantly in 1890 (and later changed 
back), and that the "official" statistics for 1870 and 1880 were actual 
ly based on a backwards extrapolation of trends between 1890 and 
1910. 19
Before 1890, persons were defined as "productively occupied" if 
they were "earning money regularly by labor ... or appreciably 
assisting in mechanical or agricultural industry" (Ransom and Sutch 
1986). This is very similar to what we now mean by labor force par 
ticipation. In 1890, however, the Census Bureau dropped the defini 
tion based on active participation in production and adopted one based 
on sources of income. Persons whose income came from property 
holdings were classified as employed landlords; those with income from 
stock dividends or bond interest were listed as employed capitalists. Many 
of those individuals would have been defined as out of the labor force 
and retired prior to 1890, as they would again today. When Ransom 
and Sutch recalculated the statistics for men aged 60 and over, using 
a consistent definition of employment, they found labor force participa 
tion rates of 64 percent in 1870 and 1880, 66 percent in 1900, 64 per 
cent in 1930, and 61 percent in 1937 (ibid.).
These numbers are much lower than the old official statistics, which 
estimated that over 80 percent of those over 65 were working in 1870. 
In addition, the new numbers are virtually constant between 1870 (or 
at least 1900) and 1937. Since then, however, the participation rate for
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men over 60 has dropped precipitously, to 55 percent in 1950, 45 per 
cent in 1960, 40 percent in 1970, and under 28 percent today. It is dur 
ing the postwar period, then, when most of the action has occurred. 
The long-term trend for women is very different. According to Golden 
(1989), participation rates for married women increased sevenfold since 
1920. Despite this, average years of work experience among employed 
married women remained almost unchanged, since the new entrants were 
women with very little experience, who kept the average down.
Current Data
Monthly Current Population Survey reports allow calculation of the 
labor force participation rates of specific demographic groups. In figures 
1.1 and 1.2, we illustrate recent trends for older men and women in 
four age categories, from 1964 to 1989. The decline for all four groups 
of older men is clear. 20
For the youngest group shown—men aged 55-59—the participation 
has dropped over 10 points, from over 90 to less than 80 percent. The 
next group is particularly interesting, since the age of earliest eligibili 
ty for Social Security benefits was lowered from 65 to 62 for men in 
1961 (as it had been for women in 1956). Partly in response to this 
change and the growing availability of early retirement options in private 
pensions, the participation rate of men aged 60-64 has plummeted over 
those 25 years, from almost 80 to 55 percent. For men 65-69, the rate 
remained steady through the early 1970s and then decreased by nearly 
20 points. It is interesting to note that substantial increases in real Social 
Security benefits (on the order of 50 percent) occurred over a five-year 
period beginning in 1969. The 1970s were also a decade of very poor 
economic growth. Both of these factors may have hastened the trend 
already underway. Similarly, the economic recovery in the mid-1980s 
may be responsible for the recent slight upturn for this group. Finally, 
the oldest group, men aged 70 and over, has followed the same general 
pattern, although more dramatically in percentage terms. Their participa 
tion rate has fallen by almost half, from 20 to 11 percent, over the past 
25 years.
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The trends for older women reflect two major demographic 
phenomena—the decreased participation of older workers and the in 
creased participation of women, particularly married women. 21 For the 
youngest group shown, aged 55-59, the latter effect dominates, and 
the rate has risen slightly and now is 55 percent. For those 60-64, there 
is very little change observed. For the older two groups, a small decline 
is noted. For all age categories, the participation rates are lower for 
women than men, with the ratio of female to male rates dropping with 
age.
The Department of Labor has unpublished data on labor force par 
ticipation rates by individual ages. Since some of the financial incen 
tives take effect at specific ages, these data are particularly interesting. 
Figure 1.3 shows the trends from 1968 to 1989, for men aged 55, 60, 
62, 65, and 70. All five lines drift downward over time, but the decreases 
are most dramatic for those aged 62 and 65. Note also the acceleration 
of the decline during the 1970s. Figure 1.4 illustrates the same detail 
for men of each age between 60 and 65. The same overall patterns are 
observed, as well as the sharp differences between ages 61 and 62 (the 
age of earliest eligibility for Social Security benefits) and between 64 
and 65 (the age of full eligibility).
Both trends, over age and over time, can be seen at the same time 
in figure 1.5, in which we observe four cohorts of men—those aged 
55 in 1968,1973, 1978, and 1983—and follow each group through 1989. 
If we ignore the multiple bars at each age, the overall macro picture 
shows the well-known movement out of the labor market with age. The 
rate of exit accelerates as people move into their 60s, with particularly 
large decreases at ages 62 and 65. 22 There is also a smaller, but still 
substantial, drop of about five points at age 60, when many pension 
enrollees become eligible.
The micro picture, holding age constant, is equally interesting. For 
nearly every single age in figure 1.5, the male participation rates decline 
with each successive cohort. The decreases after age 60, especially at 
age 62, are particularly large. This is the well-documented movement 
toward earlier retirement over time.
20 
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The macro scenario for women is similar, as seen in figure 1.6. Fewer 
women work at older ages. But the micro story—the record over time—is 
different. Successive cohorts are not retiring earlier. The pattern is much 
more irregular, and for many ages participation rates are on the rise.
Although the movement toward earlier retirement for men is most 
dramatic after age 60, it is by no means confined to those ages. Figure 
1.7 charts the absolute and percentage declines in the participation rates 
of men between 1968 and 1989, for each age between 55 and 70. The 
largest absolute declines are indeed found between ages 62 and 65, which 
certainly suggests a role for Social Security in this drama. 23 But in 
percentage terms, the size of the declines stays high after age 65—the 
age at which the Social Security reward for continued work decreases 
dramatically, as we will see below. The participation rate for men ag 
ed 62 in 1989 was a third lower than it was for men that age only two 
decades earlier. But at ages 65 and 68 it was over 40 percent below 
the 1968 figures.
Figure 1.7 also shows that the decrease in labor force activity starts 
long before eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits. The 
declines are substantial at age 60 (where a 17 percent decline in par 
ticipation rates over these two decades is observed) and even at age 
55 (where the decline is 9 percent).
The summary story, then, is one of a significant decline over time 
in the labor force participation of older men and a relative decline for 
older women, when compared to patterns of younger women. 24 At 
several ages important for Social Security and pension eligibility, the 
declines are particularly large. Accompanying these statistics, however, 
are several other interesting and relevant trends.
Trends in Part-Time Employment
Not only are older Americans retiring earlier than they used to, but 
those who remain employed are more likely to be working part time. 
The proportion working part time (fewer than 35 hours per week) in 
creases dramatically at age 65. Table 1.4 shows the distribution for per 
sons at work in nonagricultural industries during 1989.
24 
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Figure 1.7
Decrease in Male Labor Force Participation Rates 
1968-1989, by Age
Absolute Decline 
(percentage points)
Percentage
Decline
(percent)
H——h
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SOURCE: Department of Labor unpublished statistics.
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There is very little difference here between men aged 25-44 and those 
aged 45-64. Part-time work is rare. Only about 6 percent are employed 
part time and half of those are doing so involuntarily. But at age 65, 
the proportion working part time rises from 6 to 48 percent, and almost 
all of it is voluntary. Among the women, part-time work is more com 
mon, but the age pattern is the same—about 20 percent of those under 
age 65 (most of them volunteers) and almost 60 percent of those 65 
and over. 25
Over the past two decades, there has been only a modest increase 
in the proportion of the total workforce employed part time. As can 
be seen in figure 1.8, part-time workers (voluntary and for economic 
reasons) represented about 15 percent of the employed population in 
the late 1960s, when these statistics began. By 1989, the percentage 
had risen by only three points. When one looks only at the voluntary 
part time, there is even less trend, from 12 (in 1967) to 14 percent (in 
1989) of those at work. Among the elderly, on the other hand, there 
has been significant growth in part-time employment (figures 1.9 and 
1.10). The proportion of men 65 and over working fewer than 35 hours 
per week has increased from 35 to 48 percent over the past 20 years, 
an increase of nearly a third. Among older women, the proportion has 
risen from 50 to 58 percent. In both cases, almost all of the increase 
has occurred among those working reduced hours voluntarily.
Despite a fairly constant percentage of part-time work in the economy 
as a whole, then, the significance of voluntarily reduced hours has grown 
among older workers. In our empirical work below, we will pay par 
ticular attention to the importance of part-time work, since this is one 
logical way for individuals to ease out of the labor force. We will see 
that it is, in fact, a popular route of labor force withdrawal, most often 
on a new job for wage and salary workers, and most often on the career 
job for the self-employed. These transitions are ignored in labor force 
participation statistics and overlooked in studies that treat the retire 
ment decision as dichotomous.
Table 1.4
Full-Time and Part-Time Status
Persons at Work in Nonagricultural Industries, 1989
(horizontal percentage)
Group
Age
Men
25-44
45-64
65 +
Women
25-44 
45-64 
65 +
SOURCE:
Total at work
(000)
32,450
15,466
1,582
26,459 
12,509 
1,232
Employment and Earnings (January 1990, table 33).
Employed
full time
95%
93%
52%
79% 
76% 
41%
Part time for
economic reasons
3%
3%
4%
5% 
5% 
5%
Voluntary
part time
2%
4%
44%
17% 
19%
53%
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Trends in Self-Employment
Older workers are also disproportionately represented among the self- 
employed. As shown in figures 1.11 and 1.12, the proportion of 
nonagricultural workers who are self-employed rises monotonically with 
age—from 1 percent (age 16-19) to 24 percent (65+) for men, and 
from 1 to 14 percent for women. In both groups, there is a large discon 
tinuous jump between the last two age categories. Men and women ag 
ed 65 and over are 50 percent more likely to be self-employed than 
are workers aged 55-64, and almost three times as likely as the general 
population.
According to Eugene Decker (1984), the number of the nonagricultural 
self-employed has increased every year since 1970, rising by 45 per 
cent between 1970 and 1983. At the same time, agricultural self- 
employment has been relatively constant, resulting in a steady increase 
in the total number of self-employed. David Blau (1987) argued that 
these official statistics underestimate the size of the self-employed 
population.
Beginning in 1967, the Census Bureau reclassified incorporated self- 
employed workers as wage and salary workers, since technically they 
were employed by their companies, not by themselves. According to 
Blau, they are much more like the self-employed than they are like other 
wage and salary workers. Using data published sporadically in the 
Monthly Labor Review, he pieced together an adjusted series and found 
that the proportion of men self-employed has risen from a low of about 
10 percent in the early 1970s to near 12 percent by 1982. Over the same 
time period, the female self-employment rate increased from 5 to 7 per 
cent. His empirical work suggested that this recent trend is partially 
due to changes in tax laws and Social Security retirement benefits.
New data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation con 
firm that the undercount is substantial. Sheldon Haber, Enrique Lamas, 
and Jules Lichtenstein (1987) included the incorporated self-employed 
and those who report self-employment as a secondary activity, and 
estimated that the percentage of workers who owned businesses was 
60 to 75 percent higher than the official self-employed statistics.
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Figure 1.11
Percent Self-Employed Men 
in Nonagricultural Industries, by Age, 1989
20-- ^1
o --^^Lr'B|AH|AK|_IH|flHflK)-IH^
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Age 
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings (January 1990, table, 23).
Figure 1.12
Percent Self-Employed 
3Q Women in Nonagricultural Industries, by Age, 1989
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Age 
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings (January 1990, table 23).
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The high incidence of self-employment among older workers could 
represent a cohort effect—the fact that these men and women began 
their employment experiences at a time when self-employment was more 
common than it is today. But this would hardly explain the discrepan 
cy between the last two groups, born within a decade of each other. 
This difference must be due to two other explanations: self-employed 
may retire later than others, or some wage and salary workers may turn 
to self-employment late in life as an avenue of partial or phased retire 
ment. Joseph Quinn (1980, 1981) found some evidence for both of these 
hypotheses in some early cross-sectional work with the Retirement 
History Study. Victor Fuchs (1982), using three waves of RHS data, 
confirmed them both. With the full 10 years of data now available, we 
will analyze the behavior of wage and salary and self-employed workers 
separately, and show that their retirement patterns are very different 
indeed.
The Importance of Career Jobs
Recent research has shown that most American men spend a con 
siderable proportion of their work lives on long-term career jobs. This 
is true despite the fact that the median job tenure in the United States 
is quite short (3.6 years in 1978, according to Robert Hall [1982]) and 
completed job tenure of jobs ending at any given time is also very modest 
(3.9 and 2.8 years for whites and nonwhites in the early 1970s, accord 
ing to George Akerlof and Brian Main [1981]). Because our research 
focuses on exit patterns from career jobs, it is important that we establish 
the importance of the career phenomenon and understand and explain 
the seeming contradictions above.
Research on job tenure is complicated by two issues—the distinction 
between current and eventual tenure and the difference between the 
average job and the average person on a job. The first is straightfor 
ward. Tenure on a current job is, by definition, incomplete and will 
eventually be longer than it now is. For example, a young person who 
has been in the labor market for only five years could have at most
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five years of tenure on the job, even if lifetime employment were the 
rule. The fact that there are many young workers in the labor market 
is largely responsible for Hall's median tenure of less than four years. 
When he looked at the current tenure of older workers (aged 55 and 
older), he found that one-third of them were in jobs of at least 20 years 
duration.
But even this figure is misleading. Some of these workers may have 
recently left jobs of longer duration. When we look at the longest (as 
opposed to the current) job of our Retirement History Study sample 
(aged 58-63 in 1969), we find that over half of the men and over a 
quarter of the women had a job that lasted at least 20 years. As seen 
in table 1.5, nearly a third of the men had held, or were then holding, 
jobs of 30 or more years duration, and nearly 80 percent had at least 
10 years experience on their longest job.
Even these estimates are lower bounds, since a few of these older 
workers were still employed on their longest jobs, therefore adding to 
tenure when they disappeared from the sample or when the surveys ended 
in 1979. Hall uses statistical techniques to forecast the eventual tenure 
of his sample of men employed in 1978, and estimates that about half 
of those aged 40 or more were on jobs that would last at least 20 years.
With later data from the 1979 Current Population Survey, John Ad- 
dison and Alberto Castro (1987) confirmed Hall's findings that many 
workers enjoy long-term employment—20 or more years with the same 
firm. They also found that this is more likely to be true among union 
than among nonunion employees.
With some new data from a supplement to the 1987 Current Popula 
tion Survey, Max Carey (1988) estimated occupational tenure for the 
American workforce. This is defined as cumulative years in an occupa 
tion, regardless of changes of employers or other interruptions, and 
therefore is not directly comparable to the estimates above. Carey found 
that current median occupational tenure for older male workers ranged 
from 20 years for those aged 50-54 to 31 years for those 70 and over. 
There was link between this and tenure with a specific employer. Of 
those with occupational tenure of 25 years or more, nearly half had
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Table 1.5 
Job Tenure on Longest Job
Number
RHS sample in 1969
-those without longest job data
Those with longest job data
Tenure on longest job
0-4 years
5-9 years
10-19 years
20-29 years
30-39 years
40 or more years
Labor force status in 1969
Not employed
Employed on longest job
Employed on another job
Men
8,131
-313
7,818
12%
10%
23%
24%
18%
13%
100%
19%
63%
18%
100%
Women
3,021
-353
2,668
29%
15%
27%
17%
6%
5%
100%
39%
50%
11%
100%
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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more than 25 years of tenure with their current employer and another 
quarter had 10 to 24 years.
Akerlof and Main (1981) cleared up another source of confusion. 
Although the length of the average job is very short, the average 
employee is on a job of long duration. The problem is that the "average 
job" statistic counts each job equally, despite the fact that some last 
much longer than others. A tenure-weighted measure gives quite a dif 
ferent picture. 26
Akerlof and Main estimated the eventual completed tenure of per 
sons employed in 1963, 1966, 1968, and 1973, and then calculated the 
mean tenure over these persons. They found that the average completed 
tenure was long (about 17 or 18 years for men, and 11 or 12 years for 
women) and that it changed very little over the 10-year period under 
study. For those aged 56 through 59, the average duration of individuals' 
longest jobs was over 20 years.
A career job of long duration is an important phenomenon in America. 
The departure from this job is therefore a significant event. It is this 
departure that we have studied. We will see that while many workers 
do leave full-time work for full-time leisure—the traditional form of 
retirement—many others embark on new and different careers late in life.
Outline of the Book
In the next two chapters, we review the research of selected authors 
who have studied the determinants of the retirement decision. We begin 
with the research of the Social Security Administration during the late 
1930s and proceed to the present. We will see that both the research 
methodologies and the conclusions have changed considerably over time. 
The methodology has evolved from questionnaires that simply asked 
people why they retired when they did, to complex econometric models 
that draw deductions not from what people say but from what they do. 
The overwhelming dominance of health factors has given way to a more 
complex understanding of the financial environment in which retire 
ment decisions are made. The division between chapters 2 and 3 is
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chronological and therefore somewhat arbitrary. In the latter chapter, 
which begins in the early 1980s, we describe the current state-of-the- 
art in retirement research.
In chapter 4, we utilize a life-cycle model to look at factors earlier 
in a worker's career—long before retirement. If the economic incen 
tives embedded in our retirement systems affect labor supply behavior 
late in life, as considerable research suggests they do, then they may 
do so earlier in the work career as well. We discuss current research 
on the impact of pensions on labor mobility and conclude that pensions— 
and to some extent Social Security—are designed to make sure that 
workers do not stay on the job too long (the retirement issue), but also 
that they do not leave too early (the mobility issue).
Chapters 5 and 6 document how a sample of older American workers 
actually chose to withdraw from their career jobs. We find interesting 
and diverse patterns. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the relatively 
slim literature on partial retirement and then describes the actual exit 
patterns of our sample. Chapter 6 discusses some simple correlates of 
the transitions observed and compares the new jobs with the career jobs 
of those who changed employment late in life.
A major theme of this book is that the public policy decisions that 
society has made in constructing our Social Security and employer pen 
sion systems affect work behavior throughout the life cycle—before, 
during, and after retirement. The organization of the book can be viewed 
in this way. After the introductory chapter, we focus on the retirement 
decision—the transition from the career job. This is when the interac 
tions between retirement income programs and labor supply decisions 
are most obvious. This is also the topic of the bulk of the research. 
We then look earlier—prior to retirement—and ask how these financial 
incentives might influence younger workers. Finally we discuss the end 
of the life cycle—work after retirement and second careers. In the final 
chapter, we summarize what we have learned and look ahead to what 
we might expect in the future.
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NOTES
1. Similar changes in the age distribution will be occurring in most other OECD nations as well 
(OECD 1988, chapter 2 and tables A.I and A.2).
These forecasts use baseline mortality forecasts, in which increases in life expectancy are assumed 
to be modest compared to those over the past decade. When more optimistic, low mortality assump 
tions are used (an additional 10 years of life expectancy at age 60 by the year 2030), the growth 
of the proportion over 64 is much more dramatic; for example it climbs to 29 percent of the U.S. 
population by 2050 (ibid., table 7).
With a slight lag, the proportion aged 80 and above will increase significantly, from less than 
3 percent of the population today to 6 percent by 2050 (and to 16 percent under the low mortality 
assumption (ibid.)).
These long-range population projections are very sensitive to the assumptions behind them. 
Guralnick, Yanagishita, and Schneider (1989) argue that the baseline Census projections are overly 
pessimistic with respect to mortality. Assuming a decline in mortality of 2 percent per year, they 
project that a quarter of all Americans will be aged 65 and over by the year 2040, and that the 
number of those aged 85 and over will increase 10-fold.
2. The early retirement trend, especially among older men, is common throughout Western Europe 
and North America. See Mirkin (1987) and OECD (1988) for details and some analysis.
3. Mirkin (1987) argues that one motivation for the many early retirement schemes that exist 
in Western developed nations was to soak up the excess labor supply that developed during the 
stagflation of the 1970s. These plans have now become institutionalized, and will work against 
societal interests if labor markets turn around and workers are in short supply.
4. Much of the short-run problem was due to an error in the benefit calculation formula. As of 
1972, both the average monthly earnings (the input into the benefit calculation formula) and the 
formula itself were adjusting to inflation, which meant that the final benefits were overadjusted. 
This flaw was eliminated by the 1977 amendments. For more detail, see the U.S. General Ac 
counting Office report (1988). In addition to this problem, the 1970s were a decade of high 
unemployment and slow economic growth, both of which caused Social Security revenues to fall 
short of benefit payments.
5. In 1946, Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor under President Roosevelt and one of the ar 
chitects of the Social Security system, wrote "even with enlarged benefits to persons reaching 
retirement age in the next fifteen to twenty years, there would be ample funds (in the social security 
system) to meet all immediate payments out of immediate income. But by any proper actuarial 
estimate, there would be, in the end, an accumulated deficit. The reserves would not suffice to 
pay benefits when those now twenty became sixty-five and eligible for retirement. . . . Perhaps 
in 1980 it would be necessary for Congress to appropriate money to make up a deficit." (See 
Perkins 1946, p. 293.) Now that is a prediction!
6. These issues are discussed by Tobin (1988). A number of proposals for radical change in the 
Social Security system have emerged, and many are critiqued in a recent book of essays edited 
by Meyer (1987). Starr (1988) has also written on the appropriate mix of public and private pro 
vision of old-age income support, and Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (1989) have discussed some 
of the implications of privatization.
7. Parnes et al. (1985) have provided a detailed description and a selection of research findings 
from the NLS. An analogous volume for the RHS was edited by Irelan et al. (1976).
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8. This stage of life is growing because people are leaving their career jobs earlier and living 
longer than ever before. Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky (1986) report that the life expectancy 
of older Americans has been growing significantly. Between 1968 and 1980, for example, the 
life expectancy of men and women aged 65 has increased by between one and two months per 
year, mostly because of declines in cardiovascular mortality. Older people are living longer. What 
this means for work patterns is less clear, because there is some evidence that, even as life expec 
tancies increase, the health of the elderly is deteriorating. These two trends may well be related, 
if the clinical successes of modern medicine have been able to prolong the survival of the chronically 
ill. Yeas (1987) provides an excellent overview of these issues.
9. Ball (1988) has published an excellent and concise description of the fundamental principles 
and later developments of the American Social Security system.
10. See table 5 in the Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement, 1986 (Washington, 
D.C.: USGPO).
11. In 1970, after the boom decade, nearly a quarter of those aged 65 and over were living in 
poverty, compared to only 11 percent of those less than 65, and 13 percent overall. Following 
these large Social Security increases, the elderly poverty level declined and today is less than 
the overall rate (Quinn 1987).
12. In 1987, Social Security provided 32 percent of the money income of multiperson families 
with householders aged 65 and over, and 44 percent for individuals 65 and over living alone or 
with nonrelatives only (Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement, 1988, table 3.E3).
13. When the health insurance (Medicare) component is added, total (1989) OASDHI expenditures 
equal about 6 percent of GNP and over a quarter of total federal expenditures.
14. There are substantial differences in coverage by sex. In a study of new Social Security 
beneficiaries claiming benefits for the first time in 1982, Woods (1988) reported that only 27 
percent of the women were receiving a pension, compared to 53 percent of the men. When those 
expecting to receive benefits in the future and those covered for potential survivor benefits were 
included, the coverage rate rose to 44 percent for women—about three-quarters of the comparable 
rate for men. In addition, the median monthly pension amount received by women was only about 
half that received by men.
15. According to a recent study by Yeas and Grad (1987), about a quarter of the aged units (couples 
and single individuals) received private pension income and 14 percent received government 
employee pensions in 1984. These percentages will continue to grow as new cohorts continue 
to retire. In 1982, for example, about half of all new Social Security beneficiaries (56 percent 
of the married and 42 percent of the unmarried) also received pension benefits.
16. The number of active participants in plans exceeds the number of people with pension coverage, 
because the former double counts those with more than one pension plan.
17. Gustman and Steinmeier (1989c) estimate that about half of the increase in primary defined 
contribution coverage (between 1977 and 1985) is due to employment shifts toward the types 
of firms historically unlikely to offer defined benefit plans, rather than firms actually changing 
the type of plan they offer.
18. Both Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) and Moffitt (1984) have written on the nature and size 
of these intergenerational transfers.
19. In a comment on the Ransom and Sutch research, Moen (1987) disputed the assertion that 
the definition of labor force participation changed between 1880 and 1890. Moen's reading of 
the instructions to the Census enumerators at the time suggests that a key Ransom and Sutch quotation 
refers only to the occupations of children, not adults. He also claims that Ransom and Sutch
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arbitrarily excluded from the 1900 labor force those unemployed for more than six months, and 
that this is crucial for establishing a constant participation rate between 1870 and 1930. In a long 
response, Ransom and Sutch (1989) maintained that "[we] stand by our original (1900) estimate" 
[but] "are prepared to believe that the true labor force participation of men 60 and older was 
higher in 1870 and 1880 than the published census reported and higher than our benchmark estimate 
for 1900." Even if this is true, Ransom and Sutch have presented strong evidence that there was 
little change in the participation rates of older men between 1900 and 1937. What happened prior 
to that is of little relevance to our discussion.
20. Similar patterns are observed in most other OECD countries as well (OECD 1988).
21. A recent article by Shank (1988) documents the dramatic growth in female labor supply dur 
ing the postwar period. The participation rate for women aged 25 to 54 more than doubled, from 
about three in 10 in 1946 to more than seven in 10 today. Department of Labor projections estimate 
that this will rise to eight in 10 by the year 2000. The age pattern of participation for women 
has also changed, from the historical M-shape (reflecting withdrawal during childbearing years) 
to the inverted U-shape characteristic of male participation. Currently, about two-thirds of women 
aged 25-54 with children under 18 are in the labor force, as are more than half of those with 
children under age three.
22. The absolute drop in the labor force participation rate at age 62 increases from 12 to 14, 
and then to 15 percentage points as we consider the first three of these successive cohorts—each 
five years apart. At age 65, the drops are 14, 13, and 8 percent for these cohorts.
23. Of course, the absolute changes will start to decline at some age because the initial (1968) 
participation rates become so small. For example, only 30 percent of men aged 70 (and 25 per 
cent of those aged 72) were in the labor force in 1968. Even if none of the latter worked in 1989, 
the absolute decline would still be smaller than for those aged 63.
24. During the last two decades, the labor force participation rate of women aged 25-54 increas 
ed from 47 to 72 percent. For women 55-64, it was unchanged, and for those 65 and over it 
declined slightly. The combination of earlier retirement by men and steady participation by older 
women has significantly increased the female share of the older (55 and over) workforce, from 
two in 10 in 1950 to four in 10 today (Herz 1988).
25. See Herz (1988) for more detail on part-time and part-year work by women of different ages.
26. An analogy drawn from Bane and Ellwood (1986) may clarify the issue. Imagine a hospital 
with three beds, two dedicated to long-term care and one to overnight patients. Over a one-month 
period, each of the long-term beds has only one occupant, while the short-term bed has 30. Of 
the 32 total patients, 30 were admitted for only one day; hence, the average stay is very short. 
Yet, on any particular day during the month, two-thirds of the patients were on a spell of long- 
term hospitalization. The average patient on any day requires long-term care. From another perspec 
tive, of the 90 person-days of care during the month, 60 were long-term in nature.
-2- 
The Individual Retirement Decision
As the previous chapter has documented, dramatic changes have oc 
curred in the retirement patterns of older Americans during the past 
several decades. Work after age 65, once the norm, is now the excep 
tion. In 1950, the labor force participation rate of American men 65 
and over was near 50 percent. By 1980, it had dropped below 20 per 
cent, and currently only one of every six of these men is in the labor 
force. For women aged 65 and over, the participation rate has decreas 
ed slowly, from 11 to 9 percent over this same period.
Why have retirement patterns changed so much in recent years? Why 
don't older Americans work beyond age 65 anymore? Why do so many 
Americans claim Social Security benefits at age 62? l In this chapter 
we discuss these questions from an historical perspective, beginning 
in the postwar period, soon after the introduction of the Social Security 
system, and continuing up through the research of the late 1970s. The 
next chapter describes current econometric work in this area. We will 
see that over time the answers have changed as dramatically as the retire 
ment patterns being explained.
We are particularly interested in the role of Social Security and 
employer pensions in the individual retirement decision. What is the 
nature of the financial incentives embedded in these programs? Do they 
encourage or discourage work, and at what ages? To what extent do 
potential retirees respond to these incentives? How have the research 
conclusions changed over the years?
In the early days of research on these issues, financial incentives were 
rarely considered to be important determinants of the retirement deci 
sion. People were assumed to work until they had to quit—forced by 
deteriorating health, compulsory retirement, an unexpected layoff, or 
a change in personal circumstances that made continued employment
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difficult or impossible. Once they left work, they then turned to whatever 
retirement income sources were available—Social Security and, in some 
cases, employer pensions. But the thought that these retirement income 
sources might have induced the retirement behavior was largely dismiss 
ed. Voluntary retirements by able-bodied workers were thought to be 
rare.
Today, on the other hand, there is general agreement that Social 
Security and employer pensions do exert a significant influence on in 
dividual retirement decisions. Researchers have shown that substantial 
retirement incentives (or work disincentives) do exist for many older 
Americans and that workers respond as though they understand them. 
Disagreement remains on the magnitude of their influence, but all agree 
that they have some effect. Other factors, such as health status, job 
characteristics, and involuntary terminations are still considered to be 
important, but they are usually analyzed in conjunction with the finan 
cial tradeoffs faced by workers nearing retirement age.
This is an important and useful analytical transition. The incentives 
in the Social Security system and, to a lesser extent, employer pensions 
are subject to a greater degree of government influence than are the 
health status or the labor market experience (such as layoffs) of older 
workers. If the answers emerging from this new research are correct, 
then aggregate retirement trends are more responsive to public policy 
initiatives than we once thought.
There are at least two explanations for the changing views of retire 
ment scholars over the past 40 years. The first is that the actual reasons 
for retirement may have changed and researchers have simply been 
documenting this transition. Retirement incentives are undoubtedly more 
important now than they were several decades ago. As we saw in chapter 
1, our Social Security and pension systems are much larger than they 
used to be. Coverage and real benefits have grown over time, and so, 
it might be argued, has their influence.
On the other hand, the reasons for retirement may not have changed 
so much over time. Rather, what may be different is the ability of re 
searchers to ferret them out. Research methodologies have changed 
significantly. In the early days, retirees were simply asked in question-
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naires why they retired when they did. When the answers were tallied, 
analysts found that retirement incentives were rarely, if ever, mention 
ed, and concluded that they were unimportant. Modern economic 
research, on the other hand, pays much less attention to these subjec 
tive responses. We do not ask what retirees say, but rather what they 
do, and under what circumstances. This approach, with the extensive 
data sets and sophisticated statistical techniques that make it possible, 
tells a different story about the retirement decision. Those facing financial 
incentives to retire are more likely to do so, regardless of what they say. 
This revolution has been accompanied by new ways of modeling retire 
ment income. Economists now view Social Security and pension rights 
as assets or stocks of wealth rather than as annual flows. This change, 
along with a life-cycle view of decisionmaking, has shed new light on 
the choices that older workers face. There has been a timely marriage 
of modern economic theory, outstanding data sets, and improved 
statistical techniques. What has emerged is a new view of the retire 
ment decision. In this chapter, we first review the early research and 
see why retirement incentives received so little attention in the past. 
Even in these survey questionnaires, however, we find hints that we 
had missed part of the story or that the reasons for retirement were chang 
ing. We then describe a simple economic model of the retirement deci 
sion and turn to the beginnings of the modern literature that developed 
from it. We outline the nature of the financial incentives, as we now 
see them, and discuss the early econometric evidence that demonstrates 
their importance as determinants of individual retirement decisions.
The Early Literature
Social Security Administration Research
Much of the early research on the determinants of retirement behavior 
was done by analysts at the Social Security Administration and published 
in the Social Security Bulletin. 2 The earliest article, by Edna Wentworth 
(1945), was based on a survey of nearly 2,400 male old-age beneficiaries
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who received benefits in 1940 and were then interviewed during 194land 
1942. These men, among the earliest Social Security recipients, were 
asked, "Why did you quit working before you filed for benefits?" Well 
over half (53 to 60 percent in various cities) said they had been laid 
off by their employers. Of the remainder who reported a "voluntary" 
retirement (that is, not initiated by the employer), about a third claim 
ed they retired for reasons of' 'health.'' This category was broadly defin 
ed and included responses describing general fatigue and complaints 
about old age and the difficulty of work. (Of course, some of the in 
voluntary retirements, at the employer's behest, may have been prompt 
ed by the deteriorating health of the worker as well.) The important 
point is that fewer than 5 percent of the respondents seemed to have 
retired voluntarily while in good health. Wentworth concluded that "the 
fact that only 3-6 percent of the beneficiaries retired voluntarily in order 
to enjoy leisure is significant in evaluating the part old-age insurance 
benefits have played in influencing aged workers to leave the labor 
market."
A few years later, Margaret Stecker (1951) reported on the Went 
worth study and on three smaller surveys from the 1940s. She found 
that the overwhelming majority of Social Security beneficiaries left their 
last covered employment because they had lost their jobs or had had 
to quit for health reasons. Only 4 to 6 percent left because they "wanted 
to retire." She concluded that "most old people work as long as they 
can and retire only because they are forced to do so," and that "only 
a small proportion of old people leave the labor market for good unless 
they have to."
But decisions are made under constraints. Individuals who lose jobs 
can search for another, although, as we will see in chapter 6, they usually 
cannot find jobs that match their previous wage rates. Similarly, although 
some health conditions do absolutely preclude work, many others make 
it less desirable or more difficult, but not impossible. It is likely that 
the financial situation facing an older person who has been dismissed 
or fallen ill will influence the decision made. Stecker acknowledged 
this in discussing why people were so reluctant to retire. "The prin 
cipal reason that they want to continue working, however, is that without
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earnings they do not have resources enough to live at the level to which 
they are accustomed, or even to meet the cost of basic needs." She 
also noted that those whose retirement incomes were the lowest were 
the most likely to return to work after claiming benefits. Financial in 
centives may influence behavior even though the individuals attribute 
the decision to other factors.
In 1951, the Social Security Administration conducted the first large 
national survey of the retired beneficiary population. The results of over 
15,000 interviews confirmed earlier beliefs. Nearly 85 percent of the 
retired had either lost their last job or quit because they were unable 
to work. Fewer than 4 percent retired voluntarily in good health—an 
even lower percentage than in previous surveys. Most of those who 
quit or were dismissed for nonhealth reasons returned to the labor force. 
Sleeker (1955) again concluded that "voluntary quitting to enjoy a life 
of leisure is rare among old-age beneficiaries. Relatively few who are 
able to work choose retirement." As we will see, this is a far cry from 
the situation today.
In 1963, the Social Security Administration surveyed both beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries and included respondents as young as 62. Women 
had been eligible for reduced Social Security benefits at age 62 since 
1956, and men since 1961. For the first time, a trend toward more volun 
tary retirements was observed. Nearly two-thirds of the male wage and 
salary workers claimed that they had decided to retire, although more 
than half of these did so because of health.
Of the men who had retired in the previous five years, 19 percent 
of those aged 65 or over and 11 percent of those 62-64 said they did 
so because they preferred leisure (Palmore 1964). Twenty-two percent 
of the retired women surveyed claimed the same (Epstein and Murray 
1967). These numbers are much higher than the 4 to 6 percent observ 
ed earlier. Palmore stated that "although most men retire involuntarily— 
because of poor health . . . or because they have reached a compulsory 
retirement age—voluntary retirements are increasing." Epstein and Mur 
ray agreed that "there seem to be more and more aged men who are 
well enough to work and who might get some kind of job if they were 
interested, but who prefer the leisure of retirement."
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In the 1963 survey, the question on reasons for retirement listed eight 
reasons plus "other (specify)." None of the eight had anything to do 
with Social Security or pensions. This may have been responsible in 
part for the rare mention of financial incentives. Those still working 
were asked whether they expected to stop working or work less than 
they currently were, and if so, why. The answer space to this question 
was open-ended and no specific categories were suggested. Among the 
men who did plan to stop or work less, the most common reason given 
was "becoming eligible for retirement benefits." A third of the 
respondents gave this reason, and another 7 percent replied "to enjoy 
leisure" (Epstein and Murray 1967).
Here was an early indication that retirement income eligibility might 
influence a worker's plans. There was no discussion of what aspect of 
Social Security or the pension plan might be responsible. In discussing 
another finding, however, Palmore (1964) suggested that "the difference 
[in the retirement plans of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries] may be 
due to the fact that beneficiaries under age 72 have their benefit reduc 
ed by the earnings test . . . if they earn more than $1,200 per year." 
Here was an early hint of an issue that has center stage today.
A 1971 article by Virginia Reno utilized a new ongoing survey of 
recent Social Security recipients. Those not working were asked why 
they had left their last jobs. Nearly half (45 percent) said health, another 
27 percent gave job-related reasons, and 17 percent (the identical ag 
gregate percentage as in the 1963 survey mentioned above) said they 
wanted to retire. A mere 2 percent claimed the reason was eligibility 
for Social Security benefits or pension. It looked like eligibility was 
not very important.
But in another part of the survey, respondents were asked more struc 
tured questions about leaving their last jobs. In response to the direct 
inquiry, "did you leave your last job because you wanted to start get 
ting social security or a pension?" 31 percent said "yes." Perhaps 
eligibility was important, although not the primary reason. These 
responses suggest at least two conclusions: first, that there is some survey 
evidence that financial considerations may be significant, despite 
respondents' reluctance to mention them unless asked directly; and sec-
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ond, that the responses may depend on the form and nature of the ques 
tions asked, perhaps even of whether the questionnaire provides specific 
categories of answers or merely an open-ended answer blank.
Reno (1971) saw the importance of benefits in the retirement deci 
sion, and found that the proportion who wanted to retire increased direct 
ly with the size of their retirement benefits. She concluded that 
"... financial considerations often underlie the willingness with which 
men retire early," and that "the level of retirement benefit income had 
an important influence on the men's willingness to accept or initiate 
early retirement."
More recently, Michael Packard and Virginia Reno (1989) reported 
on the results of a 1982 survey of new retired-worker beneficiaries. 
Those no longer working (and not self-employed on their last job) were 
asked which of a list of factors was the most important reason for leav 
ing their last jobs. The answers suggested that there were more volun 
tary than involuntary retirements. The proportion retiring voluntarily 
rose with the age of departure from the job, and was much higher for 
those eligible for a pension. Overall, about one-third (40 percent of the 
men and 24 percent of the women) said they just wanted to retire. This 
was far more than the quarter who named health. 3 Again, almost no 
one mentioned eligibility for Social Security or pension benefits as the 
primary motivation.
Sally Sherman (1985) compared the results of the 1968 and 1982 
surveys for nonemployed men aged 62-64, and aggregated the answers 
into three categories: employer-initiated, health problems, and employee- 
initiated. The proportion of retirements that were employer-initiated 
(lost job or [rarely] compulsory retirement) remained the same over 
these 14 years—17 percent. The proportion due to health and employee 
initiation reversed. Health dropped from 54 to 29 percent, and the 
number of people claiming a desire to retire or (rarely) to receive retire 
ment benefits rose from 29 to 54 percent. This is consistent with a trend 
toward more voluntary retirements.
Several authors have noted, however, that the importance of health 
generally drops with the age of benefit receipt, at least through age 65. 
In the 1982 survey, for example, nearly one-third of the men first claim-
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ing benefits at age 62 named health as the primary reason, compared 
to only a quarter of those who waited until 63 or 64, and 17 percent 
of those at 65. (There was an increase to 22 percent among the very 
small number of men who delayed receipt beyond age 65.) The pattern 
was less clear for women, although the 62-year-old beneficiaries were 
again the most likely to cite health (Sherman 1985).
Using the National Longitudinal Surveys of older men, Eric Kingson 
(1982) analyzed the health of "very early retirees"—those who per 
manently withdrew from the labor force before age 62. He found that 
the vast majority either had medically certified disabilities or reported 
health conditions that prevented or limited work. Health status was pro 
bably very important in their retirement decisions. Packard and Reno 
(1989) found that it was, for men at least, with a sample of very early 
retirees from the 1982 New Beneficiaries Survey. The proportion of 
men naming health as the primary retirement reason for leaving their 
last job declined from 35 percent among those who left before age 55, 
to 30 percent between ages 55 and 62, to 26 percent at age 62, and 
only 21 percent thereafter. It is essential to remember, however, that 
older Americans are an exceedingly diverse group, and that most 
generalizations, excluding this one, are potentially misleading. Our 
reading of the evidence on health is not that it is unimportant as a retire 
ment determinant, or that it ever was, but that it is less important than 
it once was and less important than it may appear in surveys featuring 
subjective retrospective reasons for retirement.
Since Sherman's and Packard and Reno's data included only those 
receiving Social Security checks, they were unable to compare the cir 
cumstances of those who could and those who could not claim benefits. 
This would be a much more robust test of the influence of retirement 
benefits, and this is the approach taken in current econometric research. 
In addition, none of these researchers was able to test explicitly which 
aspects of the Social Security and pension plans might have been im 
portant. Was it the size of the benefit, the ratio of benefits to recent 
earnings, or the earnings test? Insights into these issues had to await 
a major modeling change—from viewing these benefits as flows of in 
come to viewing them as assets or stocks of wealth.
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Other Early Research
Researchers outside the Social Security Administration also shed light 
on the reasons for the dramatic retirement trends underway. Peter Steiner 
and Robert Dorfman (1957) reported on a special 1952 Census Bureau 
survey of approximately 3,600 men and women aged 65 and over. 
Although the study emphasized economic status, there were several ques 
tions on the circumstances and reasons for retirement. Steiner and Dorf 
man found that three-quarters of the men retired voluntarily, but primari 
ly for health reasons. 4 All other reasons for voluntary retirement were 
of relatively minor importance. In particular, only a small proportion 
had been driven out of the labor force by retirement systems. The authors 
concluded that the main causes of labor force withdrawal were poor 
health and obsolescence of skills—a picture consistent with that painted 
by Social Security researchers at the time.
Clarence Long (1958) attempted to explain the decline in labor force 
participation by older workers in five Western industrialized countries, 
including the United States. He found little evidence that the trends were 
due to demographic changes, rising real earnings, declining physical 
productivity of the aged, increases in arbitrary discrimination (such as 
mandatory retirement provisions), or changes in technology. He sug 
gested that the influence of Social Security and pensions was marginal 
and that
. . . Social Security and pensions were far from being the 
main force (though they doubtless helped) in bringing about 
the withdrawal of elderly persons from the labor market. In 
deed, there is evidence that elderly persons desire to work 
as late in life as their health permits, mainly because old age 
benefits rarely take the place of earned income even when 
they are comparatively generous.
The implication here is that retirement benefits could be influential, but 
that they were too small at the time to induce labor force withdrawal. 
Note that retirement rights were being viewed as annual flows, an ap 
proach that can lead to conclusions quite different from those to follow.
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To what did Long attribute the decline in participation rates? He claim 
ed that the older men were being displaced by better-trained women 
who would work for lower wages. The low educational attainment of 
the older generation put them at a competitive disadvantage against young 
and middle-aged women. Long's answer was on the demand side of 
the market.
Margaret Gordon (1963) later reported on an international study of 
18 developed nations. She noted that participation rates among older 
men had been declining for decades in all the countries studied. The 
trend accelerated during recessions and depressions and slowed or re 
versed briefly during wars, but the overall declining pattern was clear. 
She acknowledged that a large proportion of the retired attributed the 
decision to "ill health," but noted that that phrase could encompass 
a wide variety of conditions, many of which did not preclude work. 
Might not the decisions of those in poor health depend on the availability 
of retirement income sources? She concluded that
[I]t seems reasonable to assume that, in a substantial pro 
portion of cases in which ill health is the ultimate reason for 
retirement, prospective retirement income will have an im 
portant influence on the timing of the decision to retire. There 
is scattered evidence . . . that significant numbers of elderly 
keep postponing the decision to retire, despite slow physical 
deterioration, at least partly because of the prospect of serious 
ly inadequate retirement income.
Gordon found a significant negative correlation between the labor 
force participation rate of men over 64 and the ratio of average old- 
age, survivors, and disability benefits to average earnings. This is a 
rough aggregate replacement rate. She also found participation rates 
lower the longer the country had had an old-age benefit program and 
concluded that
. . . there is considerable evidence to suggest that prospec 
tive retirement income has a highly important influence on 
attitudes toward retirement. . . . The findings of the present 
study suggest that, as benefit levels are improved, a rising 
proportion of elderly people will be attracted by the prospect
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of retirement. ... As old-age benefits increase, the propor 
tion of elderly persons who choose to retire will no doubt 
gradually increase.
Truer words were never spoken.
The Gordon article is important for several reasons. She expressed 
skepticism in taking the "health" answers to retirement questions at 
face value. At minimum, health status is likely to interact with other 
factors, such as retirement income alternatives. In addition, she presented 
a supply-side explanation for the retirement trends: older workers were 
choosing to retire, given the alternatives they faced, rather than being 
forced out and then turning to whatever retirement income sources were 
available. And finally, in discussing Great Britain, Gordon included 
a long description of the impact on an individual's pension benefit of 
delaying retirement from age 65 to 70. She pointed out that the increase 
in the annual amount was insufficient to compensate for the five years 
of benefits foregone. This was an early preview of an issue that dominates 
much of the retirement literature today.
A few years later, Michael Brennan, Philip Taft, and Mark Schupack 
(1967) published a study titled The Economics of Age. They studied 
employment patterns by detailed occupational and age groups. Their 
explanation of declining elderly labor force participation rates was one 
of geographical and job immobility. Older workers, they claimed, found 
the demand for their services declining because of their decreasing pro 
ductivity, greater supplementary employment costs (such as pension con 
tributions and workers' compensation), and the substitution of female 
labor. Once displaced, older workers found it difficult to become 
reemployed, and eventually left the labor force. This prospect, which 
was really disguised unemployment, was the best among a very poor 
set of alternatives.
This is another demand-side argument. Individuals work as long as 
they can, until they are forced out. The authors dismissed the impor 
tance of Social Security and pensions in the decision, arguing that "retire 
ment income ... is simply not large enough relative to earned income 
to make voluntary retirement with sufficient income feasible."
Finally, in 1969, Richard Barfield and James Morgan published a 
research volume that focused specifically on the early retirement exper-
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ience. They noted the previous increases in the coverage and benefit 
levels provided by Social Security and employer pensions and the 
liberalized early retirement benefits negotiated by the United Auto 
Workers in 1964. They attempted to find the factors that influenced 
the decision to retire voluntarily; that is, prior to mandatory retirement 
age and the onset of debilitating health conditions. They gathered data 
on a national representative sample and on a random sample of auto 
workers around 60 years old. The major finding of their study was that 
"financial factors—primarily expected retirement income—are of prin 
cipal importance in the retirement decision." Subjective health status, 
age, and attitudinal variables were also important, but financial incen 
tives were key.
With a few exceptions, then, research through the 1960s described 
a drama in which Social Security and pension benefits played relative 
ly minor roles. Many retirements were employer-initiated, and therefore 
involuntary. Of the voluntary departures, most seemed to be due to health 
problems. At least this is how retirees described their decisions when 
asked. Researchers had detected an increase in the number of truly volun 
tary retirements by healthy people who simply preferred more leisure. 
But these were still the minority, probably less than 20 percent. Some 
analysts suspected that the availability of retirement income sources was 
more important than the surveys suggested, but hard empirical evidence 
was scarce.
Circumstantial evidence, however, was abundant. Although official 
statistics showed labor force participation rates for older men declin 
ing since at least 1890, the size of the decline was much larger after 
than before the development of the Social Security system. During the 
60 years between 1890 and 1950, the labor force participation rate for 
men 65 and over dropped about a third, from 68 to 46 percent. Over 
the next 24 years, as Social Security coverage grew from 18 to 67 per 
cent of the labor force (and private pension coverage grew as well), 
the participation rate dropped by half (Campbell and Campbell 1976). 5
In addition to this aggregate longitudinal evidence, cross-sectional 
analyses of participation rates by age showed dramatic declines at age 
65, the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits. The size of the
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age-65 effect grew over time, and another one appeared at age 62, after 
the introduction of reduced Social Security benefits (Ippolito 1990). In 
1970, the male participation rate dropped by 7 percentage points be 
tween ages 61 and 62 and by nearly 25 points at age 65. By the 
mid-1970s, nearly half of all eligible workers aged 62 to 64 claimed 
early Social Security retirement benefits.
But other things were changing as well. Health status, compulsory 
retirement, and unexpected layoffs remained important. Pension plan 
coverage was on the rise. Large real increases in Social Security benefits 
were being legislated. The economy recovered from the recessions of 
the 1950s, enjoyed the economic boom of the late 1960s, and then 
slumped into the stagflation of the 1970s. The research problem clear 
ly required empirical techniques that could disaggregate these various 
determinants and isolate their individual effects.
During this same time, two outstanding data sets were being 
developed. The Department of Labor was funding the National 
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), one part of which would follow nearly 
5,000 men aged 45-59 for 17 years—from 1966 until 1983. At the same 
time, the Social Security Administration was planning the Retirement 
History Study (RHS), a 10-year longitudinal study of the retirement 
process. Over 11,000 respondents aged 58-63 would be interviewed 
in 1969, and then again every two years until 1979. These two sources 
would provide the testing ground for new theories about the nature of 
the retirement decision.
Finally, economists were beginning to take a closer look at the choices 
that older Americans faced. They realized that the incentives embed 
ded in retirement plans were very complicated and that simple, one- 
period models were inadequate to describe the options available. 
Multiperiod life-cycle models were developed and a new view of the 
retirement decision emerged.
Economic Models of the Retirement Decision
The Social Security Act is a very complicated piece of legislation. 
To describe it in all its detail would be neither enjoyable nor productive.
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The goal of a model is to highlight essential details—those attributes 
that have an important impact on the behavior under study—and to ig 
nore others. This yields a cleaner and more understandable description 
of the program, though admittedly one missing much of the rich in 
stitutional detail.
The simplest economic models of Social Security treat it as a one- 
period tax and transfer program. Individuals maximize utility, which 
depends on leisure (L) and on the consumption of a composite good 
(X), which is purchased with income. A person enters the period with 
a stock of wealth (A) and faces an exogenously determined hourly wage 
rate (w). If we ignore income taxes and assume that the choice of hours 
of work is entirely up to the worker, the task, as seen in figure 2.1, 
is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint,
PX=A+w(T-L)
where P is the price of the composite good, T is the length of the time 
period, and (T-L) is hours worked.
Figure 2.1 
Labor-Leisure Choice, Without Social Security System
Income
E
Hours of Leisure (L) 
Hours of Work
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Graphically, the individual chooses the point (Zj) on the linear budget
constraint (AE) that is tangent to the highest indifference curve (Uj).
A simple manipulation of the budget constraint yields a useful insight:
A+wT=PX+wL.
The term [A+wT] is "full income"—the amount someone would earn 
by working the entire T hours. The sum is entirely exogenous in this 
model, since it depends on three exogenous quantities: assets, the wage 
rate, and the number of hours in the time period. It is not a function 
of the current labor-leisure choice. This "full income" is then "spent" 
on the two "goods"available: X , which costs P per unit, and L (hours 
of leisure), which costs w per hour—the opportunity cost of not work 
ing. A proportional income tax would rotate the budget constraint down 
(the equivalent of a decrease in the wage rate); a progressive tax would 
make it concave.
How does the introduction of Social Security change this model? Prior 
to the age of eligibility for benefits, Social Security merely taxes wages 
up to some maximum amount—$51,300 in 1990. Individuals earning 
beyond that amount have their full incomes reduced by the maximum 
contributions, but their marginal wage rates are unchanged. They re 
spond as they would to any wealth loss—they purchase fewer of all nor 
mal goods, including hours of leisure. In other words, they should work 
more. But someone earning less than the maximum taxable amount faces 
a second effect. The marginal after-tax wage rate is now lower because 
of the Social Security contribution. Since this is the opportunity cost 
(the price) of leisure, leisure is now less expensive than it was. This 
"substitution effect" increases the demand for leisure. The income (or 
wealth) effect says work more because you are poorer (by the amount 
of the Social Security tax) than you were. But the substitution effect 
says work less, since leisure is on sale. Whether the income or the 
substitution effect dominates is an empirical question. From a theoretical 
point of view, the net effect is ambiguous.
When the individual becomes eligible for retirement benefits (B) at 
age 62, the analysis changes again. First, the zero-hours intercept of 
the budget constraint rises from [A] to [A+B], as seen in figure 2.2.
56 The Individual Retirement Decision
Income
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Figure 2.2
Labor-Leisure Choice,
With Social Security System
Showing Reduced Labor Supply
O
T
Hours of Leisure (L) 
Hours of Work
T 
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In addition, the marginal wage rate declines because Social Security 
reduces benefits by $1 for every $2 of earnings after an exempt amount. 6 
In this one-period model, this is identical to an additional tax of 50 per 
cent. If we ignore Social Security contributions and income taxes, the 
budget constraint is parallel to the original as long as earnings are less 
than the exempt amount and then has one-half the slope (along CD, 
reflecting the one-half benefit reduction rate) until it rejoins the original 
budget constraint at D. Beyond this point the individual is working too 
many Hours to be able to collect any Social Security benefits.
The effect of these changes on the labor supply of the individual is 
unambiguous—the person should work the same amount or less. Because 
of the potential benefit (B), the individual is richer, and therefore can buy
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more of all normal goods including leisure. This is the income effect. 
In addition, the price of leisure has been reduced in that range (CD) 
where the 50 percent Social Security benefit reduction rate is in effect. 
The reward to work (the opportunity cost of not working) is less than 
it used to be. The substitution effect implies that the individual will pur 
chase more of the good (leisure), whose relative price has decreased. 
The income and substitution effects work together. The Social Securi 
ty incentives after eligibility will reduce hours of work, unless the in 
dividual was already retired (working 0 hours) or continues to work 
along DE and declines Social Security benefits altogether.
Some people who used to work at Z l will find that the tangency be 
tween the new budget constraint and their highest indifference curve 
(U2) is now along CD; say, at Z2 in figure 2.2. The combination of 
the income guarantee (B) and the dramatically reduced marginal wage 
rate (the reward for work) has reduced their labor supply. For others, 
the highest indifference curve may now intersect at Z3—zero hours of 
work, as depicted in figure 2.3. These workers have been induced to 
retire by the Social Security incentives.
This simple one-period analysis was popular in the early retirement 
research by economists, which is reviewed below. 7 But it has a fatal 
flaw. It ignores an essential ingredient in the Social Security system. 
Although Social Security does resemble a tax and transfer system in 
many ways, it also has some features of a savings program. In par 
ticular, the benefits that one eventually receives depend upon the earn 
ings (and therefore the contributions) made earlier. Social Security taxes 
today increase benefits tomorrow. And delaying retirement after the 
age of eligibility does the same. This changes the analysis in fundamental 
ways that cannot be seen in a one-period framework.
A life-cycle model of work and consumption behavior differs from 
a one-period model in several essential ways. Decisions made in any 
one period depend on past and present circumstances and on expecta 
tions about the future. People can transfer purchasing power over time— 
consuming income before it is earned by borrowing, or saving it for 
later consumption by lending. In the simplest models, with no uncer 
tainty, individuals are assumed to foresee what lies ahead—future wage 
and interest rates, future Social Security rules, and the lengths of their 
lifetimes.
58 The Individual Retirement Decision
Figure 2.3
Labor-Leisure Choice,
With Social Security System
Showing Complete Retirement
A+B
O
T
Hours of Leisure (L) 
Hours of Work
T 
O
From a life-cycle perspective, Social Security contributions are not 
just taxes. They are taxes today, but they generate larger benefits in 
the future. The net impact on one's lifetime wealth may be positive, 
negative, or zero, depending on whether the future increments exceed 
the taxes. If the rules are actuarially fair or neutral (the present dis 
counted values of the benefits and taxes are equal), then the introduc 
tion of the Social Security system should have no effect at all on labor 
supply behavior. It is merely a mandatory savings program that one 
could offset by lending and borrowing.
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Considerable research, however, suggests that for all the cohorts that 
have retired thus far, the Social Security system has not been actuarial- 
ly fair. Rather, benefits have vastly exceeded the amounts that prudent 
investment of the contributions would have provided. 8 What looked like 
an earnings tax was really an earnings subsidy, since a dollar of con 
tribution withheld provided well more than a dollar (in present discounted 
value terms) of future benefits. Rather than lowering the slope of the 
budget constraint (the wage rate) at younger ages, the Social Security 
rules had actually raised it.
The impact of the life-cycle view is even more dramatic once the age 
of eligibility for Social Security benefits (age 62) is reached. In figure 
2.2, we implicitly assumed that benefits foregone by those earning 
beyond the exempt amount were lost forever. But this is not true for 
two important reasons.
Social Security benefits are based on one's average indexed monthly 
earnings (AIME), a complicated function of covered earnings over the 
lifetime. 9 Another year of earnings will usually raise this average and 
result in higher Social Security benefits in the future. In addition to the 
benefit recalculation, there is also an actuarial adjustment that can have 
dramatic effects. Between the ages of 62 and 65, benefits are reduced 
by five-ninths of 1 percent for each month prior to age 65 that one claims 
benefits. This implies a 6.67 percent reduction for each year of early 
retirement, or a 20 percent reduction for retiring the maximum three 
years early. Viewed from the other end, the 80 percent benefit at age 
62, the rules provide a bonus—a delayed retirement credit—for each 
additional year of work between the ages of 62 and 65. (An adjustment 
is actually made for any month in which benefits are reduced or foregone, 
and differs slightly depending on whether one has yet claimed benefits 
at all (Clark and Gohmann 1983).) The adjustment, which applies to 
all future benefits, is compensation for claiming fewer checks.
The choice of whether to work another year after age 62 is now more 
complicated. With respect to Social Security, it is not simply a choice 
between a benefit of Bj if one retires and 0 if one does not. Rather, 
it is a choice between one stream of benefits (B p Bj, Bj . . . ) begin 
ning now and another stream (0, B2 , B2 . . . ) beginning in a year, with
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B2 larger than Bj. Which of these streams is worth more? Adding the 
benefits is inappropriate, since they arrive at different times. What must 
be compared is the present discounted value of the streams, where
1 , and
PDV2 =0+B2/(l+r)+B2/(l+r)2 +B2/(l+r)3 . . . 
= £ B2/(l+r)<.
The present discounted value of a stream of future payments is merely 
the stock of funds today that, if invested at interest rate r, could yield 
the stream in question. Although B2 exceeds Bj (annual benefits are 
higher if you work another year), PDV2 may or may not exceed PDVj 
because the first B2 is 0.
Note that Social Security rights, which guarantee a stream of income 
in the future, are viewed here as an asset or a type of wealth, not as 
a monthly benefit. A present discounted value is a stock, like a savings 
account, not a flow, like a monthly salary. The value of this asset can 
rise or fall as one delays retirement, depending on the extent of the benefit 
recalculation and the actuarial adjustment. This modest change of 
framework, from a flow to a stock, has dramatic implications for one's 
view of the financial incentives embedded in the Social Security 
legislation.
Suppose, for example, that the present discounted values above are 
equal. This is an actuarially fair or age-neutral system, since the asset 
value is not affected by the timing of retirement. In this case, the earn 
ings test, which is still on the books, has in fact disappeared! The benefit 
reduction rate of 50 percent is really zero. The reason is that benefits 
foregone today because of additional work are not lost, as they appear 
to be in a one-period model, but rather are delayed and returned to the 
recipient in the form of higher Social Security checks in the future.
Suppose now that PDV2 exceeds PDVj; that is, that the future in 
crements are more than sufficient, in an actuarial sense, to compensate 
for the initial benefits lost. In this case, not only are there no earnings 
test and no benefit reduction rate, but the system actually provides an 
earnings subsidy. The true compensation for the year equals the
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paychecksp/Ms the increment to Social Security wealth that accrues from 
the additional work.
On the other hand, if PDV2 is less than PDVj, future increments are 
insufficient to compensate for the loss in benefits today. Additional work 
does provide a paycheck, but it also reduces the value of Social Securi 
ty rights by the loss in present discounted value. (The loss is less than 
the full amount of benefits foregone (B t ), because future benefits do 
increase.) While one pocket is being filled, the other is being picked. 
In this scenario, the Social Security system has imposed a pay cut—a 
surreptitious one, but a pay cut nonetheless.
As we will see, one topic of debate is over which scenario most ac 
curately describes the Social Security system for workers between the 
ages of 62 and 65. But everyone agrees that after age 65, the last scenario 
is the appropriate one. The reason is that at age 65, the delayed retire 
ment credit drops from 6.67 percent to only 3 percent per year of delay. 
This 3 percent annual increment is inadequate to compensate for the 
benefits foregone. Therefore, those who work beyond age 65 do so at 
a true wage rate that is lower than they earned the year before.
Defined-benefit pension programs are similar to Social Security. They 
promise a stream of benefits in the future, the size of which is usually 
a function of one's work history. Prior to eligibility and after vesting, 
additional years of work add to the asset value of the pension rights. 
One's true compensation exceeds the paycheck by the increment to pen 
sion wealth. But after eligibility, an employee who remains on the job 
forgoes pension benefits. Whether pension wealth rises or falls depends 
on the benefit calculation rules of the particular pension plan.
Pensions are much more difficult to study than Social Security. 
Although the Social Security system is complicated, there is only one 
system, and the details are known to the researcher. In contrast, there 
are hundreds of thousands of employer pension plans, each with its own 
rules and regulations, and these are often not known to the analyst.
Larry Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) have studied the details of 
nearly 1,200 plans from the Department of Labor's Level of Benefits 
Survey and found a wide variety of incentives. They define the accrual 
rate as the change in pension wealth following an additional year of
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work divided by earnings for that year. Positive accrual rates imply 
a wage subsidy and negative ones, a wage tax. They find considerable 
evidence that future pension increments are often inadequate to com 
pensate for current benefits foregone. They conclude that:
Typical plan provisions provide a strong incentive for retire 
ment after the age of plan normal retirement, and a large 
portion of plans provide a strong incentive for retirement after 
the age of early retirement. . . . For example, while the 
average plan may provide reduced but still positive accrual 
after the age of early retirement, for a large proportion of 
plans the accrual rate after this age is a sizable negative 
number. Thus, it would not be unusual for the reduction in 
pension benefit accrual after the age of early retirement to 
be equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in wage earnings.
The development of this new view of retirement income rights—as assets 
whose values can rise or fall with additional work—was gradual. There 
is virtually no sign of it through the mid-1970s. By now, however, it 
is the dominant paradigm, and it has changed our views on how retire 
ment systems work and how they influence individual retirement 
decisions.
Retirement Research During the 1970s
Economists are interested in incentives. We generally believe that 
individuals understand and respond to the economic incentives they face. 
There is considerable circumstantial evidence that the Social Security 
and pension systems have had an important influence on retirement 
trends. In the United States, retirement (and early retirement) rates rose 
dramatically as the Social Security and pension systems expanded. 
Noticeable changes in participation rates occur at ages important in pen 
sion and Social Security rules—60, 62 and 65. Workers' earnings are 
found to cluster around the levels at which the earnings test goes into 
effect. 10 Other factors, of course, are important—health status, manda-
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tory retirement rules, and the state of the economy. But, as Joseph 
Pechman, Henry Aaron, and Michael Taussig argued in 1968:
Within these limits, ... the terms upon which people can 
retire—the loss in earnings which they suffer from not 
working—are very important. Since social security is the 
dominant retirement system in the United States, it can in 
fluence the retirement decision, both directly by altering the 
income choices that workers face, and indirectly, by help 
ing to influence the other factors which determine the time 
of retirement.
Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig evaluated the evidence that existed in 
1968 on the influence of extended Social Security coverage and benefits 
on the trends in labor force activity, and concluded that "unfortunate 
ly, the little evidence bearing on this point [rising benefit levels] is even 
weaker than the evidence on the effects of widened eligibility for 
benefits." In other words, economists were confident that Social Security 
was an important determinant, but had yet to establish it empirically. 
Over the next two decades, the evidence for this proposition and our 
understanding of how retirement income programs work would increase 
dramatically. 11
One-Period Models
Michael Boskin (1977) produced one of the earliest econometric studies 
of the retirement decision with a small sample of white married men 
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. He defined retirement as 
movement to less than quarter-time work and included among his ex 
planatory variables a measure of health status (hours ill during the year), 
Social Security benefits (the maximum for which the household would 
be eligible), the net earnings potential of the individual (net of earnings- 
tested benefit reductions), and income from assets. The findings were 
remarkable. The Social Security effect was large and statistically signifi 
cant, and many times larger than the effect of income from assets. 12 
Here was evidence that those elderly eligible for larger Social Security
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benefits were much more likely to retire than others. Boskin concluded 
that
the overall impact of the social security system ... is clearly 
to induce earlier retirement for a substantial fraction of the 
elderly population. . . . The results . . . suggest that recent 
increases in social security benefits and coverage, combin 
ed with the earnings test are a significant contributor to the 
rapid decline of the labor force participation of the elderly 
in the United States.
The magnitude of the effects that Boskin claimed was very large. He 
suggested that an "increase in Social Security benefits from $3,000 to 
$4,000 per year per couple raises the annual probability of retirement 
from 7.5 to 16 percent," and that "a decrease in the implicit tax rate 
on earnings from one-half to one-third would reduce the annual prob 
ability of retirement by about fifty percent!"
These large estimates were suspect for several reasons. The sample 
size—only 131—was very small. This may also explain why the health 
effect estimated was insignificant and of the wrong sign. The study com 
pletely ignored employer pensions. Since those with pensions are also 
likely to be eligible for relatively large Social Security benefits, the Social 
Security coefficients may have been picking up some pension effects. 
And finally, the treatment of the Social Security system was, in 
retrospect, unsophisticated. It was done in the context of a one-period 
model, and therefore ignored the impact of additional work on future 
retirement benefits. But this was one of the first econometric efforts 
to suggest that retirement income incentives are much more important 
than survey questionnaires had implied.
In that same year, Joseph Quinn (1977) published the results of some 
early research based the Social Security Administration's new Retire 
ment History Study. He used only the initial 1969 cross section of what 
would eventually become a 10-year longitudinal survey of the retire 
ment patterns of over 11,000 older Americans. In 1969, the sample 
was 58 to 63 years old and a substantial portion of the group had already 
stopped working.
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Quinn defined retirement as complete labor force withdrawal and asked 
what objective circumstances differentiated those who were and were 
not retired in 1969. He considered both Social Security and pension 
eligibility, along with an interaction term denoting eligibility for both. 
Also included were variables reflecting health status, the presence of 
dependents, asset income, the hourly wage rate on the current or last 
job, local labor market conditions, and certain characteristics of the job. 13 
Some interesting results emerged.
The coefficients on all three retirement income variables were large 
and significant. Current Social Security and pension eligibility both in 
creased the probability of retirement, and their effects appeared to be 
more than additive. Social Security eligibility alone reduced the prob 
ability of labor force participation by 11 percentage points, pension 
eligibility alone by 7 points, and both together by 26 points. The presence 
of a health limitation was also very important (reducing the probability 
of participation by 20 percentage points), as was the presence of asset 
income. The one surprising result was that the wage rate on the current 
or last job was not a significant determinant of retirement behavior. 
Subsequent research has explained this puzzling finding. 14
Quinn then disaggregated the sample by health status to see whether 
health interacted with the other explanatory variables. Statistical tests 
suggested that it did, since the explanatory power of the separate equa 
tions was significantly greater than that of the combined equation. 
Although the same coefficients generally remained significant in the 
two equations, the coefficients were much larger among those with a 
health limitation, suggesting that those in relatively poor health (though 
not bedridden or housebound—those two groups were excluded from 
the analysis) were more sensitive to their financial conditions.
For example, the aggregate Social Security effect on labor force par 
ticipation (-11 percentage points) turned out to be an average of a very 
large effect on those with a health limitation (-28 points) and a small, 
but still significant, effect (-4 points) on those in relatively good health. 
The analogous pension effects were really -14 and -5, rather than the 
average of-7. The effects of dependents and higher asset income were 
also larger for those with a health problem. This is consistent with the
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suggestion in some of the later survey research that health is often an 
important contributing, but not necessarily determining, factor in the 
retirement decision. Those with health problems are more likely to want 
to retire. Whether they can afford to or not depends on the financial 
options they face.
In 1978, Michael Boskin and Michael Kurd published an article us 
ing the first two waves (1969 and 1971) of the Retirement History Study. 
They analyzed the behavior of about 1,000 white males who were 
employed in 1969 and who did not have a working wife. In addition 
to utilizing the longitudinal nature of the RHS, this research had two 
interesting innovations. It analyzed three transition states: continued work 
(without receipt of Social Security benefits), semiretirement (working 
and receiving Social Security benefits) and retirement (not working at 
all). In addition, Boskin and Kurd considered the possibility that the 
potential Social Security benefit is itself an endogenous variable, a func 
tion of the individual's taste for work. The authors hypothesized that 
those with higher potential benefits might retire later, not because the 
higher benefits induced continued work, but because both the delayed 
retirement and the potential benefits were determined by some underlying 
preference for work. Those with a taste for work would have worked 
hard all their lives (and, hence, be eligible for large benefits) and would 
then continue to work in old age. The appropriate econometric response 
to this endogeneity is a two-stage least-squares procedure in which poten 
tial benefits are replaced by predicted potential benefits based on ex 
ogenous instruments.
Boskin and Kurd's results were similar to those of Boskin (1977), 
mentioned above. They found a strong influence of Social Security on 
early retirement, and estimated that a $1,000 increment in annual Social 
Security benefits would increase the probability of complete retirement 
by about 8 percentage points (on a mean of only 12 percent). It is in 
teresting to note that the Social Security coefficient had the wrong sign 
when the variable was treated as exogenous, suggesting that the en 
dogeneity issue may be an important one.
The Boskin and Hurd analysis ignored pensions, so that some of the 
Social Security effect may have reflected the influence of employer plans.
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In addition, their treatment of Social Security was unsophisticated, since 
changes in future benefits due to continued work were not considered. 
Despite these shortcomings, Boskin, Hurd, and Quinn did provide 
some early statistical evidence that Social Security and pensions were 
important determinants of the labor market behavior of older American 
males. Some aspect of these programs seemed to induce retirement, 
but was it the size of the benefits, the ratio of benefits to earnings on 
the job, the tax rate levied by the earnings test, or actuarial adjustment 
rules? This early research shed little light on these issues.
Multiperiod Models: Retirement Income Rights as Wealth
In 1979 and 1980, Richard Burkhauser added an important theoretical 
insight that eventually changed the way most economists view the retire 
ment decision. He emphasized the multiperiod nature of Social Securi 
ty and pension rights, and argued that "it is not simply the size of an 
nual benefits received each year but the present value of the entire stream 
of benefits that emerges as theoretically and empirically important" 
(Burkhauser 1980).
An annual benefit amount, though better than a dichotomous eligibility 
variable, is an inadequate description of the incentives an individual 
faces. This is also true for another popular summary statistic, the replace 
ment rate, which is the ratio of post- to preretirement income. Con 
sider two workers currently earning $30,000 per year on identical jobs 
and eligible for annual retirement benefits of $12,000 if they were to 
retire. It appears that their financial tradeoffs are the same—an increase 
in leisure for a substantial reduction in income. But, they may well not be.
Suppose, for example, that the first individual's benefits are indexed 
for future inflation, as Social Security is, while the other's are not, as 
is true for many private pensions. Retirement will look more attractive 
to the former, especially during times of expected high inflation. And 
suppose that the benefit calculation and actuarial adjustment provisions 
differ. For the second, let us assume that the annual benefit would rise 
from $12,000 to $15,000 per year following another year of work; 
whereas for the first, it would remain at $12,000. Another year of work
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looks more attractive if it results in higher pension benefits in the future. 
In fact, in the hypothetical case here, the year's worth of benefits 
foregone ($12,000) would be recouped in four years, and the subse 
quent years of benefit increments would then provide an added bonus 
for that additional year's work. In the second case, however, the $12,000 
in benefits foregone during the extra year of work are lost forever, and 
there is no financial reward for work other than the current paycheck. 
The point here is that the retirement incentives are very different for 
our two workers, despite the fact that the one-period tradeoffs appear 
to be the same.
A worker facing a retirement decision, then, is not just choosing be 
tween a paycheck and a pension check, but rather between two different 
streams of income. As we described above, these alternatives can only 
be compared by evaluating their present discounted values (PDV). This 
is precisely what Burkhauser proceeded to do.
Burkhauser (1979) first analyzed a sample of 761 male auto workers 
aged 59 to 64, who became eligible for Supplementary Earnings Retire 
ment Benefits under the 1965 United Auto Workers' contract. The deci 
sion he tried to explain was whether or not the worker decided to take 
an early pension, that is, prior to age 65. The key new variable he in 
troduced was the difference between the (after-tax) PDV of the pen 
sion stream if taken early and the PDV of the stream that would start 
if retirement were delayed until age 65.
He found that the average PDV of the early retirement benefit streams 
was $18,365; whereas, the average PDV of the normal retirement pen 
sion streams was only $8,660. The average loss in pension wealth, 
therefore, was nearly $10,000. Over the same time period, the PDV 
of the wages that one of these workers could earn averaged over $22,000, 
so an income maximizer would certainly continue to work. But a utili 
ty maximizer who enjoyed leisure might not. The true net gain from 
working those years was not the $22,000 in pay, but $22,000 minus 
the loss in pension wealth. Only those willing to work for a net com 
pensation of around $12,000 would remain on the job.
In his empirical work, Burkhauser found a number of interesting 
significant explanatory variables. In regression, probit, and logit equa-
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tions, the difference between the present discounted values of the pen 
sion streams was always a very important determinant. The larger the 
pension wealth loss accompanying additional work, the more likely the 
workers were to accept the pension benefits and leave the firm. In ad 
dition, the present value of the earnings expected between early retire 
ment age and age 65 was significant, confirming that higher earnings 
encourage continued work. The probability of pension acceptance also 
increased with age, with the amount of other financial assets, and with 
poor health, measured by the number of weeks of work missed during 
the previous year.
The main contribution of this paper was the treatment of pension rights 
as an asset whose value changes with the age of retirement. Burkhauser 
found that these changes in asset value were important theoretical and 
empirical determinants of the pension acceptance decision. He concluded 
that "the loss in the asset value of both private pension and social security 
benefits together with their constraints on market work encourages 
workers to take these benefits and reduce or completely stop work"; 
and suggested that "efforts to increase the labor market opportunities 
of the aged (i.e., the recent legislation to end mandatory retirement below 
age 70) may have little impact unless adjustments in the asset value of 
pensions, both private and social security, are introduced" (Burkhauser 
1979).
These Social Security implications were not based on the UAW study, 
because it was impossible to include Social Security variables in the 
analysis. In 1980, Burkhauser analyzed the impact of Social Security 
with a sample of about 700 men taken from the Social Security Ad 
ministration's 1973 Exact Match File, which contains microeconomic 
information drawn from the March 1973 Current Population Survey 
and from SSA's internal program records. These men were all eligible 
for Social Security retirement benefits at age 62. The advantage of this 
data source was accurate information on Social Security benefits. The 
disadvantage was the lack of any data on personal health or pension 
status.
The dependent variable was the decision to accept Social Security 
benefits at age 62. The size of the benefit was measured by the present
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discounted value of the future benefit stream, including the possibility 
of dependent and survivor benefits. Burkhauser assumed in this paper 
that the Social Security system was actuarially unfair (that future benefits 
increments did not adequately make up for benefits foregone during 
additional years of work) and, therefore, that the potential loss in Social 
Security wealth was proportional to the initial asset value. He did not 
calculate the wealth loss directly. This assumption of actuarial unfairness 
at age 62 is controversial, and the subject of a debate mentioned below.
Burkhauser found that the size of Social Security wealth was an im 
portant determinant of the retirement decision. The larger the asset value, 
and therefore, he assumed, the larger the potential wealth loss during 
years of delayed retirement, the more likely the individual was to ac 
cept benefits at age 62. High market earnings potential discouraged Social 
Security receipt, as did being married or highly educated.
This data source included no information on individuals' pension 
status. Since this is undoubtedly an important determinant in the retire 
ment decision, Burkhauser included a very rough proxy for this by 
calculating the probability that each individual was eligible for pension 
benefits at or before age 62, or at any time. The estimates were in 
dustrywide averages for the industry in which the respondent last worked. 
He found that those workers with high early pension probability were 
more likely to accept Social Security benefits at age 62, and that those 
eligible only later were less likely to accept than those with no benefits 
at all. This may be because pension plans frequently base benefits on 
the earnings in the last few years of work, thereby increasing the return 
to working late in one's career.
These early studies established that the incentives in our Social Security 
and pension systems could affect people's behavior and induce retire 
ment, and that the most appropriate way to view retirement income rights 
is as an asset or a stock of wealth. The value of this asset depends on 
when it is claimed. Retirement plans can encourage work by growing 
in value with continued employment. But they can also discourage work 
and encourage retirement by declining in value for those who remain 
on the job.
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A Debate Over Social Security Incentives
In 1980, Alan Blinder, Roger Gordon, and Donald Wise published 
an article that utilized the same general approach that Burkhauser had 
introduced, yet reached remarkably different conclusions. They challeng 
ed the increasingly common assumption that Social Security was an im 
portant factor in the early retirement decision and claimed that the in 
centives hidden in the Social Security law often provided strong incen 
tives to work, not to retire. These incentives, they argued, frequently 
cancelled and sometime outweighed the disincentive effects of the benefit 
reduction rate.
The authors began by examining a simple one-period model in which 
the Social Security benefits of an eligible worker are reduced by 50 
percent of any earnings over the exempt amount. When this tax is add 
ed to income taxes, it appears to provide a very strong disincentive to 
work, since the employee keeps so little of the gross pay. But, as we 
explained above, this analysis misses a key point. Unlike income taxes, 
Social Security contributions result in higher future benefits. If the present 
discounted value of these future benefit increments equals the benefits 
"taxed" away today, then the system is actuarially fair, and the earn 
ings test, though still on the books, is irrelevant. If the losses are more 
than offset, then the tax becomes a subsidy, and additional work is en 
couraged by the Social Security rules, not discouraged as frequently 
thought.
The determination of the incentives actually faced by an individual 
is complicated. It depends on a number of factors, including the dis 
count rate, the age of the potential retiree, and the presence and age 
of a spouse and dependent children. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 
calculated the actuarial adjustment (delayed retirement credit) and benefit 
recalculation (AIME) incentives separately. They first asked whether 
the actuarial adjustment compensated for the 50 percent earnings test. 
Using real discount rates of 1 and 3 percent and analyzing five 
hypothetical 62-year-old individuals, they concluded that the actuarial 
adjustment made up about one to one-and-a-half times the amount of 
the earnings test loss—the latter, obviously, turning the earnings test
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tax into a subsidy. At age 65, when the delayed retirement credit drops 
from about 7 to 3 percent per year of delay, only 10 to 60 percent of 
the loss was returned. The percentage of the earnings-test loss return 
ed in the future is higher for the married individual, if the spouse does 
not claim Social Security benefits on the basis of his or her own record, 
and declines with the age of the spouse and with the presence of depen 
dent children. But the important point is that, with rare exceptions, the 
true earnings-test tax was not 50 percent.
In addition, according to the authors, the benefit recalculation rules 
after the 1977 amendments provided additional wage subsidies as well. 
For the average 65-year-old married male in their sample (drawn from 
the Retirement History Study), the subsidy was between one-third and 
one-half of the wage, depending on the discount rate used. For their 
average 65-year-old single man, the subsidy was about a sixth of the 
wage.
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise did not combine the two parts of their 
analysis—the actuarial adjustment and the benefit recalculation. They 
concluded that "the earnings test for social security does not present 
a work disincentive for the typical worker aged 62-64 because, if he 
loses benefits to the earnings test, he recoups most or even more than 
all of them through an actuarial adjustment of his future benefits.'' When 
the estimated wage subsidy in the benefit recalculation formula is in 
cluded, they claimed that "it seems likely that the social security law—if 
understood by the public—should provide work disincentives for only 
a small minority of individuals. It seems that social security should in 
duce the majority of older workers to work harder."
Gordon and Blinder (1980) continued this line of research with a major 
empirical analysis of the retirement decisions of a large sample of white 
males from the Retirement History Study. Because of their analysis 
above, their subsequent model assumed that Social Security was irrele 
vant to retirement decisions. They estimated a market wage rate for 
each person in the sample, from a wage equation, and then derived a 
reservation wage from an explicit utility function. Individuals work if 
their market wage exceeds their reservation wage and retire (withdraw 
from the labor force) when the reverse is true. Age, health, pension
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status, education, and demographic characteristics affect the retirement 
decision through their influences on the market and reservation wages.
The Gordon and Blinder model did well predicting the retirement 
behavior of respondents aged 58 to 61, almost as well for those 62 to 
64, and not very well at all for those in the 65-to-67 age category. Ac 
cording to their estimates, age had a dramatic impact on the decision. 
In their base case, the retirement probability rose from 10 percent at 
age 61 to above 60 percent at 67. Health and market wages were also 
important. They found that "pension plans—with or without associated 
mandatory retirement provisions—provide powerful incentives to retire 
at the age of eligibility for the pension (normally 65)," and that "social 
security . . . has a much weaker effect (if any) on retirement decisions."
Despite the sophistication of the economic model and the econometric 
techniques, the derivation of the pension and Social Security variables 
was quite simple. The Social Security effect was not estimated directly 
because the authors were convinced that the incentive structure frequently 
favored work, not retirement. The pension variables, which were large 
and statistically significant at age 65, only denoted coverage. Gordon 
and Blinder assumed that the actuarial reductions for early pension ac 
ceptance were less than actuarially fair (encouraging early retirement), 
and that pensions decreased in present discounted value even further 
when one worked beyond the age of full eligibility (discouraging late 
retirement). But their dichotomous variables did not permit a test of 
this directly.
From these two important papers, the authors concluded that it "seems 
unlikely that the growth of the social security system, as impressive 
as it has been, has contributed much to the trend toward retirement" 
(Gordon and Blinder 1980). They acknowledged the remarkable coin 
cidence of the growth of Social Security and the dramatic decline in 
retirement ages, as well as the small (at that time) body of econometric 
evidence linking the two trends, and conjectured
that many people eligible for social security benefits may not 
understand how their current earnings affect their future 
benefits. It is possible, therefore, that social security is
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discouraging labor supply only because its provisions are 
poorly understood (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 1980).
These articles prompted a response from Richard Burkhauser and John 
Turner (1981) entitled "Can Twenty-Five Million Americans Be 
Wrong?" They agreed with the basic framework of analysis, that the 
impact of current earnings on future retirement benefits is the key issue. 
The forward-looking life-cycle model was gaining general acceptance. 
But Burkhauser and Turner faulted Blinder, Gordon, and Wise for not 
looking backwards in a life-cycle mode. Suppose, they said, that Blinder 
et al. were correct, that the actuarial adjustment and the benefit recalcula 
tion formula more than offset the 50 percent earnings test, and therefore 
that Social Security provides an earnings subsidy rather than a tax be 
tween the ages of 62 and 65. If so, then the benefit recalculation for 
mula provides an even larger subsidy to wages prior to age 62, when 
it is in effect but the earnings test is not. In other words, current earn 
ings are likely to increase the "average monthly earnings" on which 
benefits are based any time late in one's work career, and it is better 
to generate these earnings before age 62 rather than after. The earn 
ings test decreases net compensation at age 62, and whether it is from 
a large subsidy to a small subsidy or from a subsidy to a tax is not im 
portant. In a full life-cycle framework, Burkhauser and Turner argued, 
the Social Security system encourages the substitution of early work 
for late work by tilting the relative wage profile toward the former.
As Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981) pointed out in a rejoinder, this 
final conclusion is valid only if the actuarial adjustment at age 62 is 
less than fair. At age 62, two changes occur—both the earnings test 
and the actuarial adjustment go into effect. If they just offset each other, 
and the benefit recalculation formula remains unchanged, then there 
is no intertemporal wage tilt. Therefore, much of the debate comes down 
to the actuarial fairness of the adjustment between ages 62 and 64. 
Everyone agrees that the adjustment after age 65 is inadequate. Whether 
it is prior to 65 remains a matter of dispute.
James Kahn (1988) has added a recent contribution to the debate. He 
maintains that the Blinder, Gordon, and Wise results are very sensitive
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to the interest rate used to discount future income streams, and argues 
that the appropriate rate is much higher than the 1 and 3 percent they 
chose. The reason is that many older people are liquidity-constrained 
because they cannot borrow against future Social Security benefits at 
market rates. If so, then these retirement income rights are worth less 
than they would be if they were more portable over time. At a higher 
discount rate, the future Social Security increments from continued work 
are less valuable and less likely to offset the immediate benefits foregone.
Kahn demonstrates that for a sample of men ineligible for an employer 
pension, the Social Security incentives are almost neutral between ages 
62 and 64, when a 3-percent rate is used, but become strong work 
disincentives at 12 percent. He also shows that the retirement spike at 
age 62 is primarily low-wealth people, which is consistent with his 
liquidity-constraint story.
Early econometric work suggested that economic incentives can in 
fluence individual retirement decisions and that the nature of the in 
centives and their impact is complex. But this work had many flaws. 
Boskin and Kurd's analysis ignored pensions and the effect of addi 
tional work on Social Security wealth. Quinn studied the importance 
of pension and Social Security eligibility, but not the size of the benefits. 
Burkhauser introduced the concept of retirement income wealth to the 
microeconomic literature, but was not able to analyze Social Security 
and pension plans simultaneously. Gordon and Blinder's behavioral work 
assumed that Social Security did not affect the retirement decision and 
their data set was not amenable to easy extraction of pension benefit 
amounts. Work in the 1980s, to which we now turn, would address 
all of these early deficiencies.
NOTES
1. According to Packard and Reno (1989), 43 percent of American men claimed Social Security 
benefits at age 62 in 1985, including about 11 percent who were disabled. By age 64, nearly 
two-thirds of all men were receiving benefits. For women, including those receiving benefits as 
wives and widows, the percentages are even higher—well over half at age 62 and three-quarters 
by age 64.
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2. An excellent review of this earlier literature can be found in Campbell and Campbell (1976). 
They discuss the literature through 1975—just about the time that modern microeconomists began 
to research the retirement decision. Boskin (1977) also includes a short overview of these issues.
3. Those who had previously been eligible for disabled-worker benefits were excluded from these 
calculations. Obviously, health would have been much more important among this group.
4. This categorization shows the difficult in differentiating between voluntary and involuntary 
retirements. If poor health induces someone to retire, which of the categories is it? The decision 
may be voluntary; the poor health is not. Packard and Reno list health reasons under involuntary, 
while Steiner and Dorfman call such retirements voluntary.
5. Research by Ransom and Sutch (1986), mentioned in chapter 1, casts some doubt on the validity 
of these figures, and suggests that labor force participation rates were approximately constant 
from the late nineteenth century through 1937. But this only strengthens the point being made, 
that the development of the Social Security and employer pension plans may have had a signifi 
cant effect on aggregate retirement patterns.
6. In 1990, workers aged 62 through 64 can earn up to $6840 per year without any loss in Social 
Security benefits and they lose $1 in benefits for each $2 earned beyond that. For those 65 through 
69, the exempt amount is $9360 and the benefit reduction rate is only one-third. At age 70, the 
earnings test disappears altogether and full benefits are paid regardless of earnings.
7. See, for example, Boskin (1977), Quinn (1977), and Hall and Johnson (1980).
8. See Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) and Moffitt (1984) for discussions of the returns to the 
Social Security "investment" by cohort.
9. All of the relevant rules and regulations, from the beginning of the program to the present, 
as well as those already legislated for the future, can be found in the Annual Statistical Supple 
ment to the Social Security Bulletin.
10. See Kahn (1988) and Burtless and Moffitt (1984) for dramatic illustrations of this circumstantial 
evidence.
11. A very detailed summary and review of the recent literature, with an emphasis on theoretical 
issues, can be found in Mitchell and Fields (1982).
12. Boskin attributed the larger Social Security effect to three factors: (1) Social Security benefits 
are guaranteed until death and fully indexed against inflation; (2) they cannot be bequeathed to 
heirs; and (3) income from assets includes imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, an asset 
against which Boskin argues, the elderly are reluctant to borrow.
13. Respondents who were either bedridden or housebound were excluded from the sample. The 
health variable was based on the answer to the question, "Does your health limit the kind or 
amount of work or housework you can do?" Although this is a subjective assessment of health, 
the question was not asked in conjunction with reasons for retirement.
14. It now seems clear that this result is due to the exclusion of an important variable—some 
measure of the size of the retirement benefits for which the respondent is eligible. Higher benefits 
should induce retirement if we hold all other factors constant. But benefit levels are positively 
correlated with earnings, since Social Security and many pensions base benefits, even if loosely, 
on earnings history. The wage rate variable, then, was probably picking up its own positive ef 
fect on the probability of remaining at work and the negative effect of the higher pension benefits. 
The two effects approximately cancelled. As we will see below, when some measure of the benefit 
magnitudes is included, the wage or earnings coefficients are generally significant and of the ex 
pected sign.
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Retirement Incentives
and the 
Retirement Decision
The Current Literature
During the 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in economic research 
on retirement issues. As we discussed in chapter 1, there are several 
reasons for this. The nation is aging. The proportion of the population 
aged 65 and over will continue to grow well into the next century, ris 
ing from near 12 percent today to about 20 percent by the year 2030. 
The ratio of those aged 18 to 64 to those over 64 will decrease from 
five to three. This change in the basic age structure, combined with 
the trend toward earlier retirement, has threatened the financial well- 
being of the Social Security system. The hearings, recommendations, 
and subsequent legislation prompted by the National Commission on 
Social Security Reform (the Greenspan Commission) put Social Security 
on the front page, and concern about demographic trends and the federal 
budget deficit has kept it there.
The confluence of public interest and the availability of extraordinarily 
rich data sets have led to a significant increase in retirement research. 
In this chapter, we will review this modern research and summarize 
where we now stand. We will try to describe the general framework, 
the unique contributions, and the qualitative conclusions of some of the 
major figures in the field.
The research strategies fall into two general classes. Most authors 
have chosen to utilize the strengths of two large microeconomic data 
sets—the Social Security Administration's Retirement History Study 
(RHS) and the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), developed by the 
U.S. Department of Labor and the Center for Human Resource Research
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at The Ohio State University. These sources provide large represen 
tative samples of older Americans and a wealth of demographic, social, 
economic, and financial data on each respondent. A major drawback 
of both, however, is the paucity of private pension details. Employer 
pensions are complicated agreements, and these data sets do not begin 
to capture the complexities of the individual plans.
This problem suggests an alternative research strategy—to dig much 
deeper into the details of a small number of specific plans and analyze 
the impact of particular plan features. Much of this work is based on 
the Benefit Amounts Survey, a data set developed by the Department 
of Labor from summary descriptions submitted by individual pension 
plans. These data include the specific benefit calculation rules missing 
from the micro data sets above. Their disadvantages are the smaller, 
nonrepresentative samples of recipients and the lack of much other in 
formation on the individuals involved. 1 With this research strategy, we 
learn much more about pensions and much less about everything else.
In a recent paper, Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989b) 
report on a data set that combines some of the advantages of both ap 
proaches above. They use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, which 
includes a national random sample of over 4,200 households and in 
formation on pension plan details supplied by the providers. Unfortunate 
ly, the demographic information is not as complete as in the RHS or 
the NLS. In addition, since the data set is not specifically designed to 
study the retirement process, there are fewer older workers than in the 
two other sources. The survey is well-designed for studying pension 
incentives, but less applicable for studying their impact on retirement 
behavior.
Retirement Incentives and Mandatory Retirement
In several 1983 articles, Richard Burkhauser and Joseph Quinn 
(1983a,b; Quinn and Burkhauser 1983) described the Social Security 
and pension incentives facing a sample of older Americans and estimated 
their impact on individual retirement behavior. The initial focus of this
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research was mandatory retirement. The 1978 amendments to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) raised from 65 to 70 the 
earliest age at which most Americans could be forced to retire solely 
because of age. Subsequent legislation has virtually eliminated man 
datory retirement altogether. 2 The research question was whether the 
1978 change would dramatically alter the trend towards earlier retire 
ment. Casual empiricism suggested that it would, but more careful 
analysis indicated that it would not. Although mandatory retirement pro 
visions severely constrained the options of certain individuals, the rules 
were relatively unimportant in the aggregate.
The crux of the issue is that mandatory retirement, Social Security 
and employer pensions are all closely intertwined. Since they all can 
influence the retirement decision, it is essential to isolate their individual 
effects. When this is done, much of what looks like a mandatory retire 
ment effect is, in fact, due to the incentives embedded in the retirement 
income programs. Financial incentives and mandatory retirement turn 
out to be a carrot and a stick—alternative means to the same end.
Mandatory Retirement, Social Security and Pensions
Mandatory retirement rules were widespread prior to the 1978 ADEA 
amendments. They applied to between one-third and one-half of 
American workers approaching retirement age. For example, of the men 
and nonmarried women in the Retirement History Study who were ag 
ed 58 to 61 and employed in 1969 (the year of the initial survey), 43 
percent faced a mandatory retirement age on the job they held. Using 
three other data sources gathered at about the same time, Janice Halpern 
(1978) estimated that between 30 and 46 percent of older workers had 
jobs with compulsory retirement.
A simple comparison of the behavior of those with and without man 
datory retirement suggested a large impact. Using later waves of the 
RHS, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) followed a sample of men aged 
62 to 64 and employed in 1973. Some faced mandatory retirement over 
the next two years and others did not. Of those who did not, 57 percent 
were still working in 1975—the remaining 43 percent had withdrawn
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from the labor force. But of those who did face mandatory retirement, 
83 percent had left the labor force, and only 17 percent remained at 
work. The contrast between 17 and 57 percent indicates a large poten 
tial retirement effect.
But coincidence does not imply causation. Those with and without 
mandatory retirement had very different probabilities of pension coverage 
on that job. Of the RHS respondents who faced mandatory retirement 
during the subsequent two years, 94 percent were also eligible to col 
lect pension benefits, and most during those same two years. Of those 
facing mandatory retirement after that two-year period, nearly 90 per 
cent enjoyed pension eligibility. In contrast, fewer than half of those 
without mandatory retirement would ever collect employer pension 
benefits from their current jobs. Pensions and mandatory retirement 
went hand-in-hand. Although there were many individuals with a pen 
sion and without mandatory retirement, the converse was very rare.
The relationship between mandatory retirement and Social Security 
was also very close. Sixty-five was the most popular age for compulsory 
retirement, and that is precisely the age at which workers became eligible 
for full Social Security benefits. Sixty-five is also the age at which the 
delayed retirement credit drops dramatically, from about 7 percent per 
year of delay between ages 62 and 64 to only 3 percent (and this was 
only 1 percent prior to 1982).
To disaggregate the effects of Social Security, pensions, and man 
datory retirement, as well as all the other determinants of the individual 
retirement decision, one must first describe and quantify the retirement 
incentives and then estimate their effects in a behavioral model. The 
first part of this is difficult for several reasons. Retirement income plans 
are usually complex. They differ in coverage criteria, ages of eligibili 
ty, benefit calculation rules, delayed retirement credits, and inflation 
protection after retirement. Even if we knew all these details, which 
we usually do not, we would have to decide how to utilize them in em 
pirical research—which are important and should be included in a sum 
mary measure of retirement incentives and which should be ignored.
Fortunately, the RHS has appended to its own data the entire Social 
Security Administration earnings record (through 1975) for each of the
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respondents. (This creates the odd situation in which the researcher prob 
ably knows more about the individual's Social Security incentives than 
the individual making the decision does!) With respect to employer pen 
sions, however, we are much less fortunate. The RHS does include ques 
tions about the extent and age of eligibility and the size of the annual 
benefit, but other key details are unknown. In addition, answers to the 
pension questions are sometimes incomplete, and, in the case of ex 
pected pension amounts, frequently so.
Problems with the RHS pension data have discouraged many research 
ers from utilizing these benefits estimates. A major contribution of the 
Burkhauser and Quinn research was an attempt to squeeze pension benefit 
information from every possible source in the longitudinal questionnaires.
Social Security and Pension Incentives
We argued in chapter 2 that the best measure of the value of retire 
ment income rights is the present discounted value of the stream of future 
benefits — the asset or wealth equivalent. Unlike the annual benefit or 
the replacement rate, the present value incorporates into one number 
the age of eligibility, the size of the annual flow, life expectancy and, 
via the discount rate, the amount of inflation protection after retirement. 3 
The value is positive prior to the age of eligibility, which is consistent 
with a life-cycle view of decisionmaking.
In their empirical work, Burkhauser and Quinn calculated, for Social 
Security and employer pensions separately, two measures of retirement 
income incentives— WEALTH and DELTA. WEALTH was merely the 
present discounted value mentioned above; i.e.,
T
WEALTH(s)= E (p^s)) / (1+r)1 , 
i=s
where p{ is the probability of living through period i , r is the discount 
rate, T is the age (assumed to be 100) at which the probability of sur 
vival drops to zero, and Bj(s) is the annual benefit associated with a 
pension accepted in period s. 4 The (s) in the expression WEALTH(s)
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is a reminder that the value of the pension depends on when it is first 
claimed. This leads directly to the other retirement income incentive, 
DELTA.
DELTA is the change in retirement income wealth that accompanies 
an additional year of work. When an individual works another year, 
there is bad news and good news with respect to pensions. The bad 
news is that a year's worth of pension benefits is foregone. The good 
news is that future annual benefits may be higher. Whether the asset 
value of the stream rises or falls depends on whether the increments 
tomorrow are sufficient to offset the losses today.
DELTA is the change in wealth from one period (s) to the next (s+1) 
following an additional year of work; i.e.,
DELTA(s)=WEALTH(s + l) - WEALTH(s) - C(s)
where C(s) is the worker's contribution to the plan during the year of 
work (and equals zero in noncontributing plans). A positive DELTA 
denotes an increase in Social Security or pension wealth, and, in essence, 
a wage subsidy. A negative DELTA is a wealth loss—the equivalent 
of a wage decrease.
For Social Security, WEALTH and DELTA estimates were relatively 
easy to obtain because the RHS includes actual Social Security records 
and the exact benefit calculation rules are known. 5 In the derivation 
of WEALTH(s+1), workers were assumed to earn the same real wages 
in year (s +1) as in year (s). These were added to the earnings records, 
and the streams of benefits and their present discounted values were 
then recalculated.
Pension derivations were much more difficult. The first problem was 
to find the annual amount for which a respondent was or would be eligi 
ble. 6 Even with these figures, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983a) still did 
not know the details of the individuals' pension plans. In order to estimate 
how annual benefits would change if the respondent worked another 
year, they assumed
(a) the pension plans did not include a joint-and-survivor provision,
(b) the benefit amount was based on years of service, so that it in 
creased by [1/n], where n is years of tenure with the current 
firm, and
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(c) for those eligible for reduced but not full benefits, the benefit
amount also increased by an actuarial adjustment. 
In the absence of plan-specific information, one-digit industry averages 
for these adjustments were used, from data in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistic's Level of Benefits Study. For those respondents who stated 
that they were already eligible for full benefits, no additional actuarial 
adjustment was assumed.
With these assumptions, the authors calculated the asset values of 
Social Security and employer pension claims (and changes in these values 
with continued work) for the Retirement History Study sample. These 
assets, though ignored in traditional definitions of wealth, turn out to 
dominate the portfolios of older Americans. For three-quarters of a sam 
ple of RHS men aged 62 to 67 in 1973 (just after several large increases 
in real Social Security benefits), Quinn (1985) found that retirement 
income wealth exceeded all other forms of wealth, including equity in 
the home. 7 Wolff (1987) has confirmed these qualitative results. With 
slightly earlier data, he estimated that Social Security and pension wealth 
constituted about 30 percent of total wealth for those aged 65 and over 
in 1969.
For the mandatory retirement study, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) 
drew a sample of full-time, private-sector men (not self-employed) ag 
ed 63 to 65 in 1974. About two-thirds of them had employer pension 
wealth from a current or previous job. The median value for those with 
positive pension wealth (using a 5 percent discount rate) was about 
$21,000 (all figures in 1974 dollars)—slightly more than twice the me 
dian annual wage earnings at the time.
For workers aged 63, the pension DELTAs were almost equally split 
between positive (gains) and negative (losses) values; the median value, 
therefore, was close to zero. But by age 64, the losers outnumbered 
the gainers, and the median pension wealth loss accompanying another 
year of work was over $1,100. At age 65, there were almost no gainers, 
and the median loss had risen to over $2,000. Six percent of those aged 
65 would have lost over $5,000 in pension wealth from an additional 
year of work and another 8 percent, between $3,000 and $5,000.
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The WEALTH and DELTA figures for Social Security were much 
more dramatic. Coverage was nearly universal, and the value of most 
people's Social Security rights far exceeded their pension wealth. At 
a 5 percent discount rate, 70 percent of the sample had Social Security 
wealth over $50,000.
The change in this wealth following an incremental year of work 
depends crucially on an individual's age, because the Social Security 
delayed retirement credit drops at age 65. For respondents aged 63 and 
64, the Social Security rules generally provided a net subsidy to work. 
Those who remained employed received a paycheck and an increase 
in retirement wealth. The median annual gains were about $1,850 at 
age 63 and $850 at 64. But at age 65, nearly everyone lost because 
of the inadequate actuarial adjustment—only 1 percent prior to 1982. 
The median loss was over $3,000.
Are these wealth changes large or small? Since they are part of 
compensation—a pay raise or a pay cut—they should be compared to 
annual earnings. For those eligible for Social Security alone, the results 
mirrored the story above—on average, modest gains occurred at ages 
63 and 64, and dramatic losses at 65. The estimates suggested a me 
dian loss at age 65 of about a third of gross earnings. When the pen 
sion DELTAs are added for those eligible for both, the median loss 
at age 65 rose to almost half of gross pay—a hefty pay cut indeed.
These are only rough estimates, because they ignore taxes and im 
plicitly assume that full-time workers lose all of their Social Security 
benefits. (In fact, some low-wage workers may be able to work full 
time and still collect all or part of their Social Security benefits.) 
Nonetheless, they indicate that the financial incentives embedded in 
retirement income programs can be large. Older workers can suffer 
severe wage cuts, not because the paycheck is reduced but because Social 
Security and pension wealth decrease with continued work. Economic 
theory suggests that workers should respond to this abrupt change in 
compensation and that some who found work worthwhile at the previous 
rate of pay will not after the decrease. These workers will leave the 
job and retire.
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But do they? Do older Americans understand and respond to these 
incentives? Although the concepts are not difficult, the actual calcula 
tions are. Is there evidence that those facing large wealth losses 
(DELTAs) are more likely to retire than those who are not?
Retirement Behavior
Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) found that there is evidence for this 
effect. They attempted to explain job transitions over time—who did 
and who did not leave the labor force over a two-year period (1973 
to 1975). Their explanatory variables included the retirement incen 
tives discussed above, as well as changes in health status, earnings poten 
tial on the job, and marital status. The empirical results indicated that 
health deterioration during the two-year period increased the prob 
ability of retirement, but that marital status and mandatory retirement 
in the future (after 1975) were relatively unimportant. The financial 
variables all had the correct signs, and all but one were statistically 
significant. Higher earnings, ceteris paribus, discouraged retirement. 
Pension wealth and both Social Security and pension DELTAs encourag 
ed it. 8 The higher the wealth loss associated with continued work (the 
higher the implicit pay cut), the higher the probability that the individual 
left the labor force and retired.
Mandatory Retirement
As was mentioned above, those with and without mandatory retire 
ment during the two-year period under study behaved very differently. 
Those with this constraint were much more likely to leave the labor 
force. But they were also more likely to have employer pensions and 
therefore to face pension wealth losses if they continued to work. In 
addition, nearly all faced negative work incentives from the decrease 
in the Social Security delayed retirement credit at age 65. To what ex 
tent were the differences in behavior due to the existence of the man 
datory retirement provision and to what extent were they due to the 
coincident financial incentives?
To tackle this question, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) used a job- 
exit equation, estimated on those who were not subject to mandatory
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retirement over the two-year period, to predict the retirement behavior 
of those who were. They intentionally ignored that fact that the latter 
did in fact face mandatory retirement and asked what proportion would 
have retired anyway, because of their health and the financial incen 
tives they faced. The estimate was that 63 percent would have retired. 
In fact, 83 percent did, compared to only 43 percent of those without 
mandatory retirement. In other words, about half of the total difference 
in behavior (43 to 83 percent) could be explained by factors other than 
mandatory retirement. 9 The remaining half was due to mandatory retire 
ment and to other factors that they were not able to include. 10
As a final point, the authors estimated the total number of persons 
aged 63-65 whose retirement behavior would have changed if man 
datory retirement at age 65 had been outlawed in 1973, as it was five 
years later. The estimate was small—about 50,000 men. 11 This would 
have created a modest increase in the labor force participation rate of 
that cohort, and an almost imperceptible increase in the labor supply 
as a whole. Mandatory retirement was much less important than it ap 
peared. 12
Conclusion
This research suggests that the concepts of retirement income wealth 
and changes in this wealth are very useful. An individual with high pen 
sion benefits may feel induced to retire or to continue working, depend 
ing on how the future benefit stream varies with the decision. Neither 
the current annual benefit nor the replacement rate can capture these 
important incentives. Only by describing these retirement rights as 
assets—present discounted values—can one describe and quantify these 
factors and estimate the magnitude of their effects.
Social Security and many employer pension plans eventually create 
large financial incentives for a worker to leave a job. Empirical evidence 
on the actual behavior of a large sample of older American men in 
dicates that they behave as though they understand and respond to these 
factors. By no means do these factors (or any of the factors that research 
ers have been able to measure) explain all of the behavior. But they 
do explain some of it.
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This is important for several reasons. First, it appears that one variable 
that looked very significant—mandatory retirement—is really not so. 13 
The elimination of these rules will be important to certain individuals 
who would have been forced to leave their jobs at some arbitrary age, 
but should have little impact in the aggregate. 14 Second, we now see 
that there are alternative means to the same end. Employers can in 
fluence retirement patterns with the carrot (financial incentives) as well 
as with the stick (a compulsory retirement age). 15 A major advantage 
of the carrot is that those who really want to continue to work are able 
to. And finally, these findings suggest that retirement trends are not 
exogenous. They depend on the incentives built into our Social Securi 
ty and pension systems—incentives that discourage work at age 65, if 
not sooner. It is no wonder that so few Americans work beyond age 
65. Those who do pay dearly for their choice.
Optimal Retirement Age
In a series of recent articles, Gary Burtless (1986, 1987), Robert Mof- 
fitt (1984, 1987), and Burtless and Moffitt (1984, 1985, 1986) have 
made significant advances in the theoretical and econometric analysis 
of the retirement decision. The major focus of their work is the deter 
mination of the optimal age of retirement and the optimal labor supply 
afterwards. They adopt a life-cycle model of work and consumption 
and emphasize the nonlinear nature of the budget constraints faced by 
older Americans.
Retirement Age and Hours of Work
Workers contemplating retirement face budget constraint kinks 
(nonlinearities) along two dimensions. These dimensions correspond 
to the major decision variables that Burtless and Moffitt study- 
retirement age and post-retirement hours of work. As all modern analysts 
of these issues agree, the choice of the optimal retirement age is com 
plicated by Social Security and private pension incentives. If leisure 
is a good, then the loss of leisure during an additional year of work lowers
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an individual's utility. But the increased income earned makes addi 
tional consumption possible, which increases utility. In their words, 
an individual stops working "when the marginal disutility of another 
year of work is just equal to the marginal utility arising from the con 
sumption that can be financed by the added work'' (Burtless and Mof 
fitt 1985).
Their work emphasizes the impact of Social Security on the retire 
ment decision and they delve in great detail into benefit calculation rules. 
When considering the budget constraint over potential retirement ages, 
they find nonlinearities at ages 62, 65, and 72 (now 70, when the earn 
ings test disappears), all created by the impact of additional work on 
the asset value of future Social Security benefits. Because of these kinks, 
they expect a clustering of retirements at age 65, and depending on the 
actuarial fairness of the adjustment between 62 and 65, perhaps at age 
62 as well.
Burtless and Moffitt have defined retirement as a sudden and discon 
tinuous drop in hours worked, not as complete labor force withdrawal. 16 
Under this definition, retired workers can continue to work, and this 
decision is part of their analysis. 17 When one considers the budget con 
straint over the number of hours in a given year, another nonlinearity 
appears. Social Security rules allow a certain exempt amount of 
earnings—in 1990, $6,840 for those 62 to 64 years old; $9,360 for those 
65 to 69—before benefits are reduced by the earnings test. After that 
amount, benefits are reduced by 50 percent (for those 62 to 64) or 33 
percent (for those 65 to 69) of all incremental earnings until they are 
reduced to zero. 18 In essence, the net hourly wage drops after the ex 
empt amount is earned, and a kink appears (see point C in figure 2.2). 
(The point at which this happens is different for each individual since 
it depends on the wage rate.) If potential retirees do not fully unders 
tand the impact of benefit recalculation on their Social Security wealth 
and view the earnings test as a real tax, then Burtless and Moffitt would 
expect to find earnings of the retired clustered around the exempt amount.
Using a sample of men from the Retirement History Study, the authors 
found clear evidence of both types of clustering. As seen in figure 3.1, 
men were most likely to retire at ages 65 and 62. Over a quarter retired
Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision 89
Figure 3.1 
Frequency Distribution of Retirement Ages
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at 65, the age at which the delayed retirement credit drops and a signifi 
cant kink occurs. This is "consistent with the pronounced incentive to 
retire at that age in the Social Security benefit formula'' (Burtless and 
Moffitt 1985). The clustering at 62 is more difficult to explain, since 
the convexity in the budget constraint is much less severe, if it exists 
at all. This clustering could be due to ignorance of the benefit recalcula 
tion rules or to liquidity constraints—the inability to borrow against future 
income in order to consume (or retire) today. 19
Figure 3.2 provides evidence of clustering around the exempt earn 
ings amount. Of the retirees still working, over a quarter were found 
to be earning between 90 and 110 percent of the exempt amount, and 
many more were just below the 90 than are just above the 110. 20 Burtless 
and Moffitt found these results to be strong confirmation of their model's 
predictions. They then proceeded to estimate the parameters of their 
comprehensive life-cycle model.
Determinants of Retirement Behavior
The Burtless and Moffitt model contains two other distinctive features. 
Their specification allows the influence of Social Security benefits to 
differ from that of other unearned income. There are two reasons for 
this. Social Security wealth is less liquid than other assets, especially 
before retirement. For example, one cannot pledge future Social Security 
receipts as loan collateral. This may make Social Security less valuable 
than an equivalent amount of other wealth. On the other hand, Social 
Security benefits are fully indexed for inflation, by law since 1972 and 
by custom before then. Unlike other assets, they are not subject to the 
uncertainties of inflation, housing, bond or equity markets, or the state 
of the economy in general. For this reason, Social Security wealth may 
have a larger impact on behavior. Burtless and Moffitt permitted the 
effects to differ and the relative importance to vary over the age of the 
respondent. In addition, the authors allowed the propensity to retire to 
vary directly with age, independent of age's effect on the budget con 
straint. They expected retirement probabilities to increase with age, other 
factors held constant.
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Figure 3.2 
Distribution of Retirement Earnings Among Working Retirees
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The parameters of the retirement age and retirement hours equations 
were generally consistent with economic theory. Respondents in poor 
health tended to retire earlier, as did nonwhites and those with poor 
educational backgrounds. 21 As expected, retirement probabilities did 
increase with age.
The financial results were reasonable. Workers with higher preretire 
ment wages were found to retire slightly earlier, suggesting an income 
effect stronger than the substitution effect. Postretirement wages were 
positively associated with postretirement hours of work, but the elasticity 
was very small. Workers vested in a pension plan were found to delay 
retirement. This somewhat puzzling result may reflect pension benefit 
rules that encourage delayed retirement. Workers were found to retire 
earlier the higher the level of potential retirement income.
The results on the relative Social Security impact were very interesting. 
The relative effect of Social Security wealth compared to that of other 
assets went from zero prior to age 57 (perhaps due to high personal 
discount rates or the low liquidity of this asset) to 1.0 by age 59, 3.8 
at 62, and 5.0 by age 65 (Burtless and Moffitt 1984). These final ratios 
seem unbelievably high, but the evidence does suggest that the impact 
does change, with Social Security becoming more and more important 
over time.
Conclusions
This research, as all research, has its shortcomings. The Burtless and 
Moffitt treatment of pensions is inadequate. They were unable to model 
how pension benefits changed with delayed retirement—an issue that 
is central to the life-cycle framework. In addition, the sophisticated 
econometric techniques have both advantages and disadvantages. The 
parameter estimates have desirable statistical properties, but are dif 
ficult to interpret.
Nonetheless, these papers represent a very important contribution to 
the field. Burtless and Moffitt have integrated the analysis of both the 
retirement age and the retirement hours decisions. Their model is con 
sistent with the observed clustering of retirement ages at 62 and 65,
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as well as the clustering of postretiremen! earnings near the Social Securi 
ty exempt amount. And they find evidence of statistically significant, 
though small, Social Security effects on both retirement age and subse 
quent labor supply. 22
The Incentives of Specific Pension Plans
In a book and a series of related articles, Gary Fields and Olivia Mit 
chell (1984a, 1984b, 1984c), and Mitchell and Fields (1984,1985) have 
made major contributions to understanding the retirement decision. Their 
work differs from most of the literature in two important ways. They 
are among a small number of researchers who have chosen to delve 
deeply into the details of a number of specific pension plans. By doing 
so, they have been able to document the wide variety of retirement in 
centives that American workers actually face. The precision of their 
estimates far surpasses what anyone using the limited pension infor 
mation available in the Retirement History Study or the National 
Longitudinal Survey could hope to achieve. In addition, they have at 
tempted to calculate the retirement incentives facing a worker in each 
and every possible retirement year in a planning horizon, rather than 
in just a specific year or two.
Mitchell and Fields are interested in explaining the age of retirement, 
and they have generally ignored the issue of labor supply afterwards. 
Their model "assumes that the optimal pattern is to work full time and 
then retire" (Fields and Mitchell 1984c). When using the Retirement 
History Study sample, they defined retirement as departure from a 
primary job, and assumed that the job held in 1969 (the first year of 
the RHS) was the primary job. When using the specific pension plan 
data described below, they defined the age of retirement as the age of 
pension receipt.
The authors' theoretical model is very much in the life-cycle tradi 
tion. The worker looks ahead over a planning horizon and chooses when 
to retire. The individual's goal is to maximize personal utility, which 
depends on the consumption of goods and leisure. There is a tradeoff
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between goods and leisure, because continued work increases lifetime 
income (and therefore goods), but decreases lifetime leisure.
Earnings, Social Security, and Pensions
The choice of retirement age is affected by three key variables in the 
Fields and Mitchell model: future earnings, future Social Security 
receipts, and future pension benefits. Lifetime earnings obviously rise 
with delayed retirement. Social Security and pensions are more com 
plicated, since each year of continued work means a loss of retirement 
benefits during that year, but (usually) higher annual benefits in the 
future.
Mitchell and Fields' strategy is to calculate the present discounted 
value of the earnings (net of Social Security and income taxes), Social 
Security and pension streams that would accrue with each possible retire 
ment date over a nine-year planning horizon—from age 60 to 68. They 
then sum these three values to obtain the present discounted value of 
the total income stream (PDVY) for each potential retirement age. A 
major contribution is the method by which the pension data were 
obtained.
Rather than rely on the limited pension benefit data in the RHS or 
the NLS, Fields and Mitchell drew a sample of workers from 14 actual 
defined benefit plans from the Labor Department's 1978 Benefit 
Amounts Survey (BAS). 23 In addition to having some basic demographic 
data and the entire Social Security earnings records of the workers in 
the sample, they had the exact formulas used to calculate pension 
benefits. They ended up with a sample of nearly 9,000 workers who 
retired between the ages of 60 and 68 and who had complete data on 
retirement age, tenure with the firm, and Social Security covered 
earnings.
The authors' research strategy required them to forecast what workers 
aged 60 around 1970 thought their earnings, Social Security, and pen 
sion benefits would have been had they decided to retire at each age 
from then to age 68. 24 Future real earnings were estimated on the basis 
of individual-specific earnings equations. Future Social Security benefits 
were based on the 1972 Social Security rules, which had already
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been legislated in 1970. The authors assumed that workers would have 
expected continued annual real increases of the magnitude that had oc 
curred during the 1960s—about 3 percent per year.
Initial pension amounts were based on the individual plans' benefit 
calculation rules in effect in 1970, and were then assumed to increase 
in real terms, prior to retirement, at whatever annual real rate of in 
crease the plan had experienced during the 1960s. In five of the plans, 
benefits were held constant in nominal terms after retirement. In the 
others, postretirement increases had occurred in the past and were assum 
ed to continue in the future. The earnings, Social Security, and pen 
sion streams were then multiplied by the appropriate survival prob 
abilities and discounted at a 2 percent real rate of interest.
The present values of the pension streams for an identical illustrative 
worker in each of the 14 plans appear in table 3.1. In all cases, the 
PDV of the pension stream began to decrease at some age. But there 
was considerable variety in the asset profiles over time. 25
Mitchell and Fields differentiated between pattern and conventional 
pension plans. In pattern plans, common in union agreements, the an 
nual benefit is almost exclusively a function of the years of service with 
the firm. Conventional plans use both years of service and final salary 
(often over the last few years on the job) in determining initial benefits.
As seen in table 3.1, the pattern plans were generally structured to 
encourage early retirement. Four of the six plans peaked in the initial 
year of eligibility (age 60), one peaked at age 62, and one peaked at 
65. After the maximum, an individual lost pension wealth with every 
single year of delayed retirement. In one case (Plan E), the losses were 
extreme; the value of the pension at age 68 was only 42 percent of its 
value at age 60. Conventional plans, with their emphasis on final earn 
ings, were more likely to encourage work after age 60. Only one plan 
peaked at age 60. Far more common was growth through age 65 and 
decline thereafter.
Olivia Mitchell and Rebecca Luzadis (1988) traced changes in the 
retirement incentives in these 14 defined benefit plans between 1960 
and 1980. They found that the incentives in the four United Auto Worker 
plans had changed dramatically. In 1960, the present discounted value
Table 3.1 
Present Values of Net Private Pension Benefits for Alternative Retirement Ages: Plan-Level Data
If retirement age occurs at age
UAW plans 
Plan A 
Plan B 
PlanC 
PlanD 
Non-UAW plans 
PlanE 
PlanF
60
$28,181
36,030 
28,176
28,176
21,858
6,351
61
$27,586 
36,146 
27,571 
27,571
19,814 
6,464
62
$27,189 
36,599 
27,189 
27,189
17,912 
6,641
63
A. Pattern
$25,455 
36,341 
25,455 
25,455
16,147 
6,850
64
Plans
$23,787 
35,730 
23,787 
23,787
14,512 
6,986
65
$22,195 
34,987 
22,195 
22,195
13,001 
7,079
66
$21,706 
34,081
21,706
11,608 
6,620
67
$21,140
21,140
10,328 
6,156
68
$20,500
20,500
9,153 
5,692
B. Conventional Plans
PlanG 
PlanH 
Plan I 
Plan J 
PlanK 
PlanL 
PlanM 
PlanN
0 
13,527 
16,410 
20,012 
14,851 
17,671 
16,526 
19,491
0 
14,176 
16,709 
20,256 
15,079 
19,669 
17,042 
17,254
9,300 
20,471 
16,841 
20,270
15,290 
21,594 
17,668 
15,193
10,027 
19,364 
16,977 
19,335 
15,504 
23,468 
18,291 
14,230
10,087 
18,173 
17,028
18,359 
16,318 
25,295 
18,810 
13,742
10,497
16,869 
16,893 
17,246 
17,174
26,981
19,084 
13,198
9,461
16,190 
16,563
12,605
8,891
15,081 
15,866
11,592
7,951
13,841 
15,109
10,950
SOURCE: Mitchell and Fields (1985), p. 283.
NOTE: This table is based on pension algorithms as applied to illustrative worker; see source text. Underlined numbers are row maxima. Dashes indicate
retirement is mandatory in that plan at that age.
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of the benefit stream increased with delayed retirement up through age 
65, thereby discouraging early retirement. In both 1970 and 1980, 
however, pension wealth peaked at age 60, and declined with each year 
of additional work after that.
In four other union plans, the peak in pension wealth occurred at age 
65 in 1960 and 1970, but had moved to 62 by 1980. In six nonunion 
plans, the peak was at age 65 in all three years. In this small sample 
of union plans, then, the incentives changed significantly, from 
discouraging early retirement in 1960 to actively encouraging it two 
decades later. In later work with 83 defined benefit plans, Luzadis and 
Mitchell (1989) presented preliminary evidence that employer pensions 
did indeed respond to changes in the retirement environment—in par 
ticular, to changes in mandatory retirement legislation, Employee Retire 
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) regulation, and Social Security 
benefit calculation rules. The carrot replaced the stick.
Richard Ippolito (1990) demonstrates the same trends. He documents 
the dramatic increase over the last several decades in the number of 
pension plans that offered reduced (and usually actuarially subsidized) 
benefits at age 55 or full benefits prior to age 65. Using data from several 
sources, he estimates that the percentage of male workers eligible for 
full benefits prior to age 65 increased from almost none in 1965 to 15 
percent in 1985.
Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989a) have shown that, 
because of the service requirements in many defined benefit plans, the 
age at which pension wealth peaks depends on when the worker joined 
the firm. The later one has joined, the later the wealth peaks. In other 
words, plans often provide less incentive for long-term employees to 
keep working than they do for more recent hires of the same age. Their 
work confirms the view that there is an extremely wide variety of work 
incentives embedded in pension plans and suggests that, because of ser 
vice requirements, knowing just the worker's age and the dates of ear 
ly and normal retirement may not be enough to calculate true compen 
sation accurately.
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Work Incentives
These pension values are only one-third of the financial story. Workers 
must also consider earnings on the job and the asset value of their Social 
Security benefits. Social Security may be close to actuarially fair be 
tween 62 and 65, but is definitely less than fair after that. The Social 
Security wealth losses after age 65 compound the pension losses 
documented above and offset some of the earnings from continued work.
Fields and Mitchell (1984a) have analyzed the incentive structure, 
by year of retirement, facing 390 men in one of their plans (Plan A). 26 
As seen in the averages in table 3.2, the present value of earnings rose 
with each year of delayed retirement. The asset value of the pension 
rights declined monotonically and lost about one-quarter of their value 
by age 68. Social Security rights rose in value through age 65, and then 
declined. The net result of all three of these factors is seen in row 7. 
Several conclusions are apparent. The present discounted value of 
lifetime income always rises with delayed retirement because earnings 
exceed the losses in retirement wealth. An income or wealth maximizer 
would never retire for financial reasons. But a utility maximizer might. 
The true net annual compensation (the change in lifetime income) declin 
ed steadily, from about $7,500 (1970 dollars) at age 60 to less than 
$3,000 at age 68. This was not due to declines in the paycheck, but 
rather to losses of Social Security and pension wealth. 27
In another paper (1984b), the authors did an analogous experiment, 
using the 1982 Social Security laws and a sample drawn from the RHS. 
Their pension figures were much less reliable here. In fact, they were 
not based on the pension data available in the RHS, but rather on in 
dustrywide averages of benefit amounts. The same qualitative conclu 
sions appeared. Lifetime income rose with continued work, but by 
smaller and smaller amounts. The true earnings of an illustrative worker 
at age 61 were over $17,500 (1982 dollars). This decreased to less than 
$10,000 at age 65 (when Social Security wealth declines begin), and 
dropped further to nearly $6,000 at age 67. The worker's true com 
pensation declined with each additional year of work, with a particularly 
severe cut at age 65.
Table 3.2
Expected Future Income Opportunities as Viewed From Age 60 
(in 1970 dollars)
If retirement occurred at age
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Annual amounts
(1) Net earnings
(2) First
(3) First
year's net private pension
year's Social Security benefit3
3
1
0
,140
,904
7,302
3,157
1,901
7,503
3,513
1,894
7,549
3,487
2,172
7,450
3,451
2,480
7,430
2,449
2,807
7,399
2,608
2,991
8,471
2,775
3,181
7,295
2,953
3,376
Present values
(4) PDV
(5) PDV
(6) PDV
(7) PDV
(=(4
net earnings
net private pension
Social Security
net lifetime income
»+(5)+(6))
28
28
57
0
,879
,589
,468
7,022
28,425
29,529
64,977
13,950
28,008
30,412
72,370
20,625
26,290
31,930
78,846
26,920
24,699
33,305
84,923
32,905
23,355
34,332
90,592
38,571
22,811
33,203
94,586
43,900
22,181
31,947
98,028
48,904
21,503
30,561
100,968
SOURCE: Fields and Mitchell (1984a), p. 255.
a. Social Security benefits are computed as of the year of first eligibility. Thus, an individual retiring at age 60 would not begin receiving benefits 
until attaining age 62.
a. 
3
1
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S
3
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Retirement Behavior
Mitchell and Fields proceeded to test whether work or retirement in 
centives actually did influence the behavior of the men in their Benefit 
Amounts Survey sample. This involved reducing the eight years of in 
centives facing each worker (corresponding to retirement at ages 60 
through 68) to simpler summary parameters. The authors chose two: 
the present discounted value of future earnings, pensions, and Social 
Security associated with retirement at age 60 (YBASE), and the change 
in this figure between ages 60 and 65 (YSLOPE). 28
Economic theory suggests that, ceterisparibus, retirement age should 
be an inverse function of YBASE. This is basically a wealth effect— 
those with more wealth will buy more of all normal goods, including 
leisure. One way to buy more leisure is to retire earlier. The effect of 
YSLOPE is theoretically ambiguous because of offsetting income and 
substitution effects. The authors expect, however, that the substitution 
effect dominates, and those with the more to gain from continued work 
will tend to retire later.
Simple regression estimates with retirement age as the dependent 
variable supported their hypotheses. With a sample of workers from 
10 of the BAS pension plans, the YBASE coefficient was significantly 
negative and the YSLOPE coefficient significantly positive (Fields and 
Mitchell 1984c). Each additional $1,000 of Social Security and pen 
sion wealth at age 60 was associated with retirement about one-half to 
one month earlier. Each $1,000 in potential wealth gain between ages 
60 and 65 delayed the average retirement age by one-third to two-thirds 
of a month. 29
Silvana Pozzebon and Olivia Mitchell (1989) analyzed the retirement 
behavior of a small sample of working wives in the RHS. In contrast 
to the men, the wives' economic opportunities did not seem to be signifi 
cant determinants of their retirement behavior. Neither the base level 
of Social Security and pension wealth nor changes in lifetime wealth, 
if retirement were delayed from age 60 to 65, was statistically signifi 
cant. The wives' decisions were affected by their husbands' health, their 
husbands' incomes and the age differences between their husbands and 
themselves, but not by the financial incentives they themselves faced.
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Since there is little literature on the retirement behavior of wives, and 
since this research was done with a very small sample, it is impossible 
to draw strong conclusions. But the suggestion is that working husbands 
and wives may respond differently to their economic circumstances.
Finally, Laurence Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) estimated the im 
pact of the pension plan of a specific Fortune 500 company on the 
behavior of its workers. As did Fields and Mitchell, they knew all the 
details of the benefit calculation rules. In this plan, there was a very 
large reward for remaining on the job until age 55. Pension accruals 
after that were either small or negative, depending on the worker's age 
and service. At age 65, Social Security accruals also turned negative, 
compounding the pension effect, and resulting in wealth losses equal 
to about one-third of annual pay.
Kotlikoff and Wise compared the pension accrual patterns with observ 
ed retirement behavior. They found large increases in retirement rates 
at ages 55, 60, and 62 (the age of first Social Security eligibility) for 
those vested in the pension plan (10 years of service), but no such jumps 
for those not yet vested. At age 65, there was a large increase in the 
probability of retirement for those few still working. This pattern is 
consistent with response to the financial incentives embedded in the pen 
sion and Social Security plans. The authors concluded that
It is clear . . . that the inducements in the plan provisions 
to retire early have had a very substantial effect on depar 
ture rates from the firm . . . The jumps in departure rates 
at specific ages coincide precisely with the discontinuities 
and kink points in the worker compensation profiles that result 
from the pension plan provisions together with wage earn 
ings profiles and social security accrual.
Conclusions
A major contribution of this line of research is the detail provided 
about specific retirement plans—detail that is simply nonexistent in the 
large microeconomic data sets. The price paid is considerably less in 
formation about most other aspects of the individuals under study.
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Another contribution is the specific detail on how retirement incentives 
change, year-by-year, as workers age beyond 60. The authors found 
that retirement income programs are seldom actuarially fair. 30 The pres 
ent discounted value of the income streams depends critically on when 
the benefits are first claimed.
For workers in the Labor Department's Benefit Amounts Survey, 
Social Security wealth generally increased with work up to age 65 and 
declined thereafter. Defined benefit pension plans displayed greater varie 
ty. Pattern plans tended to encourage early retirement (prior to 65), 
while conventional plans (which include earnings in the benefit calcula 
tion rules) generally discouraged it. Delaying retirement always increases 
lifetime income, but by smaller and smaller amounts as one ages. The 
true compensation for work at age 68 can be less than half of what it 
was at age 60.
Work incentives change dramatically over time. Mitchell and Fields' 
and Kotlikoff and Wise's research on the retirement behavior in specific 
firms suggests strongly that workers do respond to these incentives, 
and therefore that individual retirement behavior and aggregate retire 
ment trends can be influenced by changes in public policy.
Uncertainty
Most retirement models have assumed a world of certainty in which 
people make decisions on the basis of their current situations and their 
best estimates of the future. In fact, however, the future is very uncer 
tain. There are probability distributions around these best estimates and 
many predictions turn out to be wrong. Health and living arrangements 
change and unexpected layoffs occur. Labor market conditions improve 
or deteriorate. And retirement benefits can turn out to be very different 
from earlier expectations, either because individuals did not understand 
the benefit calculation rules completely or because the rules changed 
after their initial expectations were formed.
The latter is particularly likely for Social Security. Prior to the 1972 
amendments, which indexed benefits to the cost of living, Congress 
periodically increased nominal and, sometimes, real benefits. Between
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1968 and 1975, for example, real benefits increased dramatically—on 
the order of 45 percent (Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn 1986). This 
occurred after a 15-year period in which real benefits were essentially 
constant. In 1983, amendments were passed that altered benefits by 
delaying a cost-of-living adjustment for six months, taxing half the 
benefits of high-income recipients, and legislating an increase in the 
age of eligibility for full benefits to age 67 (by the year 2027). Pension 
benefits are also subject to change, particularly for workers still on the 
job. Steven Alien, Robert Clark, and Daniel Sumner (1986) have argued 
that postretirement inflation adjustments are made much more frequently 
than commonly believed, even when employers have no contractual 
obligation to do so.
A few researchers have studied the effect of unanticipated changes 
on retirement plans, and a major effort in that direction is currently 
underway. Much of this research has focused on the extent to which 
the large—and presumably unanticipated—increases in real Social Securi 
ty benefits during the early 1970s were responsible for the dramatic 
declines in the labor supply of older men that followed. 31 We will see 
below that there is wide disagreement on the answer. Others have ask 
ed whether changes in retirement plans are correlated with observed 
changes in the respondent's circumstances.
Social Security Increases and the Decline in Participation Rates
Jerry Hausman and David Wise (1985) analyzed the labor force 
behavior of the wage and salary men in all six waves of the Retirement 
History Study. They used a subjective definition of retirement—a respon 
dent is retired when he says he is; that is, when he calls himself fully 
or partially retired. This definition corresponds more closely to exit 
from a career job than it does to withdrawal from the labor force. The 
authors estimated the effects of a number of explanatory variables in 
a hazard model of retirement. The observations were retirement tran 
sitions over two-year RHS interview periods.
The model included standard variables such as health status, annual 
earnings, assets, age, dependents, and pension eligibility, but the focus 
was on Social Security. 32 Its influence was measured by both flows (an-
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nual benefits) and stocks (the present discounted value of future benefits), 
and by both the current value of these two measures and the changes 
in these values following an incremental year of work. It is interesting 
to note that the asset or wealth specification fit the data better than the 
annual benefits version. As expected, high Social Security wealth in 
creased the probability of retirement (and more so at age 65 than earlier) 
and wealth losses associated with additional work decreased it.
With their empirical results, Hausman and Wise were able to simulate 
retirement patterns with and without the increases in Social Security 
primary insurance benefits that occurred between 1969 and 1975. They 
compared the differences in their estimates with the actual declines in 
labor force participation rates, and concluded that "the increases in social 
security benefits over this period may account for possibly one-third 
of the decrease." Although their comparison of subjective self-defined 
retirement status to objective participation rates makes the precise 
numerical estimates suspect, the qualitative finding that the impact of 
these Social Security benefit changes was large is interesting.
In contrast, Gary Burtless (1986) attributed "only a small role in the 
decline in the average male retirement age" to the benefit increases. 
He defined retirement as a discontinuous drop in annual labor supply 
and his dependent variable was retirement age. Lifetime Social Securi 
ty benefits were calculated under three different sets of benefit rules: 
those in effect prior to 1970, those that applied during the period from 
1970 to 1972, and those applicable after 1972. These benefits were in 
cluded in a lifetime budget constraint and the effects of the parameters 
of this constraint on the retirement age were estimated.
Burtless found statistically significant, but modest, effects of Social 
Security increases on retirement behavior. In particular, he estimated 
that the increases legislated in 1970 and 1972 reduced the average retire 
ment age by only one month. The long-run effect, had the changes oc 
curred much earlier so that respondents could have had longer to ad 
just to the change, would have been about two months. Although these 
changes are not inconsequential in the aggregate, they represented, ac 
cording to Burtless, only a small portion of the participation decline 
that actually took place. He viewed rising personal wealth levels, in-
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creases in unemployment after 1969, and changing attitudes toward 
retirement as alternative explanations.
Robert Moffitt (1987) and Alan Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
(1989) are skeptical of even this small role for Social Security. Mof 
fitt's approach to the problem was very different and relied on aggregate 
time series data on labor supply and Social Security wealth. He pointed 
out that the Social Security wealth of a cohort can rise for at least two 
reasons: increases in benefits for individuals already in the system, as 
is studied above, but also extensions of coverage to include those 
previously excluded.
With various assumptions about how people form expectations about 
the future, Moffitt presented evidence that the unanticipated increases 
in aggregate Social Security wealth were actually larger in the 1950s, 
when coverage was expanding rapidly, than they were in the early 1970s. 
But the decreases in labor force participation in the early 1950s were 
much more modest. In addition, Moffitt argued that there were large 
negative unanticipated wealth shocks in the mid- and late-1970s, when 
actual Social Security increases failed to keep pace with what recipients 
may have expected based on the early 1970s experience. Despite these 
negative shocks, participation rates continued to decline.
Krueger and Pischke (1989) analyzed the behavior of the so-called 
"notch babies"—workers born between 1917 and 1921—who, due to 
a 1977 Social Security Act amendment, suffered an abrupt and unex 
pected decrease in their future Social Security benefits. They found lit 
tle evidence that this affected the labor supply behavior of these in 
dividuals and conclude that there is probably little hope for reversing 
the trend toward early retirement by reducing Social Security benefits. 33
Microeconomic cross-section findings are difficult to compare with 
aggregate time series results. Each approach has its own advantages 
and disadvantages and these are nicely summarized in the Moffitt arti 
cle. But he and Krueger and Pischke have pointed out a potential in 
consistency between the long-run trends in aggregate Social Security 
wealth and participation rates and prompted at least a temporary pause 
among those deducing causation from recent patterns of Social Securi 
ty growth and elderly labor force decline.
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Changes in Circumstances and Changes in Plans
With a sample from the National Longitudinal Surveys, Gilbert Nestel 
(1985) compared the retirement plans of respondents at age 59 with 
their subsequent behavior. He noted a significant shift in expectations 
over time. Between the middle 1960s and the middle 1970s, the pro 
portion of respondents planning to retire prior to age 65 increased from 
about 30 to about 40 percent.
The predictions turned out to be relatively inaccurate. By 1981, only 
31 percent of the whites interviewed, and 26 percent of the blacks, 
had actually retired in the age interval in which they had said they 
would. 34 The predictions were more accurate the nearer the planned 
retirement age was to age 59. Those who did not predict accurately 
were much more likely to retire earlier than planned than later. These 
findings suggest that something happened between the date of predic 
tion and the date of planned retirement, but give no insight into what 
might have occurred.
Kathryn Anderson, Richard Burkhauser, and Joseph Quinn (1986) 
compared the planned and actual retirement dates of a sample of nearly 
1,600 men from the Retirement History Study and found that about 60 
percent left work within a year of their predicted dates. 35 More retired 
before than after they had planned, and the proportion of "on-time" 
retirements increased with the age at the time of the prediction.
More important, the authors found that changes in plans were cor 
related with what they assumed were unanticipated changes in the en 
vironment. They studied three such changes: the dramatic increases in 
Social Security benefits mentioned above, changes in individual health 
status, and changes in local labor market conditions.
The Social Security variable was measured as the unexpected increase 
in Social Security wealth caused by the changes in the benefit rules. 
The authors calculated the asset value of the benefit stream in the year 
of predicted retirement (R*) using two sets of rules—those in effect in 
1969, the year when the prediction was made, and those eventually in 
effect in year R*. The difference between the two asset values was the 
unexpected increase in wealth, and it was expected to induce earlier 
retirement. The authors also included dummy variables, indicating health
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status improvement or deterioration and differences in the local 
unemployment rate between 1969 and the earlier of R* and the actual 
retirement date.
The empirical results were reasonable. As expected, increases in Social 
Security wealth increased the probability of retiring earlier than plan 
ned and decreased the likelihood of retiring later. Self-defined health 
deterioration had the same effects. A loosening of the local labor market 
did just the opposite. The greater the increase in local unemployment 
rates, the less likely the workers were to retire early and the more likely 
they were to stay in the labor force longer than planned. This preliminary 
evidence contradicts the view that older workers, often protected by 
seniority, are likely to be forced out of employment during economic 
downturns (although some individuals certainly are), and suggests that 
they may want to and may be able to remain employed longer when 
economic conditions decline.
This research demonstrates that plans do change and, therefore, that 
models based on assumptions of certainty will miss an important part 
of the story. But it is reassuring to find that the changes in plans are 
not entirely random. In fact, they turn out to be correlated with obser 
vable and often unforeseeable changes in circumstances. When expec 
tations prove inaccurate, so do the plans based on them.
Dynamic Programming Models
Much of the most current and sophisticated retirement research focuses 
specifically on issues of uncertainty. John Rust (1987), James Berkovec 
and Steven Stern (forthcoming), and James Stock and David Wise (1990) 
have used dynamic programming models to describe individuals who 
recalculate their optimal behavior each time period, using new infor 
mation about the present and their best predictions about the future. The 
computational requirements are so burdensome that these models are 
usually streamlined along other dimensions and are quite limited in the 
options they allow. The results thus far are generally consistent with 
the previous literature—retirement decisions are influenced by Social 
Security and pension provisions, age and health status.
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What makes these models particularly interesting is that they do not 
assume that workers know their future wage rates and retirement in 
come flows with certainty. Stock and Wise, for example, argue that 
workers decide whether to retire today by making best guesses about 
future wages and Social Security and pension rules. If any time in the 
future looks better, the individual continues to work. After another year, 
the worker has more information about the future, based on actual earn 
ings during that year and any other relevant knowledge acquired, and 
must then make another retirement decision, again comparing immediate 
retirement with retirement in all subsequent years.
The key is that forecasts of future conditions will be different from 
what they were a year ago. What becomes critical in these models are 
assumptions about how expectations are formed and how sensitive they 
are to new information. This is obviously difficult to model. And some 
of what is gained in the theoretical sophistication is lost when one is 
forced to operationalize the concepts for empirical estimation.
Social Security Reform
Gary Fields and Olivia Mitchell (1984b,c), Gary Burtless and Robert 
Moffitt (1984), Stephan Gohmann and Robert Clark (1989) and Alan 
Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1985b, 1989d), whose work we will 
discuss more fully in chapter 5, have all utilized retirement models to 
estimate the effects of Social Security reforms similar to those enacted 
in 1983. 36 They all conclude that these policy changes would indeed 
alter aggregate retirement patterns but suggest that the magnitude of 
the change would be small.
Mitchell and Fields studied the impact of four changes in Social Securi 
ty regulations on the retirement ages and retirement incomes of a sam 
ple of older Americans drawn from the Retirement History Study. They 
defined retirement as the departure from the job held in 1969, the year 
of the initial RHS survey. They calculated the impact of specific reforms 
on the budget sets of the respondents and estimated the effect of these 
changes on labor supply behavior. The four reforms were
(1) an increase in the age of full Social Security benefits from 65 to 68, 
with benefits reduced by 6.67 percent for each year of receipt 
before age 68, 37
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(2) a one-time six-month delay in the Social Security cost-of-living 
adjustment,
(3) an increase in the delayed retirement credit after age 65 from 3 
percent per year of delay to 6.67 percent—the factor currently 
applied between ages 62 and 65 38 and
(4) an increase in the early retirement penalty from 6.67 to 15 percent 
for each year of Social Security receipt prior to age 65.
Three of the four proposals would lower benefits. The third leaves 
benefits prior to age 65 unchanged and increases them for those who 
retire thereafter.
The last proposal, a severe penalty for early retirement or, alternative 
ly, a large reward for continued work, had the largest predicted effect 
on behavior. Fields and Mitchell (1984b) predicted that average retire 
ment would be delayed about three months. The first proposal, which 
combines a decrease in Social Security benefits with a larger delayed 
retirement credit for work after 65, had about half that effect—an average 
delay of 1.6 months. The other two reforms—the one-time delay in the 
cost-of-living adjustment and the increased delayed retirement credit— 
had almost no effect, the former because the impact on lifetime wealth 
is so small and the latter because it only changes incentives after age 
65, when most people have already retired. These results predict that 
workers will respond to Social Security cuts with very modest increases 
in their work lives. They will choose to take the cut in income, not 
in leisure.
Burtless and Moffitt (1984) used their empirical results to simulate 
the impacts on retirement ages and Social Security outlays of three possi 
ble Social Security amendments: 39
(1) a delay in the normal retirement age from 65 to 68 (the same as the 
Fields and Mitchell proposal [1] above),
(2) a 20 percent reduction in Social Security benefits at every age, and
(3) an actuarially-fair delayed retirement credit at all ages. 40
The first two proposals would lower benefits and the last would increase 
them after age 65, when the current delayed retirement credit drops 
from near 7 percent to 3 percent. These amendments were imposed on
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the budget constraints of three hypothetical recipients—married males 
with and without a working spouse, and an unmarried male.
All three proposals were predicted to delay retirement, but the changes 
in behavior are modest. The increase in the normal retirement age to 
68 delays the retirement of the married men by about 4.5 months and 
that of the unmarried man by 2.5 months. These estimates are qualitative 
ly similar to those of Fields and Mitchell. The third proposal (an 
actuarially fair adjustment at all ages) has similar effects and the across- 
the-board 20 percent benefit reduction has about half that impact. Since 
the behavior responses are small, these reforms would substantially alter 
Social Security outlays, decreasing them under the first two proposals 
and increasing them in the third.
It is difficult to compare the Gustman and Steinmeier findings to those 
above because they calculated changes in the percentage working full 
time and part time rather than changes in the average age at retirement. 
They simulated the effects of four actual Social Security changes:
(1) A delay in the age of normal retirement to 67, with the penalty for 
receipt at age 62 at 30 percent,
(2) An increase in the delayed retirement credit after age 65 to 8 
percent per year,
(3) A reduction in the benefit reduction rate applied to earnings over 
the exempt amount (for those aged 65 to 69 only) 
from 50 to 33 percent, and
(4) A one-time six-month delay in the cost-of-living adjustment.
The first two proposals have been legislated for the future; the others 
have already taken place.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) estimated that the entire reform 
package will have little long-term effect on the retirement probabilities 
of those younger than 65—the percentage fully retired (not working) 
falls by less than 1 percentage point. But between ages 65 and 68, the 
proportion retired falls by about four points. This is the net result of 
a six-point increase in the percentage working full time and a 2 percent 
drop in those employed part time. The retirement bulge at age 65 disap 
pears. The component responsible for most of the change is the increase 
in the delayed retirement credit. There is some effect of the decrease
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in the benefit reduction rate and almost none from the delayed cost-of- 
living adjustment. The authors pointed out that with actuarially fair ad 
justments, the designation of the "normal retirement age" is irrelevant, 
since the incentives for delayed retirement are the same before and after 
this arbitrary age.
Gohmann and Clark (1989) have developed a model in which the deci 
sion to claim Social Security benefits and the decision to retire (leave 
the labor force) are treated separately and therefore allowed to move 
in separate directions in response to a policy change. They used a sam 
ple of married, wage and salary men from the Retirement History Study 
to estimate behavioral equations for both decisions, and found that they 
are simultaneously determined. When they altered the parameters of 
the model to reflect the eventual outcome of the 1983 Social Security 
amendments, their simulations suggested only slight changes in the age- 
specific probabilities of enefit acceptance and retirement.
These researchers all predict that changes in Social Security incen 
tives like those legislated in 1983 will alter retirement patterns, but on 
ly modestly. 41 But all of these estimates are only partial equilibrium 
predictions, since they assume that the other parameters in the deci- 
sionmaking process, in particular, the structure of employer pension 
benefits, will remain the same. 42 If these are also endogenous to the 
system, as we expect they are, then the final results could differ substan 
tially from the simulations above.
Involuntary Retirement
Although economists have focused primarily on retirement as a volun 
tary choice (the rational response to the set of options available), there 
has been a resurgence of interest in factors that limit or eliminate this 
choice. This is very much in the older tradition—the view that retirements 
are often involuntary, the result of circumstances beyond the worker's 
control. The two most important such factors are health and labor market 
obstacles late in life.
Health
Interest in the interaction between health and retirement has grown 
in recent years because of the 1983 amendments to the Social Security
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Act, which will increase the age of normal retirement to age 67 by the 
year 2027 and raise the penalty for claiming Social Security at age 62 
from 20 to 30 percent of the full benefit amount. Part of the justifica 
tion for this change is the recent increase in the life expectancy of the 
elderly. This puts financial strains on the resources of the Social Security 
system, but also suggests that workers may well be able to work longer 
than they do now.
Recent reviews by Steven Chapman, Mitchell LaPlante, and Gail 
Wilenski (1986) and by Martynas Yeas (1987), however, have cast some 
doubt on the popular presumption that life expectancy and health go 
hand-in-hand. The trends on longevity are clear—older Americans are 
living longer now than they did two decades ago. The increases in life 
expectancy at ages 60 or 65 are well-documented and are significant 
for males and females, for whites and nonwhites. What is surprising 
is that they do not seem to be accompanied by increases in health status. 
Chapman et al., reporting on a variety of studies and data sources, con 
cluded that morbidity and the prevalence of disability have actually in 
creased. Yeas used a number of measures of health status and found 
that they produced very similar patterns over time, suggesting increas 
ing health problems at least through the late 1970s. 43
One explanation for the declining health of the elderly is the "failure 
of success"—that medical advances keep people alive today who would 
have died in the past (Berkowitz 1988). The additional years may be 
ones of chronic illness, not good health. Regardless of the explanation, 
an implication is that the impact of health on the retirement decision 
is likely to remain at least as important in the future as it is now.
Many economists are skeptical about the usefulness of subjective health 
evaluations, especially when given as a reason for retirement or as part 
of an application for health-related benefits. One concern is that 
respondents may view health as a socially legitimate reason for stop 
ping work and therefore mention it even when it is not the primary reason 
for retirement. Joseph Quinn (1977) found that among retired RHS 
respondents who claimed that they had no health limitations and had 
health better than that of their peers, 10 percent still claimed health as 
the primary motivation for retirement, as did 13 percent of those with 
no health limitation and health the same as their peers.
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On the other hand, Frank Sammartino (1987) and Gary Burtless (1987) 
have argued that self-evaluations of health may be a better measure than 
objective standards because they implicitly include information about 
the quality of health required on the individual's actual job. Sammar 
tino has pointed out that several studies report a high correlation be 
tween medically determined health status and subjective descriptions. 
Despite this, there is a great deal of interest in alternative measures 
of health and in estimating how sensitive empirical results are to the 
definition used.
In a very thorough recent review of the health and retirement literature, 
Sammartino described three causational links. Poor health can make 
work more arduous and therefore increase preferences for leisure; it 
can lower an individual's market wage rate; and it can decrease life 
expectancy. All three can induce earlier retirement.
In empirical work, poor health is almost always associated with earlier 
retirement (see Sammartino [1987] for a list of recent references). The 
effects are large and significant. Exact comparisons are impossible 
because of the variety of definitions of both health and retirement. Sam 
martino reported on several studies that conclude that poor health raises 
the probability of retirement for workers aged 60 to 67 by 14 to 18 
percentage points and lowers the expected age of retirement by one to 
three years.
Some recent studies have focused on health measures other than self- 
defined status at the time of retirement. Donald Parsons (1982), Eric 
Kingson (1982), and Kathryn Anderson and Richard Burkhauser (1985) 
utilized subsequent mortality. Gloria Bazzoli (1985) and Herbert Parnes 
and Lawrence Less (1985a) used self-reported health, but from a survey 
wave prior to retirement. The hope here is that prior health is more 
likely to be an accurate representation, and less likely to be used as 
a social justification for retirement.
Thomas Chirikos and Gilbert Nestel (1981) and Gloria Bazzoli (1985) 
created an index from a series of impairments. J. S. Butler, Richard 
Burkhauser, Jean Mitchell, and Theodore Pincus (1987) compared self- 
reports on a specific condition—arthritis—with a clinical measure. Gary 
Burtless (1987) compared three commonly used subjective measures 
with subsequent mortality and found them to be highly correlated.
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These and other studies continue to confirm that health, however 
measured, is an important determinant of the individual retirement deci 
sion. But they suggest that the use of self-defined health status at retire 
ment exaggerates its importance and may reduce the measured effects 
of other factors. For example, Parsons (1982), using a sample from 
the NLS, found that older men were more likely to declare themselves 
in poor health the larger the Social Security benefits for which they were 
eligible. This suggests that retirement status and declared health status 
may be jointly determined. If so, then the coefficient of subjective health 
status in a retirement equation might reflect both the legitimate impact 
of health and the financial incentives in retirement income programs. 
Parsons found a stronger and cleaner Social Security effect when an 
objective measure of health—subsequent mortality—was used.
Anderson and Burkhauser (1985) reached similar conclusions with 
respect to the wage rate. They used both a subjective measure based 
on the (RHS) respondent's self-assessment and an objective one based 
on subsequent mortality. Although they found significant wage effects 
in their retirement equations in both cases, the elasticities were about 
five times larger when the mortality measure was used. Finally, Burtless 
(1987) compared a subjective measure of impairment with an index based 
on predetermined conditions. He found that both variables were signifi 
cant determinants in retirement equations, but that the measured effects 
of economic variables (Social Security benefits, pension entitlement, 
and potential earnings) were much larger when the more objective in 
dex was used.
These authors have suggested that self-declared health status may really 
be an endogenous variable, jointly determined with retirement status. 
If so, it is not a legitimate explanatory variable in a single-equation labor 
supply equation. Steven Stern (1989) has tested this hypothesis explicitly, 
although not with a sample of older workers. He considered reported 
disability and labor force participation as a system of simultaneous equa 
tions, and used symptoms and diseases as the underlying index of true 
health status. In contrast with the suggestions in much of the literature, 
Stern found very little evidence of endogeneity when using standard 
subjective health questions and very little bias on other coefficients in
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the equations. Although he admits that his evidence is not conclusive, 
he finds that the traditional disability measures are useful and reasonably 
exogenous predictors of labor force participation. The last word has 
certainly not been spoken on this issue.
Several authors (Sickles and Taubman [1986] and Butler, Anderson, 
and Burkhauser [1989]) have gone a step further and presented models 
in which actual (not just reported) health is endogenous, since medical 
care over the lifetime is a matter of choice. If medical care depends 
on income, then financial resources have two effects on the retirement de 
cision: a direct one as in all the modern models, and also an indirect one 
via their impact on health status. If this story is correct, then use of 
health status, even if perfectly measured, in a single equation model 
will yield biased coefficients for the explanatory variables.
This current literature on health and retirement yields several con 
clusions. The most obvious is additional confirmation that health is a 
key determinant of labor force status, even in sophisticated models that 
focus on choice and the role of financial incentives. But there is con 
siderable debate on the magnitude and exact nature of its influence. The 
size of the estimated effects of health and economic factors depends 
on the nature of the model (whether health is viewed as exogenous or 
endogenous) and on the precise measure of health status used.
Labor Market Obstacles
Even in an era when an increasing number of retirements appear to 
be voluntary, there is widespread interest in the special labor market 
problems of middle-aged and older workers. This interest was accen 
tuated by the job losses caused by two recessions in the early 1980s 
and by recent and current corporate restructuring, often in conjunction 
with mergers and acquisitions. The special problems of the elderly in 
clude the difficulty of finding new full-time work late in life, the short 
age of well-paying part-time job opportunities, and age discrimination.
The official unemployment rates of older workers are lower than those 
of the labor force as a whole. 44 These official statistics, however, con 
ceal part of the story. Older Americans are more likely than others to 
be discouraged workers—out of work but no longer looking, and
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therefore not counted among the unemployed. Diane Herz and Philip 
Rones (1989) showed that the inclusion of discouraged workers adds 
over a third to the unemployment rate of men aged 55 and over and 
adds over 70 percent for analogous women, but has only a very small 
effect on the unemployment rate overall. 45 Although workers aged 55 
and over were about as likely to be laid off in the mid-1980s as those 
who were younger, the older workers who were laid off were much 
more likely to leave the labor force—one-third of those aged 55 to 64 
did, as did three-quarters of those 65 and over, compared to less than 
10 percent of those aged 20 through 54 (Herz and Rones 1989).
David Shapiro and Steven Sandell (1987) have specifically studied 
older displaced workers in the NLS surveys—those men who were per 
manently laid offer fired between 1966 and 1978. They found that older 
job-losers faced special difficulties. They were more likely to suffer 
long spells of unemployment and greater earnings reductions when they 
did find work. Layoffs were also highly correlated with retirement. 
Almost 30 percent of male job-losers aged 60 retired, compared to on 
ly 10 percent of those still employed.
Robert Hutchens (1986,1988) has argued that job opportunities decline 
with age because older workers have fewer years to offer a prospective 
employer. Therefore, firms have less time to recoup the fixed costs of 
employment (such as the costs of firm-specific on-the-job training) and 
are less able to utilize compensation schemes that delay part of the pay 
until the end of the contract. In addition, the physical requirements of 
some jobs may put older workers at a disadvantage. Using data from 
the 1983 Current Population Survey, Hutchens (1988) showed that 
recently hired older workers were found in a narrower band of industries 
and occupations than were either recently hired young workers or all 
old workers. Although this could occur because older job-changers 
voluntarily choose this limited range of jobs, it is also consistent with 
the hypothesis that the breadth of opportunity declines.
According to Jim Jondrow, Frank Brechling, and Alan Marcus (1987), 
many workers would like to retire gradually. In one survey, 80 percent 
of respondents over age 55 preferred part-time work to complete retire 
ment. In another, 60 percent of a sample of managers preferred phased 
retirement. Two-thirds of another group said they would consider a tran-
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sitional step of part-time employment. Many of these individuals would 
have liked part-time work with their full-time employer. Despite these 
preferences, as we will see in chapter 5, the modal pattern of retire 
ment still involves an abrupt transition from full-time work to complete 
labor force withdrawal. Most wage and salary workers who are able 
to reduce the number of hours they work must switch jobs to do so. 
Why do the desires and opportunities for part-time work not match?
A primary reason is that part-time pay is lower than full-time com 
pensation. According to Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1985a), 
older workers in the RHS who reported themselves partially retired suf 
fered an hourly wage loss of 10 percent if they remained with their 
previous full-time employer, and 30 percent if they did not. In chapter 
6 below, with the RHS sample, we report similar findings—significant 
wage losses associated with movement to part-time work, especially 
if accompanied by a change in employer.
Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987) suggest that these wage 
declines are due to the lower productivity and higher fixed administrative 
and training costs of part-time work. They hypothesize that employers 
have to pay less to make part-time employment profitable. This is 
especially true when a worker has changed employers, lost specific 
human capital, and has to be retrained on the new job.
Why then do workers not reduce hours on their career jobs, and 
thereby maintain their specific human capital and wage rates? Accord 
ing to Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, 1985a), they do not because they 
cannot. Only 15 percent of firms responding to a 1979 survey permit 
ted some employees to reduce hours as they approached retirement. 
Only 7 percent offered this option to all employees. A survey of in 
dividuals suggested that two-thirds to three-quarters of older wage and 
salary workers were unable to work fewer hours. Shirley Rhine (1984) 
reported that only 3 percent of a sample of over 350 large firms per 
mitted phased retirement. The self-employed, on the other hand, who 
have more control over their hours, are much more likely to utilize a 
transitional period of partial retirement.
What many workers want, but cannot find, is part-time employment 
at their old wage rates. What some find, but do not want, are jobs at 
lower pay. 46 Many older workers, therefore, face unattractive alter-
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natives as they age. Continued full-time employment on a career job 
eventually results in significant losses of retirement income wealth—in 
essence, a pay cut. Part-time work on this job is rarely available for 
the wage and salary population. A new job usually means a substan 
tially lower wage rate.
Faced with these unattractive alternatives, many older Americans stop 
working. Is this decision voluntary? In one sense it is, because individuals 
choose to do it under the circumstances. But in another sense it is not, 
because the circumstances change dramatically as they age. Older 
workers face special problems in the labor market, and the interaction 
between supply and demand, choice and coercion, is a complex one.
The National Longitudinal Surveys
Herbert Parnes and his colleagues at the Center for Human Resource 
Research at the Ohio State University are responsible for the develop 
ment, collection, and much of the analysis of the data collected in the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLS). Four 
demographic groups were surveyed, including a sample of approximately 
5,000 men aged 45 to 59, in 1966. Although the study was initially 
scheduled to last only five years, concentrating on the preretirement 
experience, it was later extended to 10, and then to 17 years. Respondents 
were interviewed a total of 10 times, by telephone, mail, and in per 
son. Since this group was 62 to 76 years of age by the time the surveys 
ceased in 1983, most of them were followed through their retirement 
and well into their postretirement years. 47
The NLS data on older workers have generated a remarkable amount 
of research—six volumes of papers by members of the Center for Human 
Resource Research (all referenced in Parnes et al. [1985])—and hun 
dreds of papers by these and other researchers throughout the country. 
Their last monograph includes research by economists, psychologists, 
sociologists and statisticians. We include only a cursory review of this 
literature here, and highlight some of the findings that bear most directly 
on our research below.
Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision 119
Definitions of Retirement
Using 15 years of longitudinal data, Herbert Parnes and Lawrence 
Less (1985a) analyzed the volume and patterns of retirement over this 
period and documented the importance of the definition chosen. They 
experimented with three. The first is subjective—individuals are label 
ed retired whenever they state that they have stopped working at a regular 
job. The other two are objective. One is based on the receipt of pen 
sion or disability income (from Social Security or an employer pension), 
and the other on annual labor supply. In the latter, the authors defined 
as retired anyone working fewer than 1,000 hours per year— 
approximately half-time or less.
There are several other choices that the researchers must also make 
in calculating how many people retired during a given time period. One 
is whether to treat retirement as a one-time event (once retired, always 
retired) or as a function of current labor force status and, therefore, 
reversible. Another issue is which samples to use—those available at 
the beginning of the period or the smaller group left at the end.
Parnes and Less demonstrated that these definitional issues are very 
important. If one requires only that the individual meet one of the three 
criteria at some point during the 15 years, then 86 percent of the men 
in the sample (aged 60 to 74) were retired in 1981. At the other ex 
treme, if all three criteria have to be met and the definition is based 
on current status, only 59 percent of this same sample were retired. 48 
In proportional terms, the differences were even greater earlier in the 
surveys, when the absolute number of retired was much smaller. Parnes 
and Less concluded that there is no best definition of retirement, but 
that the appropriate definition varies with the purpose of the research. 
In their volume (Parnes et al. 1985), the authors all used the subjective 
criterion (stopped working at a regular job) and treated retirement as 
irreversible. With this definition, they found a considerable amount of 
work after retirement.
Reasons for Retirement
Parnes and Less attempted to determine why those who had retired 
had done so. They did not rely on retrospective answers to direct ques-
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tions about motivations, but rather relied on the longitudinal record prior 
to the retirement decision.49 They categorized the reasons into four 
groups: (1) involuntary retirement under mandatory retirement plans, 
(2) retirement dictated by poor health, (3) retirement because of labor 
market adversities, and (4) voluntary retirement. Individuals were in 
cluded in the first category only if they retired at the mandatory retire 
ment age and had reported in earlier interviews that they preferred to 
work longer. 50
When all the retirements during the 15 years were analyzed, the first 
and third categories turned out to be relatively unimportant. Only 3 per 
cent of the men retired because of mandatory retirement, and only 5 
percent because of adverse labor market conditions. 51 About a third 
seemed to be "forced" into retirement because of poor health, and the 
majority—nearly 60 percent—appeared to have retired voluntarily.
There were some interesting differences among subgroups. Blacks 
were significantly more likely to have retired for health reasons (47 
versus 34 percent) and, therefore, less likely to have made an un 
constrained voluntary decision. Those who stopped working at their 
regular jobs before age 62 were much more likely to have had a prior 
health problem. This finding is consistent with the research of Eric 
Kingson (1982), mentioned in chapter 2, who studied the NLS men who 
permanently withdrew from the labor force before age 62. Kingson found 
that among these "very early retirees," 85 percent of the white men 
and 91 percent of the black men had health problems—they either 
reported that health limited their work or they had medically certified 
disabilities that enabled them to receive Social Security disability benefits.
These NLS results—at least those for respondents retiring at age 62 
or later—are consistent with most of the modern research and at variance 
with the early Social Security questionnaires discussed in chapter 2. 
There is considerable evidence that today many of the labor market tran 
sitions in the later years are voluntary, made by individuals choosing 
among alternative lifestyles and income streams. Many of these transi 
tions take place before the age of 65. Of course, health and labor market 
obstacles remain important constraints for certain individuals, especially 
for very early retirees. They preclude continued work for some and
Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision 121
change the terms of the tradeoff for others. But they are by no means 
the dominant factors that they once appeared to be.
Postretirement Work Experience
When the definition of retirement is based on something other than 
current labor force status, it is possible for individuals to work while 
retired. In another paper, Parnes and Less (1985b) studied the labor 
market activities of the men who had retired between 1967 and 1979. 
At the time of the 1981 survey, nearly 20 percent of them were either 
employed or looking for work.
This percentage differed dramatically by other characteristics. Retired 
whites were more likely to be in the labor force than were blacks (18 
percent versus 13 percent), and the white labor force participants were 
much less likely to be unemployed. More than a quarter of the individuals 
from professional and managerial occupations remained in the labor 
force, compared to only 15 percent of the others. Those who retired 
voluntarily were only slightly less likely to keep working than those 
driven out by mandatory retirement or labor market adversities (23 per 
cent versus 27 and 24 percent), but people in all of these categories 
were much more likely to be at or looking for work than those driven 
out by poor health. Only 11 percent of the latter group remained in 
the labor force.
Parnes and Less also found that the likelihood of being in the labor 
force was highest right after retirement, and declined thereafter. It was 
higher for younger retirees, for the self-employed, for those with working 
wives, and for those with high levels of wealth. This last result sug 
gests that postretirement employment may be for reasons other than 
financial.
Of the retirees who worked during 1981, half of them had full-year 
jobs, but 60 percent worked part time during the weeks they worked. 
Altogether, 20 percent of those employed worked more than 2,000 hours 
per year, and 30 percent worked less than 500. Three-quarters of the 
working retired were in new occupations (defined by Census 1-digit 
categories), two-thirds in new industries, and most were in jobs lower 
on the economic scale than the ones they had left. In real terms, me-
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dian average hourly earnings were less than half what they had been 
on the preretirement job.
Conclusions
Parnes and Less found a wide variety of labor market experiences 
among the older workers in their NLS sample. By various definitions, 
they found between 60 and 85 percent were retired by 1981, when the 
age range was 60 to 74 years. The term "retired" covered individuals 
in very different states of labor market activity—from those continuing 
to work full time to those who had completely withdrawn from the labor 
force.
Our focus differs from that of Parnes et al We are interested in depar 
tures from what we define as a career job—full-time work on a job held 
for at least 10 years. Nonetheless, the Parnes results are very similar 
to those which we find with the Retirement History Study data, and 
discuss in chapters 5 and 6 below. After exit from full-time work on 
a career job, many people continue to work, sometimes part time on 
the same job, but more often with a new employer at substantially lower 
wages. Whether these individuals define themselves as retired or not 
is of secondary concern to us. We are more interested in what they do 
than in what they call it.
Summary
The retirement literature has come a long way since the mid-1940s. 
Research methodologies and conclusions have changed. The early work 
relied primarily on cross-sectional questionnaires in which retirees were 
simply asked why they retired when they did. Much of the modem work 
is based on large longitudinal data sets with detailed demographic, 
economic, and social data on thousands of individuals. This permits 
researchers to study the objective circumstances that existed prior to 
the behavior under study and, thereby, to supplement the explanations 
given by the respondents themselves.
Over these past four decades, our understanding of the retirement 
decision has grown significantly. Early evidence suggested that the over-
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whelming reasons for retirement were health and labor market con 
straints, and that very few people retired voluntarily. Modern research 
suggests the opposite—that many older Americans do leave their career 
jobs voluntarily. Although some are still forced out by bad health and 
layoffs, many others are induced out by the financial incentives embedded 
in our retirement income systems.
Most of the recent work by economists in this field has concentrated 
on the details of these financial incentives. A major breakthrough was 
the treatment of retirement rights as stocks of wealth rather than as an 
nual flows. It soon became clear that the asset value of these rights could 
either rise or fall with continued work, depending on the details of the 
benefit calculation formulas, and that these changes in wealth are real 
ly a component of compensation. Therefore, an individual's true earn 
ings could rise or fall over time without any change in the size of the 
pay check.
Modern retirement research has taken two tacks. One approach, nar 
row and deep, is to look very carefully at the mechanics of actual pen 
sion plans and deduce whether the rules subsidize or penalize work at 
various ages. The problem here is that the data sets with considerable 
pension detail provide little other information about the individuals enroll 
ed in the plans. The other approach, wide and shallow, is to utilize one 
of the superb longitudinal data sets mentioned above, with excellent 
information about the individuals in the sample, but relatively little detail 
about their pension plans. Fortunately, both avenues suggest that retire 
ment incentives do exist and that many people behave as though they 
understand and respond to them.
While the work on the theory and the explanatory variables has got 
ten more and more sophisticated, economists have paid considerably 
less attention to the actual behavior being explained. With the excep 
tion of a few analysts who have studied hours of work and a few more 
who have analyzed partial retirement, most have treated retirement as 
dichotomous. In fact, as we demonstrate in chapter 5, the labor market 
behavior of older Americans is anything but dichotomous. A wide variety 
of withdrawal patterns is observed. Although it is always possible to 
squeeze them all into two categories, we suspect that insight is lost rather 
than gained in the process.
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Before looking ahead to work after retirement, however, we first look 
back, to a body of research on the influence of retirement income plans 
on behavior much earlier in the life cycle—in the prime working years, 
long before thoughts of retirement.
NOTES
1. The Benefit Amounts Survey includes the birth date and date of retirement for each pension 
recipient, as well as earnings histories and some very basic demographic information from the 
Social Security Administration's records. (See Fields and Mitchell 1984c.)
2. Martin Levine (1988) has recently published a book on mandatory retirement. He reviews the 
literature on mandatory retirement and aging, and concludes that mandatory retirement is an un 
justifiable form of age discrimination. Karen Holden and Lee Hansen (1989) have edited a volume 
on the impact of changing mandatory retirement rules on higher education.
3. The discount rate has two components: the real rate of interest (assumed to be 2 percent), and 
the expected rate of inflation. In cases where future retirement benefits are fully indexed for in 
flation (such as Social Security and federal employee pension benefits), the inflation component 
disappears. When future benefits are only partly indexed) as with many state and local govern 
ment plans), only the uncovered portion of inflation is included. Future benefits that are fixed 
in nominal terms at initial receipt (like many private sector pensions) are discounted at the full 
nominal discount rate.
4. A more detailed description of the derivation of the WEALTH and DELTA terms can be found 
in Burkhauser and Quinn (1983a).
5. Although the WEALTH formula in the text does not reflect it, the calculations for couples 
include the expected benefits going to a surviving spouse, at two-thirds the amount that a couple 
received.
6. Information was available in three parts of the RHS questionnaire: a section on pension plans, 
a section on retirement income expected in the future, and a section on actual income received. 
In the first four waves of data, then, there were 12 potential sources of information. Not everyone 
was asked every question and not every question asked was answered. A decision tree was developed 
to search all the sources in a specific order, to maximize the probability of obtaining useful infor 
mation. Whenever possible, the pension data were based on actual pension receipt. If these data 
were not available, the authors turned next to the details of the pension plan on the current or 
last job. Finally, if still not successful, they looked at answers about expected retirement income. 
In the end, they obtained benefit estimates for about 85 percent of the sample.
7. This was most true in the intermediate wealth categories. The poorest were the least likely 
to have pension and Social Security coverage. The wealthiest tended to have other assets that 
dominated retirement rights.
8. The Social Security wealth coefficient was insignificant. This is surprising, from a theoretical 
point of view, but, in fact, weak wealth effects are frequently found in the retirement and other 
labor supply literature. One hypothesis is that wealth is correlated with an unobserved measure 
of proclivity for work. Those with a taste for work have accumulated wealth (retirement income 
wealth, in this case), and are likely to continue to work as they approach retirement age—not 
because one causes the other, but because both are caused by this unmeasured underlying per 
sonality characteristic. The correlation between wealth and attitude toward work masks the true 
relationship between wealth and the probability of retirement.
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9. Malcolm Morrison (1988) found similar results with a small sample of women. About a third 
of the actual differences in behavior between those with and without mandatory retirement could 
be explained by other factors.
10. Mandatory retirement is probably even less important than it appears here. If workers select 
jobs in part because of their compulsory retirement provisions, then those who plan to retire at 
the mandatory age anyway are more likely to end up in jobs with that constraint, because it is 
not a drawback to them. They will then retire at mandatory retirement age, but not because they 
had to, but because they wanted to. Those who prefer to stay on the job beyond then will tend 
to avoid firms with such rules and then work beyond mandatory retirement age. Since these 
preferences are not measured and are correlated with mandatory retirement status, mandatory 
retirement will look more important than it really is.
11. Morrison (1988) estimates this number at 200,000, which is still very small in comparison 
to the national labor supply.
12. Using a very different methodological approach, James Schulz (1974) and Janice Halpern 
(1978) reached the same conclusion. Schulz found that only 10 percent of a cohort of retired men 
was subject to mandatory retirement, worked up to that age, and claimed that they were willing 
and able to work longer. Using several data sets that asked similar questions, Halpern reported 
that only 4 to 8 percent of the older population was really constrained by these rules.
Data from the first 15 years of the National Longitudinal Survey of older men tell a similar 
tale. Parnes et al. (1985) report that "of the nearly 8.5 million men aged 60-74 in 1981 who 
had retired over the preceding 15 years, fewer than 5 percent had been unwillingly removed from 
jobs by mandatoiy retirement rules."
13. Steven Sandell (1988) has questioned this conclusion, and pointed out that it is based on research 
undertaken in an institutional environment different from that today. In particular, the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 requires continued pension credits and accruals for work after 
age 65. This was not the case previously. It is certainly possible that this increased incentive to 
work may encourage some workers to remain on the job and therefore make the elimination of 
mandatory retirement at age 65 more important, but the magnitude of this effect is unknown.
14. There has been a particular concern in the university community about the elimination of 
mandatory retirement in an environment with tenured employment and no heavy lifting. Recent 
research by Holden and Hansen (1989) and Montgomery (1989) suggests that the increase in the 
mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70 might delay average faculty retirement ages by one to 
two years, but also that faculty would probably be responsive to early retirement incentives designed 
to induce them out.
15. Olivia Mitchell and Rebecca Luzadis (1988) presented additional evidence that this is the case. 
They quantified the retirement incentives in 14 defined benefit pension plans from 1960 to 1980—a 
period during which mandatory retirement at age 65 was outlawed (in 1978), and the elimination 
of mandatory retirement altogether was discussed. (It was outlawed for most workers in 1986.) 
They found that the pension incentives in union agreements changed from discouraging early retire 
ment (in 1960) to encouraging it (in 1980). This paper is discussed below.
16. For those with a decline in hours over time, but without a clear and discontinuous drop, retire 
ment status was based on a combination of self-defined retirement status, labor force status, and 
Social Security receipt status.
17. About one-fifth of the retirees in the sample continued to work. Their average workweek 
was about 16 hours (Burtless and Moffitt 1984). In subsequent work, Burtless (1986) considered 
this partial retirement insignificant enough to ignore it and treated partial retirement as in 
distinguishable from full retirement.
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18. The Burtless and Moffitt analysis ignored the increments to future benefits that occur because 
of the earnings beyond the exempt amount. Because of these future increments, the true earnings- 
test tax was less than the SO percent legislated prior to 1990. (If the increments are actuarially 
fair, the earnings test disappears, since the benefits foregone are returned in the future. If the 
adjustments are more than actuarially fair, the earnings-test tax actually becomes a subsidy.) Burtless 
and Moffitt (1984) ignored this complication because they believe that retirees are generally unaware 
of its existence.
19. The impact of borrowing constraints and the clustering of retirements at age 62 are discussed 
in more detail in Burtless and Moffitt (1986). In addition, Kahn (1988) has presented evidence 
for the liquidity constraint hypothesis. He found that the retirement cluster at age 62 is primarily 
among low wealth people, who can neither dissave, since they have little wealth, nor borrow 
against future benefits. Therefore, they have to work until actually eligible for benefits.
20. The authors acknowledged the possibility that these results represent reporting bias, rather 
than the actual earnings distribution. In other words, respondents may underreport earnings to 
avoid the reduction in Social Security benefits. But since these figures were reported to Census 
workers (who actually collected the RHS data), not to the Social Security Administration, this 
may not be a serious problem.
21. In more recent work, Burtless (1987) has written in detail on the impact of health on retire 
ment. He found that industrial and occupational attachments affect work-related health status, 
and that both health and industrial and occupational attachments have independent impacts on 
the employment patterns of older workers.
22. Burtless (1986) used a similar model, estimated with the same data set, to simulate the impact 
on retirement trends of the large increases in real Social Security benefits between 1969 and 1972. 
He concluded that "social security is found to have a precisely measured but small overall effect 
on retirement. If these estimates are approximately accurate, rising social security benefits in the 
1970s played only a small role in the decline in the average male retirement age in recent years. 
The labour force participation rate of older men has declined for various reasons in addition to 
the increases in social security payments: rising personal wealth levels, sharply higher unemployment 
levels in the period after 1970, and changing attitudes toward work and retirement."
23. Eight of the plans were union agreements—four in durable manufacturing, negotiated by the 
United Auto Workers, and four others in transportation, trade, and construction. The other six 
nonunion plans were in the service and finance industries. (See Mitchell and Luzadis 1988.) 
Four of the pension plans had insufficient data on the retirees to use in the behavioral equa 
tions. Therefore, all 14 could be used in describing the retirement incentives, but workers in only 
10 of them were included in the behavioral equations.
24. See Fields and Mitchell (1984c, chapter 3) for more details on their forecasting techniques.
25. Their qualitative results were similar to those of Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) who studied the 
accrual patterns of nearly 1,200 plans and also found a wide variety of incentives.
26. The present discounted values of the pension plan in table 3.2 are different from those for 
plan A in table 3.1, because table 3.1 described the incentives for a single illustrative individual, 
while table 3.2 averages the values over the 390 men in the plan A sample.
27. In their book, Fields and Mitchell (1984c) calculated the average incentives across 10 of the 
pension plans (the 10 plans that they used in the behavioral work), but only up through age 65. 
The average (across people and plans) true compensation peaked at $8,711 (in 1970 dollars) be 
tween ages 61 and 62, and then declined to $7,306 between ages 64 and 65. Presumably, the 
declines continued after age 65, when the Social Security wealth gains became losses.
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28. The earnings component in YBASE is zero, because retirement at age 60 implies no future 
earnings in the Fields and Mitchell model.
29. Similar results were found in an analysis of the 390 workers in pension plan A (Fields and 
Mitchell [1984a]) and in a regression on workers in the RHS. In the latter case, however, the 
magnitude of the YSLOPE effect was much smaller and barely significant.
30. An exception to this is the defined-contribution employer pension plan, which is really just 
a tax-deferred savings plan.
31. Bernheim (1988) presents evidence that respondents in the RHS form generally unbiased 
estimates of future Social Security benefits, and that this was true even when the predictions were 
made prior to the large increases legislated in the early 1970s. This suggests that these increases 
may not have been entirely unanticipated, despite the fact that they followed a decade-and-a-half 
of roughly constant real benefits.
The literature below, in contrast, assumes that these real increases were not foreseen. See Ander- 
son, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) for arguments on why this is a more reasonable assumption.
32. With the exception of the pension eligibility variable, which was statistically insignificant, 
the other coefficients were of the expected sign, and significant.
33. Krueger and Pischke (1989) admit that there are alternative explanations for their nonfind- 
ing. Integrated employer pension plans would have offset part of the wealth loss, and even where 
they did not, the impact of the loss on lifetime wealth may have just been too small to create 
a discernible retirement effect. If so, it would be incorrect to conclude that a more substantial 
and widespread change in Social Security benefits would have little effect.
34. The age intervals were 58-61, 62-64, 65, 66-70, and 71 and older. Since most of these in 
tervals are several years wide, it is all the more surprising that the predictions were so inaccurate.
35. There are several differences in the two studies that might explain the conflicting results on 
the accuracy of plans. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn's predictions were all made in the year 
1969, when the respondents were 58-63 years old. They defined a prediction as accurate whenever 
retirement occurred within a year on either side of the date. Nestel's predictions were all made 
by 59-year-olds, who were probably further away, on average, from their predicted retirement 
age. Nestel also required retirement within the predicted interval (see footnote 34), rather than 
within a year of the predicted age.
36. See Svahn and Ross (1983) for a detailed description of the 1983 Social Security amendments.
37. This would imply a 20 percent reduction for retirement at age 65 and a 40 percent reduction 
for those claiming benefits at age 62. The legislation actually passed in 1983 will raise the age 
of full benefits to 66 by the year 2009, and eventually to 67 in 2027, and will set the maximum 
reduction for retirement at age 62 at 30 percent.
38. In fact, the 1983 legislation will slowly raise the delayed retirement credit from 3 to 8 percent 
per year of delay after age 65.
39. Burtless and Moffitt define retirement as a discontinuous drop in labor supply.
40. The actuarial fairness is based on the actuarial life tables for single men. This implies, accord 
ing to Burtless and Moffitt (1984), very slight reductions in benefits between ages 62 and 64 (since 
they estimate that the current rules are slightly more than actuarially fair) and dramatic increases 
after 65. Their delayed retirement credits are not constant per year; for example, their adjustment 
factors are 1.10 (rather than the current 1.03) at age 66, 1.33 (up from 1.09) at 68, and 2.05 at 72.
41. In a recent paper focusing on disability issues, Haveman, Wolfe, and Warlick (1988) analyz 
ed the impact of a 20 percent decrease in Social Security early retirement benefits. Their simula 
tions suggested that the number of early retirees would decrease by only a small percent and that 
only about a quarter of those who would leave the early retirement rolls would be able to join
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the Social Security disability rolls. In contrast, a SO percent earnings supplement (up to a max 
imum of $1,500 per year) for workers aged 62 to 64 was estimated to have a much larger effect 
on reducing the number of early retirees.
42. Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) simulated what might happen if the age of normal retire 
ment in an employer pension plan were changed from 65 to 67, to match the Social Security change. 
They predicted that the percentage working full time would increase by another 3 to 4 percentage 
points.
43. Yeas (1987) reported some preliminary evidence that this trend may have leveled off or perhaps 
even reversed during the 1980s.
44. Rones (1983) points out that this was not the case prior to the late 1960s, when the official 
unemployment rates for men aged 55 to 64 and 65 and over were slightly higher than those for 
prime aged men.
45. Part of the reason for this difference is that there is a huge pool of older Americans out of 
the labor force, and, therefore, potentially discouraged workers, and only a relatively small such 
pool among the younger. Older workers are more likely than the young to have alternative in 
come sources (Social Security and pensions) that permit them to stop searching and leave the 
labor force.
46. Confusion arises in the literature because the survey instruments usually do not clarify the 
conditions of the hypothetical part-time job when people are asked, "Would you like to work 
part time?" This is not a very useful question unless accompanied by details on wages, benefits, 
and other terms of employment. See Rones (1983) for more elaboration on this point.
47. By 1981, 43 percent of the original sample had been lost due to attrition—26 percent had 
died and another 17 percent had disappeared for other reasons, usually refusal to participate. See 
Parnes et al. (1985) for an overview of the data set.
48. If all three criteria must be met, but met at any time during the 15 years—in other words, 
if retirement is a once-and-for-all event—then 68 percent of the sample had retired.
49. A comparison of the results based on information given prior to retirement with those based 
on retrospective reasons given after retirement "reinforced our a priori view that retrospectively 
reported reasons for retirement are suspect" (Parnes and Less 1985a).
50. This may understate the importance of mandatory retirement if some individuals retire prior 
to the mandatory retirement age but were nonetheless influenced by the fact that they could not 
have worked beyond it. These people would not end up in Parnes and Less' first category.
51. Even when only those who retired at age 65 or later are considered, only 9 percent seemed 
to have retired because of a mandatory retirement provision on their regular jobs.
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The Importance
of Employer Pensions and Social Security 
at Younger Ages
In the previous two chapters, we reviewed the literature on the im 
portance of Social Security and employer pensions on the labor supply 
decisions of older workers. The characterization of retirement income 
rights as special forms of wealth, whose value affects and is affected 
by labor force behavior, is at the core of the modern economic analysis 
of retirement. Less well understood is the role that Social Security and 
pensions play at younger ages. Although the actual receipt of retire 
ment benefits occurs near or at the end of the work life, their values 
are determined by decisions made much earlier.
In this chapter, we consider the effects of pensions on the patterns 
of wage compensation and on work behavior earlier in an individual's 
career. Although it is still controversial, there is emerging a life-cycle, 
implicit-contract view of the relationship between workers and the firms 
that employ them. Employer pensions play an integral role in this rela 
tionship. Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the most obvious aspect of this 
contract: nonactuarially fair pension plans can penalize workers who 
stay on career jobs too long. Here, we suggest that pensions can also 
affect mobility much earlier. In summary, they penalize workers who 
leave too early as well as those who leave too late.
In the "spot" market view of competitive markets, workers are paid 
the value of their marginal products in every time period. At the heart 
of the implicit contract view, and the controversy surrounding it, is the 
notion that workers are paid their marginal product over their careers 
with a firm rather than at every moment during that career. They can 
be overpaid or underpaid at any moment, as long as it averages out
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in the end. This view of labor market equilibrium turns out to be more 
than an esoteric point of theory. It is an important distinction that fun 
damentally alters one's view of who pays for pensions, who loses when 
a worker leaves a career job "too early," and how the size of a firm's 
pension liability varies over the career of its workers.
We also discuss the role of the Social Security system earlier in a 
worker's career. Since a link exists between Social Security taxes and 
future benefits, one can estimate the net effect of Social Security on 
the wage of a worker of any age. We argue that changes in Social Securi 
ty policy could influence work across the entire life cycle.
Pensions
In the last chapter, we discussed how a worker's pension wealth 
changes if benefit acceptance is delayed. Here the value of pension wealth 
is shown to change throughout an employee's work career with the firm. 
Pension accrual (the change in the present discounted value of a pen 
sion following an additional year of work) starts not when one is first 
able to claim benefits, but as soon as one is vested with a firm. If changes 
in pension wealth affect net compensation and labor supply of older 
workers, they may do the same at younger ages as well.
Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Pension plans are generally of two types. Defined contribution plans 
establish a contribution rule; for example, the employer and employee 
may each pay 5 percent of current salary into a pension fund. Con 
tributions are invested and the eventual benefit is based on the value 
of the funds at the time. If workers who leave the firm before retire 
ment have a right to the full current value of the contributions, then 
the plan should have little effect on mobility. Because defined contribu 
tion plans are usually actuarially fair across possible retirement ages, 
they should play a relatively minor role in the timing of retirement.
Defined contribution plans are really just mandatory saving plans with 
tax advantages. Their effect on work behavior is not significantly dif-
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ferent from that of other forms of wealth. While this is the dominant 
form of pension for university professors, fewer than 30 percent of 
covered workers have a defined contribution as their primary plan (table 
1.3). But as we saw in chapter 1, these types of pensions have been 
growing rapidly in recent years. If this continues, it will diminish the 
importance of the employment penalties late in life that we emphasized 
in chapter 3, as well as the earlier incentives discussed below.
Defined benefit plans are a more complex form of savings and play 
a much more important role in work decisions. These plans promise 
workers a benefit at retirement based on an agreed-upon formula. 
Employees usually make no explicit contribution to the plan. A typical 
defined pension plan offers benefits beginning at some stated age to 
workers of specified tenure, and is usually based on years of service 
and/or some average of highest nominal earnings. In practice, the lat 
ter generally means the earnings in the last few years of employment 
with the firm.
One method of calculating pension accrual is to estimate, year by 
year, what the present discounted value of the pension would be if the 
worker were to leave the firm after that year. This is the "quit value" 
of the pension—what it would be worth were the worker to quit. Positive 
accrual (growing pension wealth with continued employment) means 
that true compensation exceeds the paycheck; negative accrual means 
the opposite. Tracing the actual quit value for a worker in a given pen 
sion plan requires information on the worker's annual earnings, the ap 
propriate interest rate, the life expectancy of the worker, and the often 
very complex pension plan rules.
Larry Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) have studied the sensitivity 
of lifetime accrual patterns to changes in each of these parameters. They 
used a pension plan with cliff vesting, in which workers lose all benefits 
unless they stay with the firm for 10 years. Prior to 1987, this was the 
maximum number of years a firm could require before vesting. The 
1986 Tax Reform Act reduced the normal maximum to five years.
Kotlikoff and Wise also assumed that, in addition to a normal retire 
ment age, the plan had an early retirement option subject to an actuarial 
reduction in annual benefits. This is typical of most defined benefit plans.
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For simplicity, benefits were assumed to be some fraction of final year's 
earnings and service, with no offset for Social Security. Finally, they 
assumed that the worker would live to early retirement age and had 
a normal life expectancy thereafter.
The authors calculated the ratio of pension accrual to salary in each 
year for workers with constant growth in real wages. Under these 
assumptions, the accrual paths shown in figure 4.1 have two major 
spikes. This contrasts the accrual path for the defined contribution plan, 
which would be a constant proportion of the wage.
Figure 4.1
Pension Increments as a Percentage of Salary, by Age,
for a Wage Stream with 6% Inflation Discounted at
Real Interest Rates of 3%, 6%, and 9%
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SOURCE: Kotlikcffand Wise (1989), p. 21.
For ease of explication, Kotlikoff and Wise assumed that work begins 
at age 30, early retirement is available at age 55, and normal retire 
ment occurs at 65. Therefore, the first spike appears at age 40, after 
10 years of service with the firm, when the worker becomes vested.
Employer Pensions and Social Security 133
A worker who leaves before then loses all pension benefits, so the quit 
value of the pension is zero up to this point.
Once the worker is vested, pension accrual is found to be a smoothly 
increasing percentage of salary up to the point of earliest benefit eligibili 
ty. This pattern is caused both by the aging of the worker, which moves 
him closer to the promised benefit stream, and by the increase in years 
of service with the firm. The second peak in pension accrual occurs 
at the early retirement age. It is the period after early retirement eligibility 
that was the focus of much of our discussion in the previous two chapters.
Since pension plans usually did not provide full service credit after 
normal retirement age, accrual was likely to be negative after that age 
and pension wealth fell for the majority of workers. l (This is not shown 
on figure 4.1 which stops at age 65.) The accrual rate between the ear 
ly and normal retirement ages is more varied. The Employee Retire 
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) regulations forbid early benefit 
reductions larger than necessary to offset the additional years of ex 
pected benefit receipt. In other words, the reduced benefits must be 
at least actuarially fair.
In figure 4.1 all three assumptions about real wage growth and nominal 
interest rates yield peaks at the earliest retirement age, but only the lowest 
line shows negative pension accrual immediately thereafter. The top 
two lines simply show smaller positive accrual. Actual accrual will de 
pend on the size of the actuarial reduction factor and other details of 
the benefit calculation formula. All that is required for the pension to 
peak at early retirement is that the early retirement penalty be less than 
an actuarially fair reduction. If this adjustment factor is tilted strongly 
enough toward early acceptance, it can even offset the increase in benefits 
caused by wage growth and another year of tenure. In such a case, the 
worker is "over-rewarded" for retiring early, "under-rewarded" for 
staying on, and accrual can be negative after the early retirement age.
Sara Hatch (1981) found that the majority of retirement programs 
with early retirement options have reduction factors that are smaller 
than actually fair. They do not sufficiently "punish" early retirement 
and, therefore, they actually encourage it. For simplicity, Kotlikoff and 
Wise (1989) assumed that benefits are based on a single year of earnings,
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real wages grow at a constant rate, and hours worked are constant over 
all years. Most pension plans use more years in their calculations, and 
real earnings growth may decline at older ages. These two factors would 
make negative pension accrual more likely after early retirement age. 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) also looked at a national sample of pen 
sion plans and estimated accrual paths for a typical worker who joined 
the plans at age 30. Average accruals closely followed the trends in 
figure 4.1. They peak just before early retirement age, fall during the 
early retirement window, and then turn negative after normal retire 
ment age. The recent change in pension legislation that required all plans 
to continue pension credits past age 65 (with the caveat noted in foot 
note 1) will reduce these negative accruals to some extent and therefore 
diminish the work disincentives facing older workers.
The Spot vs. Implicit Contract View of Pensions
Despite the fact that most workers make no explicit contributions to 
their defined benefit pension funds, it is unlikely that pensions are a 
free gift from a firm to its workers. Rather, both sides recognize that 
pension promises are costly to the firm. This cost must be offset by 
the willingness of employees to receive lower current earnings. There 
is profound disagreement, however, over the nature of this pension pro 
mise and the amount of reduced wages workers are willing to accept 
for it. Two contending theories of competitive labor markets offer 
significantly different views of how workers value the pension promises 
of their firms and how the resulting liabilities of these firms should be 
determined.
We discussed above the quit value of a pension. Annual pension ac 
crual was measured as the difference between the pension's value were 
the worker to quit at one point in time versus its value following a quit 
one year later. While this calculation is straightforward, its implica 
tions for work behavior and pension liability are not. Neoclassical 
economic theory posits that in a competitive market, workers are paid 
the value of their marginal product to the firm. Total compensation in 
cludes both wage earnings and the pension accrual associated with
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that extra work. But how does a worker actually value this accrual? 
More specifically, what will workers be willing to forego in reduced 
wages for the promise of future benefits?
Jeremy Bulow (1982) has argued that workers are unlikely to give 
up anything more than the change in the quit value of the pension. In 
this "spot" market view of labor contracts, workers do not view their 
relationship with the firm as a multiperiod one. They demand that total 
compensation (wages plus pension accrual) equal the value of their pro 
ductivity in each period. If they leave, they will have been paid in full. 2
But as Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) point out, estimated accrual pat 
terns and the assumption of spot labor markets imply a very unlikely 
productivity pattern during a worker's tenure with the firm. As figure 
4.1 shows, workers assumed to have constantly increasing real wages 
will have total compensation spikes at the year of vesting and once again 
at the first year of early retirement. This seems incompatible with any 
reasonable assumption about productivity and suggests that a strict spot 
market model does not adequately explain the reality of pensions. A 
more complex model of labor market behavior is required to under 
stand the role of pensions at younger ages.
Richard Ippolito (1986,1987,1989) has offered an alternative explana 
tion for the pension contract—that it is the enforcing mechanism in an 
implicit long-term contract between the workers and the firm. 3 The firm 
promises not to terminate the worker (except for cause) or the pension 
plan (barring unforeseen exigencies), and the worker promises not to 
quit. The advantages to the firm are a stable workforce and lower turn 
over and training costs. The advantages to the workers are stability of 
employment and the opportunity to reap the returns from long tenure 
with the firm.
To hold workers to their end of the bargain, they are asked to forego 
wages in excess o/the quit value of their pensions, despite the fact that 
firms are only required to turn over this quit value to a worker upon 
termination. This model relaxes the requirement that marginal product 
equal compensation each year, and instead requires only that lifetime 
compensation equal lifetime productivity. 4 But this equality will occur 
only if workers stay with the firm until the end of the implicit
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agreement—sometime around retirement age. As we saw in the last 
chapter, workers who stay beyond this are penalized by a loss in pen 
sion wealth. According to Ippolito, the same thing occurs to those who 
leave too early.
The mechanism for this mobility penalty is found in the mechanics 
of many defined benefit plans. Benefits are generally based on years 
of service and on some measure of average earnings, usually over the 
last few years of employment with the firm. If a vested worker leaves 
in mid-career, these nominal earnings are frozen and become the basis 
for nominal benefits many years later, at the age of receipt eligibility. 
Pension benefits are tied to a much lower nominal wage base than if 
the worker had stayed with the firm. Wages that would have been earned 
in future years with the firm would have been higher because of pro 
ductivity increases and inflation. It is the employer's promise to pay 
a pension based on these higher wage years that is forfeited when a 
worker quits "too soon."
Because of the implicit contract that encourages workers not to quit, 
Ippolito argues that the current "stay" value of the pension is a better 
measure of the firms' current obligation to its workers. The stay value 
is based not on the current nominal wage (as the quit value is), but rather 
on the nominal wage the worker expects to receive on the eve of retire 
ment. Since this is a higher nominal wage than the current one, the stay 
value of the pension exceeds the quit value. They become equal only 
at retirement age. Although the current legal obligation of the firm is 
only the lower quit value, its actual obligation is higher, Ippolito argues, 
because the quit value is not likely to be exercised. It is the final stay 
value that firms expect to pay. Their current liability, therefore, is the 
present discounted value of that, and it is changes in the stay value that 
are the appropriate accruals for the workers who remain on the job.
In Ippolito's model, pensions are seen as mechanisms to ensure that 
workers leave their jobs at the right time. Negative accruals at older 
ages assure that they do not stay too long. Substantial losses in pension 
wealth at younger ages assure that they do not leave too soon. The penalty 
to workers who do leave is the difference between the foregone wages 
(high enough to finance a stay pension) and the smaller quit pensions 
they actually receive.
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The loss is not likely to be trivial. With some simplifying assump 
tions and an interest rate of 10 percent, Ippolito shows that a worker 
who quits a job 10 years from retirement can lose nearly two-thirds 
of the stay value of the potential pension.
Steve Alien, Robert Clark, and Ann McDermed (1986) used Ippolito 
methodology to simulate the losses in pension wealth associated with 
quitting a job, using pension data from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey 
of Medium and Large Firms and samples of individuals from several 
micro data sets. They simulated representative pension plans and 
estimated the percentage of salary necessary to finance a quit pension 
and a stay pension each year.
Their findings, summarized in table 4.1, are similar to those of 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). After vesting, quit pension accrual as a share 
of salary rises each year until the onset of early retirement. In contrast, 
the stay pension provides a smoother accrual path. There is no spike 
in its accrual path at vesting since the stay pension assumes the worker 
will, in fact, stay until retirement age. The spike at early retirement 
is also less pronounced—15 rather than 27 percent of annual salary. 
The pattern of pension wealth loss they found, were the worker to leave 
under the implicit contract scenario, mirrors the accrual patterns. The 
pension loss associated with a quit builds until middle age, since the 
stay accrual taken from salary is greater than the legal accrual guaranteed 
to a quitter. Hence, the potential wealth loss generally peaks (at about 
one year's salary, according to Alien, Clark, and McDermed) in late 
middle age. After that, the pension loss associated with a quit rapidly 
falls and approaches zero as the worker approaches early retirement age.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed did not take into account the recent 
reduction (from 10 to 5) in the maximum years of tenure required before 
vesting occurs. But it is not likely that this would dramatically change 
their results. Reducing the maximum number of years until complete 
vesting will shift the spike in the quit pension value by five years and 
provide positive accrual to workers between their fifth and tenth years. 
It will have no effect on the stay pension value. It will reduce the penalty 
that worker who do leave the job with between 5 and 10 years of tenure 
pay, but it will not substantially alter the losses associated with quit-
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Table 4.1
Simulation of Pension Contract Lifetime Compensation Patterns
for the Typical Manufacturing Firm with 1,000 or More Employees
for Its Professional and Administrative Staff
Accrual as a percent of salary
Age
25
35
40
45
50
55
60
64
65
70
Tenure
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
39
40
45
Quit pension
1.4
10.9
13.9
17.5
22.0
27.5
10.1
-1.7
-3.3
-15.3
Stay pension
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.7
15.0
15.5
5.3
-4.2
-6.0
-20.0
SOURCE: Compilation from Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1986).
ting, since both the quit and stay value of pensions at early ages are 
relatively small.
Pension Plans and Turnover
In a spot market framework, pensions are neutral with respect to job 
tenure with a firm. Since workers forego only the change in the quit 
value of a pension each year, they suffer no loss if they leave a firm. 
They collect all their past wage decrements on the way out. While it 
is true that they forego the ever-increasing accrual value of future years 
of tenure with the firm, it is assumed that their total compensation 
package in the future will be equal to their future productivity and,
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therefore, that they will receive similar benefits in alternative employ 
ment. In the less pristine real world, the operation of markets is not 
quite so smooth, but the presence or absence of pensions adds no com 
plications to the spot market view of labor market turnover.
The implicit contract view, however, puts pension plans at the center 
of a theory of turnover. Workers who join a firm with a defined benefit 
pension plan agree to a wage package that defers some of the compen 
sation until the end. The value of a worker's services to the firm equals 
the worker's total compensation only for those who stay until retire 
ment age to collect a pension. Quits before the optimal retirement age 
result in a penalty, often a large one, to the worker.
While substantial evidence exists that workers in firms with pensions 
tend to stay longer and do have lower turnover rates, the studies do 
not adequately disentangle the incentives of the potential pension wealth 
loss from the fact that such firms may simply have higher overall com 
pensation packages. 5 Empirical testing of the effects of pensions on turn 
over has been difficult for two reasons. First, few data sets provide 
both the detailed information on pension rules necessary to estimate 
accruals and quit penalties and the longitudinal data on the individuals 
necessary to test behavioral models. Second, to the extent workers 
recognize these penalties, those more likely to stay until retirement age 
will tend to choose firms with such plans. While this is exactly the match 
ing that firms and workers desire, such matching at the start of career 
jobs may obscure the true importance of losses in pension wealth 
associated with an early quit on a sample of workers caught in 
mid-career.
Both Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1986, 1988a) and Alan Gustman 
and Thomas Steinmeier (1987, 1989a) have attempted to disentangle 
the ways in which pensions influence tenure with a firm. Alien, Clark, 
and McDermed (1986) used data from the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) to 
estimate a model of turnover that included pension coverage and the 
capital loss associated with a quit. Because workers who plan to stay 
with the firm are more likely to join firms that penalize moving, they
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first estimated a pension coverage equation to adjust for this sample 
selection bias.
Because neither the PSID nor the NLS contains detailed information 
on pension characteristics, Alien, Clark, and McDermed linked pen 
sion data from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey for Medium and Large 
Firms (EBS) to these data sets. They assigned the modal pension for 
mula for each industry-occupation cell in the EBS to workers in the 
PSID and NLS according to their industry and occupation. They 
estimated the likelihood that an employee with a given firm in 1975 
would leave that firm by 1982 and found a strong negative relationship 
between pension coverage and a quit. This is consistent with the mobility 
literature. They found some evidence that the potential loss of pension 
wealth discouraged quitting, and concluded that the "loss in pension 
wealth associated with quitting substantially reduces the rate of mobili 
ty among workers covered by pension," and that "pension loss helps 
explain why older workers may be reluctant to leave a job even though 
market conditions may imply that future wage increases in his/her pre 
sent job will be quite low."
In a later study with the same data sets, Alien, Clark, and McDer 
med (1988a) found that potential pension wealth losses had a larger ef 
fect on turnover than either vesting or overall compensation levels. The 
losses were mainly associated with lower layoff rates rather than quit 
rates, and they concluded that
this evidence indicates either that deferred compensation 
schemes increase productivity (and thus reduce layoffs) or 
that employers are sufficiently concerned about layoff reputa 
tion and the ability to offer deferred compensation schemes 
in the future to prevent them from laying off workers and 
collecting a capital gain on their pensions.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) used data from the Survey of Con 
sumer Finances (SCF) to test the importance of pensions on turnover. 
The SCF has excellent data on the pension characteristics of the in 
dividuals in the sample, so the authors did not have to assign modal
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formulas from another data source. In addition, they used a method 
of estimating pension losses very different from that proposed by Ip- 
polito and by Alien, Clark, and McDermed. They estimated an age- 
earning profile for each person in their sample and then processed it 
through the rules of the individual's actual pension plan to calculate 
the path of "quit" pension accruals. With earnings data, this yielded 
age-compensation paths for all workers on their current jobs. They then 
estimated an alternative age-compensation path for each based on those 
who actually did change jobs over the period of the analysis. Finally, 
with these simulations from actual stayers and quitters, they estimated 
current and alternative job paths for all individuals in the sample.
Gustman and Steinmeier found that workers who switched jobs suf 
fered for two reasons. First, their total pension wealth declined. 6 But, 
in addition, they tended to earn less on the alternative job. Hence, the 
appropriate comparison is the total compensation on the two jobs from 
the transition date until normal retirement age. They found that "lost" 
pension wealth (pension backloading) did matter. The higher the loss, 
the less likely the job switch. But they also argued that it was far less 
important than the lower wage workers could expect on a new job. They 
concluded that' 'compensation premia constitute a much more impor 
tant fraction of the loss from job termination than does backloading of 
pension benefits [and] simulations . . . confirm that it is not backloading, 
but wage premia that accounts for the large difference in mobility be 
tween pension covered and noncovered jobs."
The papers by Ippolito and by Alien, Clark, and McDermed on the 
one hand, and those by Gustman and Steinmeier on the other, used dif 
ferent approaches to estimate the importance of pensions on turnover. 
They began with different views of how pension rules affect compen 
sation across a worker's tenure with a firm, and they reached different 
conclusions about the importance of lost pension wealth on the deci 
sion of workers to quit a job. Both sets of authors did find some cor 
relation between pension wealth loss and turnover, but Gustman and 
Steinmeier found that wealth loss was dominated by wage change ef 
fects. The difference in their conclusions reflects the currently unsettl-
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ed debate on the precise nature of the effects of defined benefit pension 
plans on employee turnover.
Pension Liability
Since a firm can legally terminate a pension plan at any time, its pen 
sion liability is often estimated to reflect the current quit value of the 
obligations. Were the plan terminated, workers would only be eligible 
to receive pension benefits paid at the stipulated future retirement age, 
based on current nominal wages.
But if, in fact, workers have entered into an implicit contract to receive 
stay pensions based on nominal wages at the time of retirement, then 
this method dramatically underestimates the actual current pension liabili 
ty of the firm. The amount of the underestimate depends on the age 
distribution of the firm's workforce, since the difference between quit 
and stay values rises and then falls as workers approach retirement age.
Once again, empirical evidence is scarce on the relative merits of 
these two alternative views of pension liability. Ippolito (1986) argued 
that stock traders are better judges of a firm's pension liability than are 
actuaries, and that one can examine stock prices for clues about which 
accounting method most accurately reflects true liability. Martin Feld- 
stein and S. Seligman (1981) and Feldstein and Randall Morck (1983) 
found that when the traditional method of estimating liability (quit values) 
was incorporated into their stock market equations, the companies' stock 
appeared undervalued. When Ippolito used the larger stay value of pen 
sion liabilities, there was no evidence of either over- or undervaluation 
of stock. This suggests that the stock market views the higher liabilities 
implied by the implicit contract view of pensions as the relevant finan 
cial concept.
Social Security
Another Look at Accrual Rates
Much of the discussion concerning pensions in the previous section 
can be applied to the retirement component of Social Security. One can
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estimate the annual accruals of Social Security wealth. In fact, as we 
have seen in chapters 2 and 3, this is precisely what researchers have 
done to estimate the impact of Social Security on retirement. Social 
Security wealth and changes in that wealth are important theoretical 
and empirical components of modern economic models of retirement.
In the previous section, pension accruals were introduced as a means 
of differentiating between single-period and multiperiod models of labor 
contracts. The emphasis was on how pensions influence tenure with 
a single firm and on how alternative views of pension promises affect 
pension liabilities. There is little or no discussion on the impact of pen 
sions on lifetime labor supply. In contrast, this is precisely the focus 
of the small amount of literature on Social Security and younger workers.
Social Security is similar to a defined-benefit pension plan, since the 
government promises workers a benefit at retirement based on a known 
formula. Normal benefits begin at age 65, with an early retirement op 
tion at 62. Cliff vesting exists since workers (aged 62 by 1991) must 
have worked in Social Security-covered employment for 10 years to 
be eligible for benefits. This requirement is not likely to be important 
for many workers since, unlike most employer pension plans, Social 
Security earnings are portable from one covered job to the next.
For workers aged 62 by 1990, retirement benefits are based on the 
highest 35 years of Social Security-covered earnings. A major change 
in the formula has occurred for those who were less than 63 years old 
in 1978. The highest years' earnings used in the benefit calculation for 
mula are now indexed to economy wide changes in nominal wage rates. 
In effect, they are blown up to current dollars before being averaged. 
If this change were applied to defined-benefit pension plans, it would 
dramatically reduce the current penalty to those who leave a job before 
retirement and remove the major penalty associated with quitting. It 
would allow those who left a job to receive the real value of their last 
year of work with the firm, adjusted not merely for inflation but also 
for growth in real wages, even if they left the job many years before 
retirement.
If one assumes that workers receive constantly increasing real wages 
and work the same number of hours per year, and if one ignores taxes
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and merely looks at the present discounted value of future benefits, then 
the accrual pattern for Social Security would look much like that for 
a private pension found by Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). From a quit- 
value perspective, accruals would be zero until vesting, and then show 
a large peak at 10 years. Accruals would then rise slowly for another 
25 years, as additional years of work replace zeros in the calculation 
formula. After 35 years, current earnings would be replacing past (lower) 
earnings rather than zeros, and the accrual increases would taper off. 
As was seen in the last chapter, what happens at age 62 is a matter of 
considerable dispute. Some authors, such as Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 
(1980), argue that accruals remain positive (at least they did during the 
1960s and 1970s) and therefore continue to subsidize work. Others have 
estimated small negative accruals and discussed work disincentives that 
would imply. All agree that Social Security accruals turn sharply negative 
after age 65.
What distinguishes a small, recent literature on this topic is a shift 
away from the assumption of constant hours over the work career and 
an emphasis on intertemporal labor supply shifts. Richard Burkhauser 
and John Turner (1981, 1982, 1985) have argued that, from a lifetime 
labor supply perspective in which workers can choose annual hours, 
it is irrelevant whether accrual rates are positive or negative after age 
62. What is critical is whether these rates are higher or lower than they 
were in earlier years. Once annual hours are endogenous, it is in the 
worker's interest to shift away from hours that are less well rewarded 
and toward those that are better rewarded. If Social Security accrual 
rates peak at early retirement, as many private pensions do, this will 
encourage workers to work more when younger and less when old. 
In a recent paper, Stephan Gohmann and Robert Clark (1989) present 
a sophisticated retirement model that makes the same point.
As discussed in the last chapter, there is considerable evidence that 
the Social Security system reduces work effort at older ages. Empirical 
research on its importance earlier in the career is sparse. Burkhauser 
and Turner (1978) used time-series data to argue that Social Security 
is partly responsible for the leveling off of the decline in hours worked 
per week that took place after the first four decades of the twentieth
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century. They suggest that the market work of younger men would have 
fallen two to three hours more since 1936 without the presence of Social 
Security. Adrienne McElwain and James Swofford (1986) also used 
time-series data to show that younger men increase their hours worked 
in years when it is easier to earn an income above the Social Security 
taxable maximum. Both of these studies recognize the life-cycle effect 
of the tax and benefit components of Social Security in their labor supply 
estimates. This perspective is more fully developed in the next section.
An Alternative Measure of Social Security's Marginal Value
Those who recognize the relationship between Social Security con 
tributions and future benefits know that the official Social Security tax 
does not represent their true tax rate. Future benefits offset current taxes 
to some degree. This reduces the true tax paid on work in the period.
If Social Security benefits and taxes were perfectly actuarially link 
ed, the increase in the present discounted value of future benefits would 
exactly offset the taxes paid. Edgar Browning (1975) has shown that 
the Social Security tax should then have no effect on work behavior. 
Social Security would merely act as a neutral deferred compensation 
plan whose impact on current disposable income could be offset by lend 
ing and borrowing.
But no such exact actuarial relationship between taxes and benefits 
exists. Nevertheless, some relationship does exist, and it is only by 
understanding this that the effect of Social Security on workers 
throughout their work life can be understood. Burkhauser and Turner 
(1985) exploit this life-cycle view to analyze how the dramatic changes 
mandated for the twenty-first century by the 1983 amendments to the 
Social Security Act affect younger workers today.
Table 4.2 shows the legislated payroll tax (t) across the life of workers 
who retired and took Social Security benefits at age 65 in 1982. The 
legislated payroll tax increased from 4 percent in 1955 to 8.55 percent 
in 1978 (column 3). Column 4 shows the marginal benefits associated 
with an additional dollar of taxable income, and column 5 is the true 
payroll tax rate—the difference between columns 3 and 4.
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During the 23 years of earnings used in the calculation of Social Securi 
ty benefits for a worker who reached age 62 in 1978, the expected 
marginal gain in Social Security benefits far exceeded the marginal taxes 
paid. For these years, the Social Security tax was actually a substantial 
wage subsidy. The subsidies were even larger for workers with depen 
dent spouses, since, at no additional charge, Social Security pays an 
additional 50 percent benefit to the eligible spouse of a Social Security 
recipient. Note, however, that during the years not used in the calcula 
tions (in this case, those prior to 1956), the payroll tax was, in fact, 
a tax at the legislated rate. And after age 61, the 50 percent earnings 
test applied, reducing the marginal impact of a dollar earned below what 
it was a year before. Even if Social Security continued to provide a 
subsidy between ages 62 and 64, there would be an incentive to shift 
hours from years with low subsidy to years of high subsidy, as long 
as the actuarial adjustment was less than fair. This view assumes that 
workers know which years will and will not eventually be used in the 
calculation formula, an interesting assumption theoretically, but one 
whose accuracy is subject to question.
In the previous chapter, we argued that Social Security encourages 
older workers to retire after some age (certainly by 65) because of reduc 
tions in Social Security wealth. From a life-cycle view, the Social Securi 
ty benefit formula is shown to twist net wage compensation toward mid 
dle years, encouraging workers to increase their work then and decrease 
it at both ends.
The divergence of legislated rates from benefit-adjusted rates for the 
new generation of workers entering the system in the 1980s is much 
less than that of the generation now retiring. The increase in the number 
of years used in the formula (which is 35 in 1990) is one explanation, 
as is the indexing of past wages in the averaging calculation. 
In addition, the increased labor force participation of women will mean 
fewer men will have dependent spouses.
This long-run trend toward convergence of legislated and actual tax 
rates was accelerated by recent amendments to the Social Security Act. 
Table 4.3 shows the legislated payroll tax rates for a male aged 22 in 
1983 before and after the 1983 Social Security Amendments. The true
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tax rates are shown for men in the lowest and highest Social Security 
benefit calculation brackets. The numbers (0.32 and 0.15) refer to the 
increase in monthly benefits associated with a $1 increase in average 
monthly earnings. Even before the amendments, the true payroll taxes 
were larger, and the difference between legislated and true rates smaller 
than for the currently retiring generation of workers. For a worker 
without a dependent spouse, the tax was really a tax for most years. 
For those in the 0.15 bracket, the pre-1983 net tax was between 50 and 
70 percent of the legislated rate (column 7).
The effect of the 1983 changes in benefits and legislated tax rates 
on true marginal tax rates is estimated in table 4.3. Column 4 shows 
the new legislated payroll tax rates over the work life of those workers. 
They represent an increase of about 1 percentage point (about 10 per 
cent) over the pre-amendment rates. But by reconsidering the link be 
tween future benefits and current taxes, we see that the change in the 
true tax rates was substantially larger in both absolute and relative terms.
Concentration on changes in legislated payroll rates masks the changes 
in true tax rates implied by the alterations in the future benefit schedule. 
The 1983 act cut benefits by increasing the age of full benefits from 
age 65 to age 67 (for those reaching age 62 in 2022) and by taxing one- 
half of all Social Security benefits for high-income recipients. 7 Although 
this tax is now paid by only a small number of current Social Security 
recipients, it will be relevant for more workers in the future unless the 
tax thresholds are raised to offset inflation.
The exact changes in the true payroll tax are controversial. They de 
pend critically on assumptions about discount rates and about the man 
ner in which individuals perceive the future and act on those percep 
tions. Edgar Browning (1985), for instance, has argued that the 1 percent 
real discount rate used in Burkhauser and Turner (1985) and in a parallel 
study by Roger Gordon (1983) was unrealistically low, and that a much 
higher rate is appropriate. A more fundamental criticism by Browning 
is that workers do not know for certain which years will be included 
in the average earnings measure. Hence, it is not appropriate to divide 
work life into years that are used in the accounting period and years 
that are not. To do so results in low true marginal tax rates in the years
Table 4.3
Life-Cycle Marginal Social Security Payroll Tax Rates For White Males 
Age 22 in 1983 Before and After 1983 Amendments
Legislated payroll tax rates True tax rates
(0.32 bracket)
Year
1983
1991
2001
2011
2022
1983
1991
2001
2011
2022
Age Preamendment
(%)
22
30
40
50
61
22
30
40
50
61
9.15
10.20
10.20
10.20
10.20
9.15
10.20
10.20
10.20
10.20
(0.15 bracket)
Amendment Preamendment Postamendment Preamendment Postamendment
9.55
11.20
10.98
10.98
10.98
Worker
9.55
11.20
10.98
10.98
10.98
Worker
9.15
3.94
1.08
1.81
-0.20
with dependent
9.15
-2.14
-7.60
-6.02
-9.16
9.55
6.27
3.80
4.37
2.78
spouse
9.55
1.48
-3.04
-1.79
-4.27
9.15
7.27
5.92
6.27
5.32
9.15
4.42
1.86
2.60
1.12
9.55
9.15
7.99
8.23
7.56
9.55
7.15
5.14
5.66
4.63
m
•o
$a
SOURCE: Burkhauser and Turner (1985). I
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used, since the earnings generate higher future benefits, and in true tax 
rates equal to the legislated rate in all other years. Browning suggested 
that if workers are not certain which years will be used in the averag 
ing process, then the true rate should be some average of the two.
Taking these factors into account in his simulations, Browning argued 
that while "historically" the divergence between legislated and true 
payroll tax rates may have been great, the difference is much less for 
today's generation of workers. His simulation results suggest that true 
rates are in the range of 80 to 90 percent of actual rates. This is ap 
proximately the range of difference found for single workers in the 0.15 
bracket of table 4.3. In any case, both papers provide a plausible reason 
for the reduced support for Social Security among younger workers. 
The well-known increases in taxes together with the less-publicized 
decreases in future benefits combine to reduce the value of Social Security 
to today's contributors. Only a life-cycle view of the process can com 
bine the taxes and benefits and reveal the true redistributional impact 
of the program.
Summary
The life-cycle view of human behavior is intuitively and theoretical 
ly appealing. The basic idea is that labor supply, consumption, and sav 
ings decisions are based not only on one's current situation, but also 
on the past and on expectations of the future. In the very short run, 
this view is obviously accurate; people do not reduce consumption on 
the weekends because they are not earning income for two days. In the 
medium run, it also makes sense; consumption habits take time to alter, 
and people should be able to anticipate and incorporate likely changes 
in circumstances ahead. In the very long run, over a lifetime, the theory 
strains credulity, but still provides a useful construct with which to ap 
proach multiperiod issues.
Public and private retirement income programs are certainly 
multiperiod in nature. Work decisions today affect retirement benefits 
in the future. It is widely agreed that the incentives built into these
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schemes affect labor supply behavior late in life. It is reasonable to ex 
pect that there are implications earlier in the career as well, but the 
literature is much thinner and the empirical evidence less robust.
Richard Ippolito is a leading proponent of the view that employer 
pensions are part of an implicit contract that firms and employees ex 
pect to be long term in nature. The contract binds them together and 
is structured to penalize a job separation that is too early or too late. 
Reputational considerations discourage the firm from reneging on its 
part of the agreement, even though it might be profitable to do so in 
the short run. Pension promises and liabilities should be evaluated, then, 
on the assumption that the workers will be around to collect all the 
delayed compensation foregone during their work careers.
There is considerable evidence that financial penalties for early depar 
ture do exist and some evidence that workers respond to them when 
they are large enough to be important. Mobility is lower among workers 
with pensions, but it is not clear whether this is due to pension wealth 
losses, to wage decreases associated with moving, or to the fact that 
workers who intend to remain with one firm tend to choose firms with 
pensions. Research also suggests that the stock market views unfunded 
pension liabilities as larger than the quit value of current obligations, 
which is consistent with the implicit contract view. But this implicit 
contract literature is relatively new and the evidence to date is far from 
overwhelming.
Both Gustman and Steinmeier (1989b) and Ippolito (1987) have pointed 
out a number of puzzles and inconsistencies in the implicit contract story. 
A primary reason for pensions in this scenario is to reduce worker turn 
over and thereby reduce hiring and training costs. If so, then why are 
the implicit pension penalties so low during the early years of associa 
tion with the firm, precisely when turnover is most likely? The penalties 
may deter mobility among mid-career workers, but they seem too incon 
sequential to do much at either end. Another hypothesized goal is to 
prevent shirking by the workers. If a substantial portion of deferred 
compensation will be forfeited if an individual is dismissed, then there 
are strong incentives not to give cause. But if this is important, why 
do these incentives generally disappear as soon as the worker reaches
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early retirement age, when pension wealth often declines with delayed 
receipt?8
Other objections are even more basic. The size of the penalty for early 
departure depends critically on the rate of inflation, a factor which is 
highly variable and totally out of the control of the contracting agents— 
the firm and the workers. Why would they rely so heavily on a penalty 
that they cannot control? In addition, the magnitude of these financial 
incentives varies dramatically from plan to plan. They are nonexistent 
in defined contribution plans and show great variety among defined 
benefit programs. For the implicit contract theory to make sense, these 
differences should reflect underlying differences in the firms, industries 
and occupations in which they are found. Very little research into these 
implications has been conducted. And finally, the entire story assumes 
that workers understand the details of their pension plans and the nature 
of these pension wealth incentives. Olivia Mitchell (1988) and others 
have cast some doubt on this.
When the pros and cons are weighed, some researchers, such as Ip- 
polito, remain committed to the concepts behind the implicit contract 
theory and the new pension economics, even while acknowledging that 
many unanswered questions remain. Others, such as Gustman and 
Steinmeier, express considerably more skepticism and look to other 
motivations, like the redistribution of income among workers, to ex 
plain the structure of pension plans.
The Social Security system also creates an interesting set of incen 
tives across the life cycle. The most dramatic and best understood oc 
cur near the end, and it is reasonable to argue that their effects—to in 
duce older workers out of the labor force—are intentional. Whether there 
is any method to the variations in implicit tax rates over the rest of the 
work life is much less clear, as is the proposition that workers under 
stand and respond to them during their younger and middle years.
That individuals respond rationally to incentives is appealing to 
economists. Most of our models assume it, and many of our empirical 
results confirm it. The research discussed in this chapter is new, in 
novative, and controversial, and the jury is still out on its accuracy and 
importance.
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NOTES
1. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 requires continued pension credits and ac 
cruals for work after age 65, unless the worker has reached the maximum number of years of 
tenure that are counted in the benefit calculation formula (Herz and Rones 1989). The discussion 
here reflects the situation that existed when this research was done, and does not reflect the im 
pact of this law on typical accrual patterns.
2. Current pension legislation requires firms to back up their explicit defined pension promises 
by holding reserves equal to the quit value of the pensions. This is consistent with this single- 
period view of labor contracts.
3. Decker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979) were earlier proponents of the importance of pen 
sions in implicit lifetime contracts.
4. Gustman and Steinmeier (1989b) have experimented with a model in which lifetime produc 
tivity and lifetime compensation have to be equal for all employees as a whole, but not for in 
dividual ones. They then simulate how pension features might be used to reallocate pay among 
different age cohorts of employees.
5. See, for example, Schiller and Weiss (1979), Viscusi (1979), Freeman (1980), Mitchell (1982), 
McCormick and Hughes (with British data [1984]), and Rebitzer (1986).
6. Clark and McDermed (1988) compared the total pension wealth of a worker with one 40-year 
job to that of a worker with an identical wage profile, but with four different employers, all with 
the same pension plan. In their baseline example, total real pension wealth at age 65 for the mobile 
workers was only 57 percent of that of the 40-year employee. The exact percentage depended 
on whether or not the worker could cash out his pension wealth upon termination, and if so, the 
interest rate at which these funds could be invested. But in all cases examined, final pension wealth 
was always lower for the worker who switched jobs, illustrating one cost of job mobility.
7. Single-tax filers with taxable income above $25,000 and joint filers above $32,000 pay taxes 
on half of their Social Security benefits as well.
8. There is a related story at the aggregate level. With delayed compensation to be repaid only 
at retirement, workers are actually creditors, like bondholders, to the firm. If the firm goes out 
of business, the employees stand to lose some of their accounts receivable. This should discourage 
the workers, as a whole, from making demands deleterious to the health of the firm.
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Transitions from Career Jobs
As we discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there is voluminous literature 
on the economic determinants of the retirement decision, much of it 
very current. Over the past decade, economists have focused on the 
financial incentives embedded in the Social Security and private pen 
sion systems and on how these incentives affect individual behavior. 
The consensus is that strong incentives to retire do exist, that many in 
dividuals behave as though they understand and respond to these in 
centives and, therefore, that the incentives have some impact on ag 
gregate retirement patterns.
Most economic models of retirement have focused either on retire 
ment status or on hours of labor supply. The first concept is discrete; 
the latter, continuous. Analyses of retirement status have usually treated 
the concept as dichotomous—one is either retired or not—but have dif 
fered on how it should best be defined. For example, Boskin (1977) 
defined retirement as movement to quarter-time (or less) work. 
Burkhauser (1979, 1980) used the acceptance of pension or Social Securi 
ty benefits. Quinn (1977), Gordon and Blinder (1980), and Burkhauser 
and Quinn (1983b) required complete labor force withdrawal. Fields 
and Mitchell (1984c) defined retirement as departure from a primary 
job, and Burtless and Moffitt (1985) looked for a sudden and discon 
tinuous drop in hours worked. Quinn (1980, 1981) and Hausman and 
Wise (1985) used self-defined retirement status. But all of the above 
used their rules to define a dichotomous state. We show below that this 
oversimplification overlooks some very rich and interesting labor force 
withdrawal patterns and therefore misses much of the story.
Some researchers have also studied hours of work after retirement. 
These models generally posit a continuous budget constraint along which 
a worker chooses the optimal combination of income and leisure. As we
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have explained above, the actual budget constraint is kinked because 
of the vagaries of tax, Social Security, and pension rules, and true com 
pensation can differ dramatically from the wage rate. Economists usually 
assume either that workers can choose to work any number of hours 
(e.g., Gordon and Blinder 1980), or that the number of hours is fixed 
(e.g., Fields and Mitchell 1984c, and Burtless and Moffitt 1984). 
Although there is some truth in each of these assumptions, neither cap 
tures the realities of actual behavior.
Relatively few economists have dealt seriously with the fact that retire 
ment, in fact, includes a whole gamut of labor market activities. To 
label them all with a single term obscures the rich variety of behavior 
that actually exists.
In this chapter, we discuss the economics literature that explicitly 
models the diverse patterns of labor market withdrawal. Most of this 
treats the decision as trichotomous—one either retires completely, retires 
partly, or does not retire at all. We then describe the actual patterns 
of departure from full-time work on career jobs that we have observed 
in our Retirement History Study sample. Although traditional retire 
ment (sudden and complete labor force withdrawal) remains the most 
common pattern, a substantial minority of Americans leave their career 
jobs via more complex routes. A few choose a period of partial retire 
ment (reduced hours) on the career job. Others take a new part-time 
position. Some older workers move from one full-time job to another, 
and others retire completely, but then later return to the labor force 
in a full-time or part-time capacity.
We will establish several facts below. First, alternative routes to retire 
ment, other than the traditional transition from full-time work to full- 
time leisure, are common among the American workforce. Second, most 
of the intermediate stages occur soon after departure from the career 
job. And finally, these transitional jobs last long enough to be interesting. 
In chapter 6, we will discuss some of the correlates and implications 
of the different exit patterns.
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Partial Retirement
Self-Employed vs. Wage and Salary Workers
Using the initial 1969 cross section of the Retirement History Study, 
Joseph Quinn (1980, 1981) compared the retirement patterns of a sam 
ple of white married men aged 58 through 63. The focus of this research 
was twofold: to determine the extent of partial retirement among older 
Americans, and to compare the patterns of self-employed and wage and 
salary workers. The hypothesis was that partial employment would be 
more common among the self-employed, since they have more control 
over their work environment. They are less likely to be covered by com 
pulsory retirement provisions or pension plans, and are generally un 
constrained by institutional rules on the length of the workweek.
Retirement status was determined by the respondents, who describ 
ed themselves as either completely retired, partly retired, or not retired 
at all. These subjective responses correlated well with more objective 
labor force status (in or out) and annual hours measures. 1
Several interesting conclusions emerged. Among men approaching 
normal retirement age (58 to 63 in the 1969 cross section), partial retire 
ment was a common phenomenon, particularly among the self- 
employed. 2 Five percent of the wage and salary workers and over 12 
percent of the self-employed described themselves so (Quinn 1981). 
In fact, among the self-employed in this age range, partial retirement 
was more common than complete retirement.
Data on annual hours of work confirmed that the self-employed en 
joy more hours flexibility. Among those not retired, the annual hours 
distribution of the wage and salary workers was completely dominated 
by the mode around 2,000 hours, reflecting full-year status at the stan 
dard workweek. Over 80 percent worked between 1,500 and 2,500 hours 
per year. In contrast, the self-employed "not retired" were more evenly 
distributed over the spectrum. Over half worked more than 2,500 hours 
per year, and another 8 percent worked less than 1,500 hours.
Retirement status was highly correlated with the age and health of 
the individual. The probability of partial retirement rose monotonically
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with age, and was always much more common among those with a health 
condition limiting the type or amount of work they could do. This sug 
gests that the phenomenon may grow in importance as the nation ages. 
For every age and health combination, partial retirement was more likely 
among the self-employed than among wage and salary workers. Addi 
tional analyses suggested that retirement status was also influenced by 
pension and Social Security eligibility and by the amount of asset income.
Quinn (1980) also found that some of the self-employed (about one 
in eight) had become so only in the previous 10 years. This suggests 
that some people may utilize self-employment as a transitional step be 
tween a career job and retirement.
This early research was relatively unsophisticated. It did not utilize 
the longitudinal nature of the RHS, and the treatment of retirement in 
come sources was very rudimentary. But it previewed some findings 
of later, more detailed research—that partial retirement is an important 
phenomenon among the American workforce, that its importance grows 
with the age of the individuals, that the behavioral patterns of wage 
and salary workers and the self-employed are different, and that some 
wage and salary workers turn to self-employment late in life. There 
was also some circumstantial evidence that one reason for the difference 
in retirement patterns is a lack of choice of hours in the wage and salary 
sector, a topic that Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier later addressed 
in a much more sophisticated manner.
Victor Fuchs (1982) also analyzed the phenomenon of labor force 
withdrawal among the self-employed, using the first three waves of the 
RHS. He intentionally avoided the term "retirement," because the con 
cept is so poorly defined. He began by observing, as seen in table 5.1, 
that the proportion of the workforce that is self-employed increases with 
age, and that this can be seen in both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
data. This relationship with age occurs partly because self-employment 
has declined in importance in the United States over the long run, so 
we tend to observe fewer self-employed among the young than among 
the old. But the trend is also found within cohorts as they age. This 
is either because the self-employed retire later than wage and salary 
workers, so their relative number among the employed grows as a cohort
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ages, or because some wage and salary workers become self-employed 
late in life.
Using a sample of white urban men in the RHS, Fuchs found that 
both reasons were important. At every age between 58 and 65, those 
already self-employed were less likely to stop working and this difference 
generally grew with age. In addition, 4 to 5 percent of the wage and 
salary workers switched over to self-employment in each of the two- 
year transition periods studied.
In order to understand why some workers switched to self-employment 
late in life, Fuchs estimated transition equations for those who were 
initially wage and salary workers. He found that workers were more 
likely to switch if they had had some periods of self-employment earlier 
in their careers, or if their career jobs had characteristics similar to self- 
employment. In particular, managers, professionals, and sales workers, 
many of whom have considerable discretion on the job, and those already 
working particularly short (less than 35 hours) or long (more than 50 
hours) weeks were significantly more likely to become self-employed. 
The probabilities were considerably lower for those eligible for pen 
sions or subject to mandatory retirement provisions, both of which are 
uncommon among the self-employed. In other words, those wage and 
salary workers whose work habits already resembled those of the self- 
employed were more likely to become so around retirement age.
Fuchs then combined all of those initially working (wage and salary 
and self-employed) and asked why some continued to work while others 
did not. Not surprisingly, he found that the probability declined with 
age, with evidence of poor health, and with pension or mandatory retire 
ment coverage. But he also found that the probability of continuing work 
was significantly higher if the respondent was self-employed. In fact, 
holding all the other economic and demographic variables constant, the 
probability of continuing work over a two-year period was nearly 8 
percentage points higher for the self-employed. Interaction terms be 
tween class of worker and age suggested that this difference was im 
portant only at ages 61 and above.
In a final set of regressions, Fuchs showed that among men initially 
working more than 35 hours per week, the self-employed were more
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likely to reduce their weekly labor supply below 35 hours two years 
later than were wage and salary workers. This suggests that the addi 
tional hours of flexibility enjoyed by the self-employed may be part 
of the reason why they are more likely to continue working late in life. 
In summary, Fuchs has emphasized an important transition route for 
workers leaving career jobs, namely, a switch to self-employment. This 
change often involves a reduction in hours worked. He suggested that 
many of those who do switch have been self-employed in the past or 
are leaving wage and salary jobs that resemble self-employment in im 
portant ways, although he does not explicitly compare the old and new 
jobs. We will pursue this line of inquiry below.
Minimum-Hours Constraints
In a long series of articles beginning in 1983, Alan Gustman and 
Thomas Steinmeier have added considerable insight to our understand 
ing of the labor supply choices facing older workers, and have developed 
sophisticated theoretical models and econometric techniques to deal with 
the complexity they found. Their major contribution has been to em 
phasize the importance of partial retirement—a transitional period of 
reduced hours between full-time employment and complete labor force 
withdrawal. They show that this transitional stage often occurs on a 
job other than the career job and usually at a significantly lower wage 
rate. They maintain that this occurs because most jobs have a minimum- 
hours constraint, so that many people have to leave their career jobs 
in order to work part time. They argue that models that ignore this 
phenomenon of gradual retirement can be very misleading.
With a sample of wage and salary white men, Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1984b) demonstrated again the importance of partial retirement in the 
labor force withdrawal process, utilizing the same subjective defini 
tion used by Quinn (1980, 1981). 3 Although they found that being "not 
retired" dominated up through age 63 and full retirement dominated 
thereafter, the intermediate status was an important phenomenon 
nonetheless. Fewer than 10 percent of those below age 62 described 
themselves as partially retired, but the proportion rose to between 15
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and 20 percent among those aged 65 to 69. In fact, for those over 65, 
partial retirement was much more frequent than nonretirement. When 
the authors combined the first four waves of the RHS data, they found 
that about a third of the respondents were partially retired at some time 
during that six-year period.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a) also studied job change among older 
workers and found that the vast majority of the partially retired were 
no longer on their main jobs (defined as the full-time job held at age 
55). Partial retirement usually involves a job change. In contrast, most 
of those not retired were still on the same job they held at 55. This 
difference would not be surprising if those partially retired had all fac 
ed mandatory retirement on their previous jobs, but this was not the 
case. Even those partly retired who had not and would not have faced 
mandatory retirement were much more likely to be on a new job. This 
was true even for the subset with no health problems and with neither 
a pension nor mandatory retirement on their main jobs.
A final piece of the puzzle was that those who did switch to a new 
job usually did so at a wage rate lower than what they had previously 
earned. 4 Why then do older workers change jobs? Why do they not 
simply reduce hours on their career jobs? Gustman and Steinmeier con 
clude that they do not because they cannot. Most jobs, they claim, have 
a minimum-hours constraint. Although the RHS did not inquire about 
this, some other data sets have. For example, over half (56 percent) 
of those who answered the appropriate question on the Michigan Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics claimed that they could not have worked 
less if they had wanted to. 5 In a survey of employers, only 15 percent 
(and only 10 percent in manufacturing) had a program in which workers 
could reduce hours as they approached retirement (Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1983). The authors concluded from these various sources 
that between 60 and 90 percent of workers face minimum-hours con 
straints on their jobs and, therefore, are unable to reduce hours as they 
age.
Gustman and Steinmeier also showed that ignoring these constraints 
can lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, the discontinuous labor 
supply shifts (in hours and employers) observed for most workers who
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choose partial retirement may be attributed to dramatic changes in 
preferences in a model that does not include the minimum-hours con 
straint. Similarly, the "choice" to move to a job with a lower wage 
rate will be puzzling unless one realizes that a reduction in hours on 
the original high-wage job was not possible. The authors demonstrated 
that ignoring the partial retirement option can significantly change the 
coefficients in a retirement model, because those partially retired have 
to be combined either with those retired or those not retired in a 
dichotomous world. Those who define retirement as complete labor force 
status would call them "not retired" and not differentiate between par 
tial retirement and continued full-time work on the original job. Those 
with a definition based on hours or work or pension receipt would label 
many of them as retired, and equate partial retirement and complete 
labor force withdrawal. Since there is a sizable number of people in 
this intermediate category, particularly among those 65 and over, the 
empirical results are affected by how they are defined. 6
A Structural Retirement Model
Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) have developed a structural model 
of retirement that incorporates changes in individual preferences and 
budget constraints over time. In contrast to most of the retirement 
literature, their model permits individuals to reduce their hours to less 
than full time, but only at a reduced wage rate. This corresponds to 
the actual options described above.
Graphically, the worker faces the budget constraint shown in figure 
5.1, which is drawn for a particular moment in time. Point A corresponds 
to full-time work at the full-time wage rate. No other hours options 
are permitted at this wage rate. To work less, the worker must take 
a lower wage rate, either on the main job or, more likely, on a dif 
ferent job. If this choice is made, the worker faces the budget constraint 
BCDE, kinked because of the mechanics of the Social Security system. 
Point E represents full retirement. Y(t) is current earnings, and, 
therefore, is zero at E.
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Figure 5.1
Choice of Income and Leisure at Tune t, 
With Different Part-Time and Full-Time Wages
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SOURCE: Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a), p. 561.
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The complete budget constraint includes point A and line segments 
BCDE. The labor supply choice depends on this budget constraint and 
on the shape of the individual's indifference curves. A person with a 
very flat set of indifference curves (for whom a small increase in in 
come would compensate for a large loss in leisure) will remain at point 
A and continue full time on the career job. People with steep indifference 
curves (a strong preference for leisure) will prefer point E and withdraw 
from the labor force. Workers with very curved indifference sets may 
be found working part time, along BCDE.
The individual faces a life-cycle labor supply problem, with each year 
treated as a separate period. Both the budget constraints and individual 
preferences change over time. Gustman and Steinmeier hypothesize that 
the indifference curves steepen as the worker ages, and therefore that 
most people eventually end up at point E, that is, out of the labor force.
In their empirical work, they estimated the parameters of a utility 
function, which the individual maximizes subject to a changing budget 
constraint. The parameters were chosen to maximize the likelihood of 
observing the retirement patterns actually observed in a sample drawn 
from the first four waves of the RHS. 7 Because of the complexity of 
the estimation procedure, only one of every 10 eligible households was 
chosen, and only a very sparse set of explanatory variables was used.
The variables determining the shape of the indifference curves in 
cluded age, year of birth, and a dummy variable denoting a serious health 
problem lasting a year or more. Compensation (separately for full- and 
part-time work) had three components: wages, and pension and Social 
Security benefits. Full-time and part-time wage profiles were imputed 
from wage equations. 8 The pension and Social Security components of 
compensation were defined as the changes in the present discounted 
values of the streams of benefits that would occur with an additional 
year's work. 9
The coefficient estimates were all significant in the expected direc 
tion. As anticipated, they indicated that indifference curves steepen 
significantly with age and with the onset of a health problem. The wage 
terms were modest in size. The authors estimated that a 10 percent
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change in the wage rate in the year of retirement would change the date 
of retirement by about five months.
The Gustman and Steinmeier model (1986a) had two innovative com 
ponents: two different wage rates (for full-time and part-time work), 
and variable hours on the part-time job. To isolate which of these features 
was more important, they reestimated their equations in models in which 
there is (1) one wage and fixed hours (a la Fields and Mitchell); (2) 
one wage and variable hours (a la Gordon and Blinder); and (3) two 
wages, but partial retirement hours are fixed. It turned out that the im 
portant feature empirically was the introduction of the part-time wage 
rate, an innovation that they consider essential to understanding actual 
retirement patterns.
The authors (1986a) tested the overall quality of their model by 
simulating retirement patterns based on their parameter estimates, and 
comparing them with the patterns actually observed. Their results did 
a remarkable job of duplicating the retirement peaks observed at ages 
62 and 65 without the use of dummy variables denoting these two ages. 
The simulated peaks were due entirely to smooth changes in the slope 
of the indifference curves and to the sudden changes in financial incen 
tives embedded in the Social Security and pension rules. When the ef 
fects of Social Security, pension, and mandatory retirement were 
eliminated from the compensation function, both simulated peaks disap 
peared. When the single-wage model simulations were compared, they 
did an inferior job of tracing actual retirement behavior.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) used their model to simulate the 
effects of three components of the 1983 Social Security reforms:
(1) the increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 67,
(2) the increase in the annual delayed retirement credit after age 65 
from 3 to 8 percent, and
(3) the decrease in the benefit reduction rate (the earnings-test tax) from 
50 to 33 percent, which has already gone into effect for those 
aged 65 to 69.
Their simulated impacts are long-run in that they assumed that workers 
faced these rules all along. They are less than long-run, however, because 
the model does not permit other institutions (like pensions) to adjust 
to the new Social Security environment.
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Their simulations suggested a decline in retirement behavior around 
65. The authors predicted that the percentage of Americans over age 
65 working full time would increase and the percentages working part 
time and fully retired would decrease. Disaggregation indicated that 
most of the impact was due to the increase in the actuarial adjustment 
for delayed retirement after age 65, which would reduce or eliminate 
the surreptitious pay cut that Social Security imposes then. There was 
very little effect prior to age 65 and a slight increase in retirement ac 
tivity at age 67. In proportional terms, some of these predicted changes 
were substantial, because the changes occurred on such a small base 
of workers over 65. But because of the small base, the overall impact 
of these changes on the labor force would be minimal. 10
The delay in the age of normal retirement is equivalent to a decrease 
in Social Security benefits. With no other changes, it would decrease 
the income levels of older Americans. But the increased incentives to 
work beyond age 65, because of a delayed retirement adjustment that 
is closer to actuarially fair, will induce some additional labor supply 
and partly offset this income loss.
In a subsequent paper, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986b) simulated 
the impact of the 1983 Social Security legislation on retirement behavior 
and lifetime income. Without any labor supply response, all groups 
would lose lifetime income equal to about 11 to 14 percent of Social 
Security wealth because of the 1983 amendments. All of the groups 
offset this loss, to some extent, with additional work. But the degree 
of offset varied. Those in good health made up nearly half of the loss, 
while those in poor health made up only a fifth.
In summary, Gustman and Steinmeier have added two important and 
realistic dimensions to their behavioral models: minimum-hours con 
straints and partial retirement at reduced wages. They have confirmed 
that partial retirement is an important phenomenon among older 
Americans (about one-third of their RHS sample reported themselves 
as partially retired at some time between 1969 and 1975) and that most 
people have to switch jobs in order to reduce hours. The price paid 
for this additional flexibility is a decrease in hourly pay.
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Most of the previous research had ignored the partial retirement op 
tion and labeled those in this intermediate category as either retired or 
not retired. Gustman and Steinmeier have shown that this dichotomy 
is unrealistic and that empirical results change when it is relaxed.
Partial Retirement as an Earnings Reduction
In a series of recent papers, Giora Hanoch, Marjorie Honig, and Cor 
delia Reimers have emphasized the importance of partial retirement be 
tween full-time employment and complete labor force withdrawal. They 
also have found that partial retirement is common and that its duration 
is significant, and concluded that traditional models of dichotomous 
retirement miss important aspects of the story.
Honig and Hanoch (1985) adopted an objective definition of partial 
retirement, in contrast to the subjective concept used by Quinn and by 
Gustman and Steinmeier. According to Honig and Hanoch, retirement 
means a reduction in earnings. They use as a measure of earnings reduc 
tion "the ratio of current to potential earnings (in real terms), the latter 
defined as the individual's maximum earnings during the greater part 
of his adult life." They defined those with no earnings as fully retired, 
those earning less than half of their highest annual real earnings as par 
tially retired, and all others as not retired. For the ends of the spectrum— 
those fully retired and those not retired—this definition correlates very 
well with subjective self-definitions by the respondents themselves. But 
fewer than half of those whom the authors defined as partially retired 
described themselves in the same way. Nearly 40 percent called 
themselves fully retired, despite their (usually small) positive earnings.
Decreases in earnings can result from lower wages, lower hours, or 
both. Honig and Hanoch found that both occurred among older workers 
and that the latter appeared both as decreases in hours per week and 
in weeks per year. But they found the strongest association between 
partial retirement and diminished hours per week. Those partially retired 
averaged 34 hours compared to 43 for the nonretired.
With their definition, Honig and Hanoch found a significant amount 
of partial retirement among older American men. During the four years
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between 1969 and 1973, between 14 and 27 percent (depending on age 
in 1969) of the white married wage and salary men in the Retirement 
History Study sample moved from nonretirement into partial retirement. 
And this ignores those initially self-employed, who are more likely to 
utilize a period of partial retirement.
Not only was partial retirement fairly likely, but it was also of signifi 
cant duration. The average partially retired person had been so for over 
two years, and nearly a fifth had been so for four or more years. And 
since these respondents were still partially retired in 1973, the even 
tual duration would be even longer.
The authors also found that partial retirement was very likely to con 
tinue or to develop into full retirement. There were, however, a small 
number of irregular patterns; for example, a transition from full retire 
ment back to partial or to nonretirement, or a move from partial to 
nonretirement. These odd patterns were most likely to occur among 
the younger respondents.
Honig and Hanoch discovered some interesting differences between 
the partially retired and others. Not surprisingly, the former were much 
less likely to be on the same job they had had two years previously, 
since some became partially retired by switching jobs. But they also 
were more likely than the others to have experienced earlier interrup 
tions in Social Security-covered earnings, were less likely to have pen 
sion coverage, and were much more likely (than the nonretired) to report 
health limitations.
The authors tested several models of the decisionmaking process. They 
concluded that the most likely involved recursive decisions: first, peo 
ple decide whether or not to continue working, and then, if they do 
continue, they decide whether to work full or part time. Labor force 
participation was correlated with good health, low family income, a 
lack of pension coverage, and high Social Security entitlement. The 
last finding may seem surprising, since high Social Security wealth can 
finance leisure. Here it seems to encourage continued work. The answer 
may lie in the intertemporal incentives embedded in the Social Securi 
ty system. The annual Social Security benefit cannot capture the com 
plicated impacts of current work decisions on future benefits and, hence, 
on Social Security wealth.
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For those who did decide to continue working, the likelihood of par 
tial retirement (as opposed to nonretirement) increased with age, the 
onset of health limitations, education, and high family income, and 
decreased with pension coverage and the size of the potential annual 
Social Security benefit. 11
In more recent work, Reimers and Honig (1989) changed the time 
unit of analysis and the definition of partial retirement and found even 
more of the phenomenon. They utilized information in the RHS regard 
ing the exact timing of job transitions to interpolate a month-by-month 
job history, and then examined transitions from one month to the next. 
They defined partial retirement to occur whenever real monthly earn 
ings fell below 80percent of peak lifetime monthly earnings, compared 
to the 50 percent annual threshold used above. This may be an overly 
liberal definition of partial retirement, since monthly earnings can change 
for many reasons other than an intentional change in labor supply status.
With this new definition, the authors concluded that men aged 58 to 
61 leaving nonretirement were more likely to end up in partial retire 
ment than in full retirement. This contrasts the Honig and Hanoch con 
clusions mentioned above, in which transitions to full retirement were 
always more frequent, and shows the sensitivity of the results to the 
choice of time interval and the definition of partial retirement used. 
Reimers and Honig found that most of the transitions from nonretire 
ment to partial retirement occurred while the respondent stayed work 
ing for the same employer. This implies a far greater degree of intra- 
firm hours flexibility than found by Gustman and Steinmeier, who claim 
that most people have to switch jobs in order to reduce labor supply, 
or by us (below), with a more severe "hours-only" definition of par 
tial retirement.
Different definitions obviously lead to different estimates about the 
magnitude of partial retirement. Reimers and Honig adopted a lenient 
definition (less than 80 percent of one's highest real monthly pay) and 
therefore found a lot of it. But nearly all of the evidence suggests 
that partial retirement is important, and that by ignoring it, as much 
of the retirement research does, one overlooks some very
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interesting behavioral responses. Reimers and Honig (1989) conclude 
that
retirement has often been viewed as an "either-or" proposi 
tion: either one is working full-time or not at all, with the 
transition occurring in the early sixties for Americans. It has 
become increasingly clear, however, that retirement in the 
U.S. is a more complex phenomenon. In particular, signifi 
cant numbers of older workers are spending time in the in 
termediate stage of partial retirement.
Job Reentry after Retirement
In some recent work, George Sweeney, J.S. Butler, Richard 
Burkhauser, and Kathryn Anderson (1989) have shown that a life-cycle 
model modified to allow uncertainty about the date of one's death yields 
good predictions about who returns to work after leaving the labor force. 
They suggest that reentry after retirement may be part of a rational plan 
of consumption over the life cycle. Behavior changes when new infor 
mation becomes available. While aging, people must reevaluate their 
own life expectancies and levels of assets, and may find that returning 
to work after having been retired makes sense.
To test the model, the authors analyzed a sample of men and women 
drawn from the RHS who were working in 1968, but later stopped and 
reported themselves fully retired. They found that 23 percent of the 
sample returned to work—most within two years after retirement. The 
longer one was out of the workforce, the less likely was reentry. In 
creases in Social Security and pension wealth significantly reduced the 
probability of reentry, with Social Security having the larger effect. 
The authors argued that this may reflect the fact that Social Security 
benefits are reduced when earnings exceed the exempt amount, which 
creates a work disincentive not found in most pension plans.
Butler, Anderson, and Burkhauser (1989) have brought the literature 
on health and retirement to bear on the decision to return to work in 
older years. The main innovation in this paper is the use of a competing- 
risks model that allows unobservables that influence both health and
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the probability of returning to work to be correlated. They found that 
these unobservables are correlated, and that including this correlation 
changes the impact of Social Security and pension income.
Both of these papers shed some light on the decision to reenter the 
labor market at older ages. However, neither distinguishes between exits 
from career jobs and exits from what may be one of several post-career 
jobs. In addition, little information is provided on the type or duration 
of the new jobs.
In our research discussed below, we also consider the extent of labor 
market reentry, or "unretirement." We have a stricter definition of 
the phenomenon, since we will define as retired only those who have 
been out of the labor market for at least two years. Since Butler, Ander- 
son, and Burkhauser report that most of their reentries occurred dur 
ing the first two years, we will find fewer unretirements than they did. 
It is really a matter of definition whether someone who moved from 
one job to another with a six-month hiatus really retired and then 
reentered, or merely switched jobs with a little time off in the interim. 
For younger workers, we would certainly not label the interim as ' 'retire 
ment" and we prefer not to here either. But the important point on which 
we all agree is that very interesting patterns of labor market withdrawal 
are being observed. People are leaving the labor market in many dif 
ferent ways, and once out, some decide to return. This is in stark con 
trast to most of the recent retirement literature in which the retirement 
decision is modeled as dichotomous and permanent.
Although the research on partial retirement is limited, it has made 
some important points. The authors all agree that the traditional 
dichotomous treatment of the retirement decision that dominates the 
literature is inadequate, that it overlooks some common and interesting 
withdrawal patterns, and that it can result in misleading conclusions. 
In fact, many people do utilize periods of partial retirement between 
full-time work and full-time leisure. Most do so on new jobs, and often 
at significantly lower wage rates. A primary reason appears to be the 
hours flexibility that is unavailable in their career jobs.
In the section below, we describe in detail the exit patterns of a large 
sample of older American workers, using all 10 years of the Retire-
Transitions from Career Jobs 173
ment History Study. The evidence confirms that nontraditional retire 
ment patterns are common and suggests that the scope of future research 
should be broadened to include them.
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs
In chapter 1, we argued that career jobs are important in America. 
Despite all the discussion about the mobility of American workers, most 
spend a considerable amount of time on a single job. Among the men 
in the 1969 wave of the Retirement History Study, for example, 55 per 
cent remained on their longest job for at least 20 years, and nearly 80 
percent stayed at least 10 years (table 1.6). For the women in the sam 
ple, the analogous figures are smaller—28 and 55 percent—but still 
substantial.
In this study, we are concentrating on the patterns of disengagement 
from career jobs. Since we are utilizing the Retirement History Study, 
which follows for 10 years a sample of people initially aged 58-63, 
we observe exits only between ages 58 and 73. Before turning to the 
topic at hand, we will discuss our definition of a career job and the 
derivation of the samples used in the tables below.
Definition of a Career Job
Our definition of current employment on a career job is simple: the 
respondent must be working full time (at least 35 hours per week) on 
a job held for at least 10 years. We experimented with several alter 
native definitions. We found that requiring 40 hours per week decreas 
ed the sample size appreciably, but that relaxing the definition to 30 
or 25 hours made very little difference. Since many full-time jobs now 
involve fewer than 40 hours of work per week, the 35-hour definition 
seemed most appropriate. Increasing the tenure requirement to 15 or 
20 years on the job diminished the sample size significantly. Since we 
consider a full-time job of 10 years' duration to represent a significant 
commitment to an employer—even if the job is not the longest job held— 
we chose the 10-year definition. 12 From this perspective, an individual
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could hold more than one career job; we are studying the transition from 
the last one.
Sample
Of the more than 11,000 respondents in the 1969 RHS sample, near 
ly 4,500 met our definition of current employment on a career job (table 
5.2). Almost all of those individuals who did not fit our definition were 
either out of the labor market altogether or working on jobs of less than 
10 years' duration. Since the retirement patterns of wage and salary 
and self-employed workers are very different, we disaggregated along 
this dimension. About 21 percent of the men and 7 percent of the (non- 
married) women were self-employed. 13 Since the absolute number of 
self-employed women is so small (50), they are excluded from further 
analysis.
Table 5.2 
Selection of Sample of Workers on Career Job in 1969
Number
RHS sample in 1969 
-not employed in 1969 
-bad data on tenure or hours
-tenure less than 10 years 
-hours less than 35 per week
RHS sample employed on a 
career job in 1969
-wage and salary 
-self-employed
Men
8,131 
1,550 
365
2,239 
216
3,761
2,956 
805
Women
3,021 
1,315 
73
807 
115
711
661 
50
Total
11,152 
2,865 
438
3,046 
331
4,472
3,617 
855
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
As seen in table 5.3, the vast majority (about 80 percent) of the wage 
and salary men and women changed their labor force status between 
1969 and 1979, the end of the RHS surveys. Of those who did not, 
nearly all either died or disappeared from the survey while still on their 
career jobs. Fewer than 3 percent remained employed full time until 
1979.
Table 5.3 
Disposition of Sample of Workers on Career Job in 1969
Total
-bad data on disposition 
-good data on disposition
Remained full time on career job
-until 1979
-until death 
-until disappeared
Left full-time status on career job
-without 4 years of additional 
data after exit
-with 4 years of additional 
data after exit
Wage and salary 
men
2,956
-75
2,881
57 ( 2%)
256 ( 9%) 
306(11%)
2,262 (79%)
816 
1,446
Self-employed 
men
805
-23
782
113 (14%)
95 (12%) 
92 (12%)
482 (62%)
241 
241
Wage and salary 
women
661
-12
649
17 ( 3%)
22 ( 3%) 
75 (12%)
535 (82%)
167 
368
Total
4,422
-110
4,312
187 ( 4%)
373 ( 9%) 
473 (11%)
3,279 (76%)
1,224 
2,055
1
2.
o 
O
I
!
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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The disposition of those who were self-employed in 1969 is very dif 
ferent. Only about 60 percent left full-time status on that job and of 
the other 40 percent, over a third were still working full time in 1979. 
The others died or disappeared.
We are primarily interested in those individuals who stopped doing 
full-time work on their career jobs. As we will see below, those who 
stopped did so in many different ways—some moved to part-time work 
on the same job, others took new jobs, and still others left the labor 
market and were never observed working again.
There is a potential problem here, however, since some of those whom 
we never observed working again may have left the sample after leav 
ing their jobs. Some died, some refused to be reinterviewed, and others 
could not be located. For another group, those first observed out of 
their full-time career jobs in 1979, the last year of the RHS, there was 
simply not another opportunity to contact them again. Some of these 
respondents may well have taken another job, but we do not know. To 
diminish this problem, we have chosen a subsample of those for whom 
we have four years (two RHS interviews) of data after their departure 
from the career job. 14 There are 1,446 wage and salary men, 241 self- 
employed men, and 368 wage and salary women in this category (table 
5.3). With this sample, which we use below, we are more confident 
that the transitions listed are accurate. "Out of the labor force" now 
means out for at least four years.
Exit Patterns
In table 5.4, we show the exit patterns of the RHS respondents who 
were still in career jobs in 1969, who subsequently left these full-time 
positions and whom we could follow for four additional years. Of the 
wage and salary men, over a quarter did something other than withdraw 
from the labor force. More than 20 percent left and took a new job, 
and those were about evenly split between new full-time and new part- 
time positions. A small proportion (5 percent) moved to part-time status 
on the same career job—i.e., reduced their labor supply below 20 hours 
per week. 15 The remaining 73 percent of the sample were never observed 
working again.
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The least likely transition was to part-time work on the career job, 
even though, as we will see, the earnings from this move usually ex 
ceeded the earnings on a new part-time job. The low probability of 
becoming a part-time worker on one's career job may be because this 
choice was generally not available to wage and salary workers, as 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1983) suggest, or because the workers chose 
to leave in order to collect pension benefits and prevent a loss in pen 
sion wealth. Pension accruals usually fall after early retirement age, 
and the loss in pension wealth might be even larger for those who worked 
part time on the career job. Not only would they be likely to face ac 
tuarial adjustments that inadequately reward continued work, but the 
part-time work might decrease the earnings base on which the pension 
benefits are calculated, if they are based on the last (as opposed to the 
highest) few years. Hence, for some workers, a lower wage on a new 
job may exceed the true net wage for part-time work on the career job.
Table 5.4
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs, for Those
with Four Years of Subsequent Data
(vertical percentage)
Type of 
transition
Part time on career job
Part time on new job
Full time on new job
Out of labor force
Wage and 
salary 
men
5%
10%
12%
73%
Self- 
employed 
men
25%
13%
13%
49%
Wage and 
salary 
women
10%
10%
7%
74%
(Sample size) (1,446) (241) (368)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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For self-employed men, the withdrawal patterns were very different. 
Only half of the sample left the labor force when they stopped full-time 
work on a career job, and of those who did not, a transition to part- 
time work on the same job was by far the most likely choice. A quarter 
of the sample reduced their hours in this way, which undoubtedly reflects 
the greater control over hours enjoyed by the self-employed. Another 
quarter moved to a new job, equally split between full time and part time.
The fact that the self-employed were five times more likely than wage 
and salary workers to continue to work part time on their career jobs 
suggests that more of the latter might do the same if there were fewer 
direct restrictions on part-time work, and if defined benefit pension plans 
did not penalize that choice. This might substantially decrease the per 
centage who move directly from full-time work to full retirement.
The (nonmarried) wage and salary women in the sample resembled 
the wage and salary men. About three-quarters of them chose the tradi 
tional labor force withdrawal. The quarter that did not was more even 
ly divided among the three choices: part-time work on the career job, 
or part-time or full-time work on a new job.
Age of Respondent
The exit patterns varied with the age of the respondent at the time 
of departure (table 5.5). Most of these men and women left their career 
jobs between the ages of 62 and 64, which is now normal retirement 
age. Those who left earlier, between 58 and 61, were by far the most 
likely to take another full-time job—about one in four of the wage and 
salary men, one in three of the self-employed men, and one in five of 
the women did so. Only one-half to two-thirds of these younger workers 
left the labor market for at least four years.
In the older categories, new full-time employment was much rarer 
and transitions to part-time work were more popular. Only a small 
minority of the wage and salary workers stayed on career jobs past age 
65 (6 percent of the men and 11 percent of the women). This group 
was the least likely to leave the labor force for good. About 40 percent 
made a nontraditional exit and over half of them moved to part time
Table 5.5
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Age of Worker at Time of Exit 
(horizontal percentage)
Group 
Age
Wage and salary men
58-61
62-64
65
66-70
Self-employed men
58-61
62-64
65
66-70
Wage and salary women
58-61
62-64
65
66-70
Type of Transition
Part time on 
career job
(%)
2
2
8
21
11
19
44
40
1
10
7
21
Part time on 
new job
(%)
8
10
12
14
7
18
16
4
12
8
19
5
Full time on 
new job
(%)
23
10
5
4
35
11
0
4
17
4
0
12
Out of 
labor force
(%)
66
77
74
61
48
52
41
51
70
77
74
62
Total
327 ( 23%)
825 ( 57%)
200 ( 14%)
94 ( 6%)
1,446 (100%)
46 ( 19%)
118( 49%)
32 ( 13%)
45 ( 19%)
241 (100%)
69 ( 19%)
215 ( 58%)
42 ( 11%)
42 ( 11%)
368 (100%)
O
tt
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
180 Transitions from Career Jobs
on their career jobs. This may seem odd, but the very fact that these 
men and women stayed on their career jobs past 65 (a rare phenomenon 
these days) indicates either that their preferences were different from 
those of most older workers or that they held career jobs that were more 
flexible with respect to retirement options. The popularity of the part- 
time option suggests that the latter may be the case.
The patterns of the self-employed also differed by age. Overall, about 
half took nontraditional exits. Younger workers (58 to 61) who kept 
working were most likely to move to another full-time job, and over 
a third did; those 62 to 64 were most likely to drop to part-time employ 
ment, either on the same or on a new job; and the older workers (65 
and older) very rarely switched jobs. They either reduced hours on career 
jobs or dropped out of the labor force completely.
Timing of Transitions
The transitions in table 5.4 could have occurred at any time within 
four years of departure from full-time work on the career job. The RHS 
data permit one to calculate exactly when each transition occurred, unless 
the transition was to part-time on the same job. 16 In this case we assumed 
it took place immediately. The distributions for the wage and salary 
men are shown in table 5.6, along with the probability of each type 
of exit occurring during each six-month period.
Most of the transitions happened immediately or soon after the depar 
ture from the career job. Nearly half of the wage and salary men who 
moved to a new part-time job and over 60 percent of those who took 
a new full-time job did so during the first year. The same story is told 
by the transition rates in table 5.6. The probability that someone leav 
ing a full-time job took a new full-time job in the first six months was 
nearly 7 percent. Of those who were still not working after six months, 
only 2 percent took a full-time job during the next six months. The 
likelihood of a new full-time job for those not working past one year 
continued to fall. The probability of a move to new part-time work also 
declined with time out of work, but not as dramatically.
The timing patterns for self-employed men were slightly different. 
They took even less time off between jobs. Over 60 percent of those who
Table 5.6
Marginal Probabilities of Various Transitions Within Four Years of Leaving Career Job
Wage and Salary Men 
(horizontal percentage)
Type of transaction
Months after exit 
from career job
0-6
7-12
13-18
19-24
25-30
31-36
37-42
43-48
Total
Number Part time on 
entering period career job
1,446 4.7%
1,236
1,191
1,156
1,125
1,101
1,082
1,064
(1,446) (65)
Part time on 
new job
3.4%
1.9%
1.5%
1.5%
1.3%
1.0%
1.3%
0.6%
(151)
Full tune on 
new job
6.9%
2.0%
1.4%
1.2%
0.8%
0.7%
0.4%
0.4%
(176)
Still out of 
labor force
84.9%
96.2%
97.0%
97.3%
97.9%
98.3%
98.3%
99.0%
(1,054)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
I
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took a new part-time job and nearly 90 percent with new full-time 
employment began the new job within a year. The patterns for women 
were mixed. Those who claimed new full-time jobs generally did so 
very quickly, like the men. But the women who moved on to new part- 
time jobs took their time. Fewer than 40 percent made this transition 
during the first year.
Duration of the Transition Job
The tables above suggest that nontraditional exits from full-time work 
on a career job are fairly common. About a quarter of the wage and 
salary respondents and about half of the self-employed men did 
something other than simply leave the labor force. One interesting ques 
tion is whether these intermediate stages last long enough to be impor 
tant and worthy of analysis. If workers use them to delay complete retire 
ment by only a couple of months, then there is little here to study. On 
the other hand, if the transitional steps last for several years, then this 
is a phenomenon worth investigating.
The next three tables show the status of the transitional jobs one and 
two years after the transition, for those who dropped to part-time status 
on their career jobs (table 5.7) or took new part-time (table 5.8) or new 
full-time (table 5.9) jobs. 17 In table 5.10, the data are aggregated across 
demographic groups and transition types.
Several important points emerge. The main one is that these transi 
tional jobs do last sufficiently long to be of interest. Nearly three-quarters 
of those respondents who left their full-time career jobs for something 
else were still on that transitional job a year later, and nearly 60 per 
cent remained after two years (table 5.10). Some had quickly moved 
on to a second transition job—11 percent after one year and 17 percent 
after two years. The remainder had left the labor market altogether. 
For the 18 percent of the sample who stopped working within a year 
after starting the transitional job, this job may have been a mistake- 
something that looked better than it turned out to be. Another 7 percent 
left during the second year. But the other three-quarters of those career- 
job-leavers who continued to work had at least another two years of 
labor market activity ahead of them.
Transitions from
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Table 5.9
Tenure of Full-Time Status on New Job 
(horizontal percentage)
Group Status 1 and 2 years after transition
Part time on
Tenure
Wage and salary men (N=203)a
after 1 year
after 2 years
Self-employed men (N=34)a
after 1 year
after 2 years
Wage and salary women (N=30)a
after 1 year
after 2 years
Total (N=267)
after 1 year
after 2 years
another
new job
5
7
9
12
7
10
6
8
Full time on
another
new job
11
16
9
9
3
7
10
14
Out of
labor force
26
33
6
15
20
30
23
30
Part time on
the new job
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Still full time
on the new job
57
44
76
65
70
53
61
48
H
3
I. 
I
O
SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 
a. See chapter 5, footnote 17.
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Table 5.10
Tenure of First Transitional Job, 
Status 1 and 2 Years After Transition
Tenure
(N=743)
After 1 year
After 2 years
On another
job
(%)
11
17
Out of
labor force
(%)
18
25
Still on
transitional job
(%)
72
57
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
The disaggregated tables reveal some interesting detail. For those who 
became part time on their career jobs, that was usually the end of the 
line (table 5.7). Some (16 percent) returned to full-time status on that 
same job (primarily the self-employed) and others (20 percent) left the 
labor market, but very few (4 percent) went on to a new job within 
the next two years.
In contrast, many of those who moved from a career job to a new 
part-time or full-time job (tables 5.8 and 5.9) continued to experiment. 
Within two years, nearly a quarter of those respondents had moved on 
to another postcareer job. The part-timers tended to stay part time, and 
the full-timers, full time. The latter were slightly more likely to leave 
the labor force within two years of starting the transitional job.
Unretirements
Most of the people who made labor market transitions late in life did 
so soon after leaving their career jobs. But there is a small minority 
who spent a significant amount of time out of the labor force, and then 
reconsidered and reentered. Table 5.11 suggests that about 10 percent 
of those out for at least two years "unretired." These estimates pro 
vide a lower boundary for the phenomenon, because some additional 
people may have reentered, but after they had ceased contact with the 
RHS. 18
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Table 5.11
Unretirements—Labor Market Reentries 
After At Least Two Years Out
Group 
Time period
Part time 
on new job
Full time 
on new job
Stayed out of 
labor force
Wage and salary men (N=l,125)
after 2-3 years 26 17
after 3-4 years 20 8
after 4 or more years 20 14
Total 66(6%) 39(3%) 1,020(91%)
Self-employed men (N = 126)
after 2-3 years 5 0
after 3-4 years 2 1
after 4 or more years 2 1
Total 9(7%) 2(1%) 115(91%)
Wage and salary women (N=286)
after 2-3 years 6 1
after 3-4 years 6 2
after 4 or more years 8 1
Total 20(7%) 4(1%) 262(92%) 
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
The likelihood of a late reentry was about the same for wage and 
salary men, self-employed men, and wage and salary women. For all 
the groups, unretirees were much more likely to return to part-time rather 
than to full-time employment.
Summary
Most of the research by economists on retirement patterns in the United 
States has viewed the individual's decision as either a dichotomous choice
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between work and leisure or as a choice of hours of labor supply along 
a continuous budget constraint. Recent work suggests that both of these 
modes of modeling assumptions can be misleading. In fact, older workers 
take a variety of routes between full-time work and full-time retirement. 
The paths are so varied that the phrase "retirement' '—defined by dozens 
of authors in dozens of different ways—may well conceal more than 
it reveals. What we are observing and describing are labor market tran 
sitions, and they are not easily categorized by a single term.
Using data from the Social Security Administration's Retirement 
History Study, we have analyzed the exit patterns of a large sample 
of men and women who were aged 58 through 63 and still employed 
on a career job in 1969. Career employment was defined as full-time 
work on a job of at least 10 years' duration. We found that the vast 
majority of these older workers (about 80 percent of the wage and salary 
workers and 60 percent of the self-employed) were observed leaving 
full-time career employment over the next decade. Of the remainder, 
most either died (9 percent) or disappeared prematurely from the sam 
ple (11 percent) while still fully employed. Only a very few (4 percent, 
and predominantly the self-employed) stayed fully employed on a career 
job through 1979.
The focus of this chapter is on the patterns of disengagement from 
career jobs. In most of the tables, we required at least four years of 
good data (two more waves of questionnaire information) after the in 
itial transition. This left us with a sample of about 2,000 individuals 
for study.
The primary finding is that a sizable minority of these older Americans 
utilized a nontraditional route to leave the labor force. Although the 
abrupt change from full-time work to complete withdrawal was still the 
most frequent transition, over a quarter of the wage and salary workers 
in the sample did something different. I9 Approximately 10 percent of 
the men moved to part-time work on another job, and a similar propor 
tion took a new full-time position. Relatively few (only 5 percent) were 
able to reduce hours to part-time status on their career jobs. 20
The self-employed behaved very differently. Only half withdrew com 
pletely from the labor force and of those who did not, a transition to
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part-time work on the same career job was by far the most likely 
occurrence.
There were interesting differences by age at departure from full-time 
work on the career job. Through age 65, part-time positions (new and 
on the career job) became more likely the older the worker, while new 
full-time positions became less so. Nontraditional exit routes (particularly 
part-time on the career job) were the most likely for the few individuals 
who stayed on their career jobs until after age 65.
Most of the transitions occurred very soon after departure from the 
career job—usually within a year. Nonetheless, a significant minority 
(about 10 percent) waited at least two years before returning to work, 
and some even longer. These "unretirements" may have been planned 
all along, or may have been responses to unforeseen changes in 
circumstances.
These transitional jobs were of sufficient duration to represent an im 
portant part of the retirement process. Nearly three-quarters of the jobs 
lasted more than one year, and almost 60 percent lasted at least two 
years. Part-time positions on the career job lasted the longest, follow 
ed by part-time work on another job, and then by new full-time work. 
But even half of the new full-time jobs lasted two years or more. These 
intermediate jobs were most likely to end with complete labor force 
withdrawal, although some individuals experimented with more than 
one transitional position.
In summary, something is happening. Part-time and full-time work 
on a new job is a serious alternative to continued work on the career 
job and to complete labor force withdrawal. These findings suggest that 
a substantial number of older Americans are willing and able to con 
tinue working despite the financial disincentives that often penalize the 
decision to do so.
NOTES
1. Over 99 percent of those who described themselves as not retired were in the labor force (Quinn 
1981). Almost 90 percent of the completely retired were out of the labor force. Among the self- 
defined partly retired, seven-eights of the self-employed and three-quarters of the wage and salary 
workers were in the labor force. Some of those not in the labor force may have been part-year 
workers who happened not to be working at the time of the survey.
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2. As we will see below, self-employment status is not exogenous, since many workers switch 
to self-employment status late in life. Quinn (1980) found that about 12 percent of the self-employed 
had become so within the previous 10 years. In the research we report below, we are only analyz 
ing workers still employed full time on career jobs—jobs held for at least 10 years.
3. The primary advantage of this definition (fully retired, partly retired, or not retired) is its simplici 
ty. It eliminates the need for arbitrary distinctions based on labor supply or earnings. Its disad 
vantage is that in a small number of cases it does not correspond well to more objective measures. 
For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) redefine as fully retired a few individuals who 
called themselves partially retired, despite having held no job for two years or more.
4. Gustman and Steinmeier (198Sa) reported a significant wage drop for individuals who reported 
themselves as not retired in one RHS wave, and partially retired two years later. The wage decrease 
was observed for those partially retired on the same job and those partially retired on a new job. 
More people were in the latter category, and the wage drops were larger for those who had changed 
jobs.
5. This may underestimate the extent of minimum-hours constraints. Some of those who said they 
could have worked less may have been working overtime and referring to a reduction to full time. 
They may have faced a minimum-hours constraint below that. When the sample was limited to 
only those working 42 hours or fewer per week, 61 percent said they could not work less (Gustman 
and Steinmeier 1983).
6. In some early empirical work, Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a) estimated reduced-form equa 
tions to explain individuals' choices to be retired, not retired, partially retired on their main jobs, 
or partially retired on a new job. They then showed the importance of the definition by which 
partially retired people would be assigned to a dichotomous retirement status. The magnitude— 
and often the direction—of the effect on the probability of retirement of the main job wage rate, 
the presence of mandatory retirement, marital status, and health condition changed depending 
on whether those in the partially retired categories were counted as retired or not retired.
7. In each of the four waves of the RHS, each respondent was categorized as working full time 
(f), working part time (p), fully retired (r) or status indeterminate (x). With four years and four 
states, there are 256 potential patterns. In the full RHS sample, 49 percent of the observations 
moved directly from full-time work to full retirement, and remained there. Another 9 percent 
were fully retired in all four waves. Of the remaining, many had patterns involving partial retire 
ment, the most common of which were Jffp, ffpp, ffpr, fprr and fppp (Gustman and Steinmeier 
1986a).
8. Two full-time wage equations were computed, one for jobs started before age 55 and another 
for jobs started after 55. The former was based on a sample drawn from the Panel Study on In 
come Dynamics, the latter on an RHS sample. People were assumed to stay on their full-time 
jobs until mandatory retirement age. After that age, where applicable, the full-time wage was 
based on the full-time wage equation, with the variable "tenure on the job" set to zero. All of 
the wage equations are shown in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a).
9. Annual pension benefit amounts were obtained from the RHS, and actuarial adjustments for 
delayed retirement were based on industrywide averages. Benefits were assumed to be frozen 
in nominal terms after retirement. The Social Security adjustments were based on Social Security 
rules and the earnings records appended to the RHS. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) for 
additional details.
10. As noted above, the authors assumed that the incentives in pension plans would not change 
in response to the 1983 Social Security reforms. If the age of normal retirement in pensions were 
increased to age 67 as well, the changes at ages 65 and 66 would be augmented. On the other 
hand, if pension incentives were altered to offset the Social Security changes, then the simula 
tions presented here would be overestimates.
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11. In a related article, Honig (1985) reported very similar results for the nonmarried women 
in the RHS sample.
12. In a series of very interesting papers on the transition from work to retirement, Chris Ruhm 
(1988, 1989 and 1990) defined the career job as the longest job held, regardless of when the respon 
dent left it. With this definition, he finds even more transitional behavior (bridge jobs, in his ter 
minology) than we do.
13. The initial RHS sample included as respondents men and nonmarried women. Married women 
were excluded because it was thought that their retirement would be defined largely in terms of 
their husbands' behavior, and therefore that there was less to be learned from them than from 
a larger sample of the included categories. For this reason, there are no married women in our 
sample.
14. In this analysis, we are implicitly treating the RHS as a four-year longitudinal survey, but 
one that starts for each respondent not at a particular calendar date, but rather at the moment 
of departure from the career job. We include only those respondents on whom we have data over 
this subsequent four-year period.
15. Our definition of a career job requires full-time employment, meaning over 35 hours per week. 
Many of the respondents were very near 35 hours. We did not want to overstate the number of 
job transitions by including those with small decreases, to just under 35 hours per week. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this transition, movement to part time required a decrease to below 20 hours 
per week. This probably understates the number of transitions, by excluding from the count some 
workers who would have described themselves as moving from full to part time.
16. In this case, detailed questions on the timing of the move were not asked. We assumed that 
all these transitions occurred within the first six months.
17. For these samples, we required only two years of data after the respondent left the career 
job. If we knew that a respondent made a transition at any time within four years of leaving the 
career job, then that respondent was included in this sample. Therefore, the sample sizes are slightly 
larger here than in earlier tables.
18. For the individuals in table 5.10, we have a minimum of four years of good data after their 
departure from the career job. For many, we have more than four years. But some may have 
reentered after four years, but after the RHS had ceased (1979) or lost track of them.
19. With the career job defined as the longest job held, Ruhm (1988) concludes that the majority 
of individuals leave their career jobs well before retirement, and utilize a transitional job-stopping 
process before leaving the labor force. The qualitative nature of his results is consistent with ours. 
The quantitative differences stem from the fact that we consider any full-time job lasting at least 
10 years to be a career job, whereas Ruhm would define it a bridge job if the individual had 
held a longer job earlier. We think that job transitions by middle-aged people (for 
example, those in their 40s and younger, when nearly a quarter of Ruhm's sample leave their 
"career" jobs) are not really part of the retirement transition.
20. Ruhm's (1988) results are perfectly consistent with ours on this point. He found that only 
6 percent of his RHS sample partially retired on their career jobs.

- 6 -
Correlates of 
Career Job Transitions
Nontraditional routes to retirement are important in America. As the 
nation ages and the relative supply of younger workers diminishes, the 
labor supply decisions of the elderly will become more and more im 
portant. Over the past decade, Congress has moved in several impor 
tant ways to encourage work at older ages. The 1983 amendments to 
the Social Security Act will slowly reduce work disincentives after age 
65. Legislation concerning labor-management contracts has also been 
modified. Congress first raised the minimum age at which firms could 
force mandatory retirement from 65 to 70, and then, for most workers, 
outlawed mandatory retirement at any age. In addition, 1986 amend 
ments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act require that 
employees who work beyond a pension plan's normal retirement age 
receive credit in the plan's benefit formula. This was intended to reduce 
negative pension accruals and therefore reduce the disincentives to work 
in later years.
Employers can also choose on their own to alter private pension in 
centives and other personnel policies in order to entice older workers 
to remain on the job. One attractive mechanism may be the introduc 
tion of more flexible hours alternatives, to make the options faced by 
wage and salary workers more like those already enjoyed by the self- 
employed. Another would be to reduce even further the loss in pension 
wealth that generally accompanies work at older ages.
Before proposing further changes, however, it is important to under 
stand the rich diversity of withdrawals from career jobs that are possi 
ble and the circumstances under which current choices are being made.
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As we have seen, many older Americans are already choosing to leave 
the labor force in stages, by moving from full-time career employment 
to part-time work or to a transitional new job. Others leave the labor 
force entirely and then return later.
In this chapter, we first describe some of the correlates of these dif 
ferent patterns. How did the choices vary with the health or education 
of the individual? Did they differ by industry and occupation or by the 
financial circumstances facing the worker? Did the decisions depend 
on why the person left the career job? We then turn to a comparison 
of the old and new jobs of those who actually changed employment. 
Did these workers continue to do what they had done before, or were 
they embarking on new and different careers?
Correlates of Transitions
Health
A major determinant of the well-being of the elderly is health. Health 
status, defined in many ways, both subjectively and objectively, has 
always played a central role in the retirement literature (see chapter 
3). Its dominance has diminished somewhat during the past several 
decades, as researchers have begun to concentrate on the financial in 
centives surrounding the retirement decision, but no one would deny 
that it is still a major factor. In a very recent study using all 10 years 
of the Retirement History Study, for example, Gary Burtless (1987) 
found that a self-defined health variable is a very significant and im 
portant determinant of employment status. He estimates that "at age
62 the average probability of working full-time for a man in good health 
is 82 percent. For a man with a health limitation the probability is only
63 percent, or nearly a quarter less." 1
The sample we are studying includes only individuals who were 
employed full time on career jobs in 1969. Therefore, much of the 
population with serious health impairments is excluded from our group 
because most of them had already left the labor market before the start 
of the survey. Within our sample, however, there is still a range of health
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conditions and, given the longitudinal nature of the data set, we are 
able to observe subsequent changes in the health of those who started 
out in good shape.
The health variable used here is subjective—the respondents' self- 
description of their health relative to that of their peers. 2 We measure 
health in the survey prior to the individual's departure from the career 
job—in different years and at different ages, therefore, for different 
members of the sample.
As seen in table 6.1, only about 10 percent of these individuals claimed 
health worse than that of their peers. We are studying a relatively healthy 
cross section of the older population. Although the behavioral differences 
were modest, men with poorer health were the most likely to withdraw 
completely from the labor force. Those in better health were more likely 
to remain on the career job part time or move to a new job. This was 
particularly true of the self-employed, for whom the differences were 
more dramatic. The patterns were less clear among the women, perhaps 
due to the very small number (32) of these women in "worse" health.
Education
The patterns by level of education were not clear (table 6.2). Among 
the largest group, the wage and salary men, the likelihood of a non- 
traditional route seemed to increase with educational attainment above 
"some high school," and it was substantially higher for those with a 
college degree. But this generalization did not hold for the other groups. 
For the self-employed men (over half of whom had no formal high school 
education, and many of whom were farmers), there was no pattern, 
and among the women (with the highest average education), nontradi- 
tional paths decreased with years in school.
Pension and Mandatory Retirement Status
Current pension status appears to have played an important role in 
the retirement decision. 3 According to table 6.3, those eligible to receive 
a pension at the time they left their career jobs were much more likely
Table 6.1 £ 
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Health Prior to Exit
(horizontal percentage) n
I 
£
<V3
O "-•>
n
B9
Group
Health status8
Wage and salary men
Better
Same
Worse
Self-employed men
Better
Same
Worse
Wage and salary women
Better
Same
Worse
Type of transition
Part time on
career job
4
5
3
29
23
24
8
11
9
Part time on
new job
(%)
10
11
8
18
11
9
10
8
19
Full time on
new job
(%)
13
12
9
15
13
9
10
5
3
Out of
labor force
(%)
73
72
79
37
54
58
72
76
69
Totalb
526 (38%)
724 (52%)
149 (11%)
65 (28%)
133 (58%)
33 (14%)
159 (44%)
173 (48%)
32 ( 9%)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Self-defined health status, relative to peers, in the interview prior to exit from the career job.
b. Sample with good health data.
s-
g
Table 6.2
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Level of Education 
(horizontal percentage)
Group 
Educational attainment
Wage and salary men
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16+ years
Self-employed men
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16-1- years
Wage and salary women
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16+ years
Type of transition
Part time on 
career job 
(%)
5
2
4
7
26
19
27
29
12
12
9
6
Part time on 
new job
(%)
11
8
11
11
13
14
10
18
10
8
11
8
Full time on 
new job 
(%)
10
11
14
18
12
19
14
6
4
10
8
8
Out of 
labor force 
(%)
74
79
71
64
49
48
49
45
75
71
72
78
Total8
576 (40%)
298 (21%)
432 (30%)
123 ( 9%)
120 (50%)
42 (18%)
59 (25%)
17 ( 7%)
113 (31%)
52 (14%)
151 (41%)
49 (13%)
n
I 
I
n
B?
H 
31
a o
SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 
a. Sample with good education data.
Table 6.3
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Age and Pension Status 
(horizontal percentage)
Group
Age at exit 
Pension status8
Type of transition
Part time on 
career job
Part time on 
new job
Full time on 
new job
Out of 
labor force Totalb
Wage and salary men
58-61
Not eligible
Eligible
62 +
Not eligible
Eligible
Total
Not eligible
Eligible
Wage and salary women
58-61
Not eligible
Eligible
62 +
Not eligible
Eligible
Total
Not eligible
Eligible
6
0
12
2
11
1
0
3
25
1
21
1
7
9
14
9
12
9
13
5
11
8
11
7
38
15
15
6
20
8
23
14
8
2
11
4
50
76
58
83
56
82
63
78
55
90
57
88
120
201
369
726
489
927
30
37
130
166
160
203
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Pension eligibility refers to eligibility for a pension on the career job when the individual left the career job.
b. Sample with good pension eligibility data.
o•-h
n
a. 
o
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to withdraw completely from the labor force. Over 80 percent of the 
eligible men did, compared to only 56 percent of those not eligible. 4 
The difference was even higher for women (88 versus 57 percent). Much 
of the difference stems from the fact that those eligible were much less 
likely to stay part time on the career job. The reason for this is clear— 
unlike Social Security, most pensions require one to leave the job in 
order to draw benefits. In addition, if benefits are based on the last several 
years' earnings, a move to part time could lead to a substantial reduc 
tion in pension wealth. But the probability of taking a new job (especially 
full time) was also diminished by pension eligibility on the career job, 
suggesting that a key motivation for the transitional jobs may be the 
earnings they provide.
When the sample is further disaggregated by age (with age 62, the 
earliest age of Social Security eligibility, as the cutoff), the same pat 
terns are observed, although the younger workers were always more 
likely to continue working. This was particularly true for new full-time 
employment. Nearly 40 percent of the younger (aged 58 to 61) men 
and nearly a quarter of the younger women who were ineligible for 
a pension started a new full-time job. This was true for only 15 percent 
of the men and less than 10 percent of the women aged 62 and older.
Pension eligibility and mandatory retirement frequently came hand- 
in-hand prior to the 1983 legislation that virtually outlawed mandatory 
retirement before age 70. As seen in table 6.4, both current pension 
eligibility and mandatory retirement increased the likelihood of a tradi 
tional retirement—directly from full-time career work to complete labor 
force withdrawal—among men. Pensions appear to have had the larger 
effect, and when they were combined, they were complimentary but 
far less than additive. The influence of the two together is dramatic— 
the proportion continuing to work after leaving the career job dropped 
from nearly one in two to only one in eight when both factors were 
in effect. But mandatory retirement only increased the probability of 
movement out of the labor force by 6 percentage points once pension 
eligibility was already established. This suggests that these two institu 
tions may be viewed as alternative means to the same ends, and that 
changes in the mandatory retirement laws should have only marginal 
effects while the pension incentives remain in effect. 5
200 
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Industry and Occupation
Transition patterns differed dramatically by industry and occupation, 
as shown in tables 6.5 and 6.6. Among wage and salary workers, over 
half of those in the agricultural and private household industries and 
over 40 percent of those in construction and retail trade chose a non- 
traditional route to retirement. This contrasts the experience of those 
in manufacturing, transportation, and public utilities and mining, where 
only about one in five did so. When the industries are ranked in ascend 
ing order of traditional retirement, as they are in table 6.5, the industries 
go loosely from service to manufacturing, and from low to high union 
presence. This is interesting in view of recent trends in America toward 
a more service-oriented economy—and one in which the proportion of 
the work force that is unionized has shrunk—and suggests that nontradi- 
tional retirement routes may increase in importance in the future.
Certain figures stand out in table 6.5. Part-time work on the career 
job was very rare, except in agriculture and private household work 
(both of which are small industries) and in finance, insurance, and real 
estate. In the latter, employees are often paid on commission, so firms 
are less interested in imposing hours constraints. Among women, part- 
time work on career jobs was more common, especially in private 
household work and retail trade.
In several industries, movement to a new job was very common. About 
a third of the men in construction, retail trade, and public administra 
tion did so. For some reason, it was much less common among the 
women in these same industries.
The distribution by occupation tells a similar tale. Nontraditional retire 
ment patterns were more likely among white-collar than among blue- 
collar workers. About a third of managers, sales, and service workers 
did not leave the labor force in one move. Laborers, craftsmen, and 
foremen were much more likely to do so.
Gary Burtless (1987) has pointed out that the relationship between 
industry and occupation and labor force status may have an intermediate 
factor—health. It may be that certain jobs cause bad health, and that this,
Table 6.5
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Industry 
(horizontal percentage)
Group
Part
Type of transition
time on
Industry8 career job
Wage and salary men
Private household
Agriculture
Construction
Retail trade
Public administration
Finance, insurance & real estate
Other service
Wholesale trade
Manufacturing-nondurable
Manufacturing-durable
Transportation & public utilities
Mining
Total
19
14
5
8
3
13
7
5
3
1
3
7
5
Part time on
new job
(%)
24
14
7
15
12
8
10
14
11
11
7
7
10
Full time on
new job
(%)
14
29
30
17
17
10
12
8
13
8
10
4
12
Out of
labor force
43
43
58
60
69
69
71
73
74
80
80
82
73
Totalb
21
14
97
84
108
83
120
37
238
403
213
28
1,446
noI I
o
o CP
a. 
o
Wage and salary women
Private household
Retail trade
Public administration
Finance, insurance & real estate
Other service
Manufacturing-nondurable
Manufacturing-durable
Transportation & public utilities
Other
Total
37
16
0
6
5
10
0
0
c
10
4
9
0
10
13
8
5
15
c
10
11
2
5
13
8
5
8
0
c
7
48
73
95
71
73
77
87
85
c
74
27
45
20
31
119
60
39
13
14
368
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. In ascending order of "out of the labor force" for wage and salary men.
b. Sample with good industry data.
c. Cells with sample sizes smaller than 10. n
8-
H 
3
Table 6.6
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Occupation 
(horizontal percentage)
Wage and salary men
Farm labor & managers 23
Sales workers 9
Managers 6
Service workers 6
Professional & technical 4
Clerical workers 3
Transportation equipment operators 6
Craftsmen & foremen 4
Nonfarm laborers 7
Operatives 1
Private household workers c
15
12
14
13
12
12
13 
8 
6
10
c
23
23
14
15
12
12
8
13
9
9
c
38
56
66
66
72
12
73
75
78
81
c
13
43
200
93
139
97
62
439
102
252
3
oo
Group
Occupation8
Type of transition
Part time on
career job
Part time on
new job
Full time on
new job
Out of
labor force Totalb
2.
B
s,
o
§•
Total 10 12 73 1,443
Wage and salary women
Sales workers
Managers
Service workers
Professional & technical
Clerical workers
Operatives
Private household workers
Other
Total
24
14
10
4
7
7
47
c
10
6
0
17
8
13
7
7
c
10
0
19
5
8
6
4
7
c
7
71
67
68
79
74
82
40
c
74
17
21
41
73
116
72
15
11
366
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. In ascending order of "out of the labor force" for wage and salary men.
b. Sample with good occupation data.
c. Cells with sample sizes smaller than 10.
O
n
8-
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not the job per se, is responsible for the difference in retirement pat 
terns. He tested this hypothesis and found that there are, in fact, signifi 
cant correlations between industry and occupation and current health, 
and that the differences can be extreme. 6 Nonetheless, even though health 
is an important determinant, he found that the impact of industry and 
occupation remained strong in a multivariate framework. There was 
an independent influence over and above the indirect effect through 
health.
Olivia Mitchell, Phillip Levine, and Silvana Pozzebon (1988) have 
also found important occupational and industrial differences in retire 
ment patterns. They suggest that part of this may be due to differences 
in job risk (those on the riskier jobs retire earlier) or age/productivity 
profiles.
Wage Rate, Earnings, and Wealth
In table 6.7, we disaggregate our three samples by the wage rates 
that the respondents were earning prior to the job transition. An in 
teresting, nonlinear pattern emerges among the male wage and salary 
workers. Those at the ends of the wage spectrum were the most likely 
to continue working when they ended full-time employment on a career 
job. For example, nearly 40 percent of the men earning less than $7.50 
per hour (the bottom quintile) and 30 percent of those earning more 
than $20 per hour (the top 7 percent) stayed in the labor force after 
this transition. In contrast, only about 20 percent of those earning be 
tween $7.50 and $20 per hour did so. The same pattern appears at the 
bottom end of the women's distribution—low-wage women were the 
most likely to continue working. Since only 5 percent of the women 
earned more than $15 per hour, it is difficult to draw conclusions here. 
For the smaller number of self-employed men, no pattern appears.
Data on annual earnings on the career job prior to the transition tell 
a similar story (table 6.8). Among the wage and salary men, the prob 
ability of complete labor force withdrawal increases through the $20,000 
to $30,000 category and then falls, although the decrease at the top is 
smaller than in the wage rate data. The data for women are similar,
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although the smaller sample sizes, especially at the top, reduce our con 
fidence in the results.
In table 6.9, we disaggregate by the level of traditionally defined wealth 
in the survey year prior to departure from a career job. This wealth 
includes financial assets and real estate, including the home. It excludes 
human capital, durables, and the asset value of retirement income rights. 
The figures are adjusted for inflation and are all expressed in 1971 
dollars.
A similar pattern emerges, although it is not as distinct as it was in 
the wage data. Those most likely to move directly out of the labor force 
were those in the middle wealth categories. The very poor (including 
those in debt) and the very wealthy were the most likely to utilize in 
termediate stages.
These findings suggest that nontraditional exit routes may be popular 
among two very distinct groups—those at the bottom and those at the 
top of the socioeconomic scale. The motivations may be very different. 
The poor may have no choice but to continue working because they 
have so few assets to spend during retirement. The rich, on the other 
hand, may choose postcareer work even when there is no financial need, 
either because their commitment to work is greater or because the jobs 
they can choose are more enjoyable or amenable to part-time work.
In addition, there may be a cause in common among members of these 
diverse groups. It may be that the relative scarcity of defined-pension 
benefit plans among very low- and very high-wage workers means that 
there is relatively little change in their true wage rates if they work part- 
time on their career jobs. Note that those earning less than $5 per hour 
are the only wage and salary group more likely to work part time on 
a career job than part time on a new job (table 6.7). The same is true 
for those in the highest wealth category (table 6.9). While low-wage 
workers are unlikely to have employer pensions of any kind, the wealthy 
may have pensions related to profits or stock prices rather than tradi 
tionally determined pension benefits. Although this evidence is far from 
conclusive, it is consistent with the hypothesis that subtle changes in 
compensation late in life affect labor supply decisions.
Table 6.7
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Wage Rate before Exit 
(horizontal percentage)
Group 
Wage rate8
Wage and salary men
Less than $5/hour
$5-7.50/hour
$7.50-10/hour
$10-15/hour
$15-20/hour
More than $20/hour
Total
Self-employed men
Less than $5/hour
$5-7.50/hour
$7.50-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Total
Type of transition
Part time on 
career job 
(%)
18
7
2
3
2
5
4
15
33
25
25
21
22
Part time on 
new job 
(%)
13
11
9
11
6
9
10
10
16
30
4
5
12
Full time on 
new job 
(%)
14
15
8
9
15
15
11
15
12
0
4
11
11
Out of 
labor force 
(%)
55
67
81
77
77
70
75
60
40
45
67
63
55
Total5
77
187
351
537
125
91
1,368
92
43
20
24
19
198
§•
5-
a
Correlates of Career Job Transitions 
209
oo 
«r> Tt 
vo 
vo
in <s oo vo ~*
oo
vo o
<S 
ON
—H CT\
IO
 
i_
* § 
&=£ 
«8•a111
•o 
2 O
 ^H -5. 
c -S «n 
i 
^
05 
<* t- ^
 
i
w 
"5 
I 
' O
oo «i m
 r- ^-i
08 
nJ 
<&
 &
 V
* I
Table 6.8
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Annual Earnings before Exit 
(horizontal percentage)
Group 
Annual earnings8
Wage and salary men
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-40K
$40-50K
More than $50K
Total
Self-employed men
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-50K
More than $50K
Total
Type of transition
Part time on 
career job 
(%)
22
4
2
4
4
4
4
16
24
28
14
18
21
Part time on 
new job 
(%)
20
8
10
11
6
11
10
15
13
9
0
18
12
Full time on 
new job 
(%)
14
11
10
10
19
16
11
12
16
6
0
9
11
Out of 
labor force 
(%)
44
77
78
75
72
70
75
57
47
56
86
55
56
Totalb
64
501
548
157
54
57
1,381
75
62
32
14
11
194
K>
O
o
O
o.§
Wage and salary women
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-40K
More than $40K
Total
18
7
2
13
13
9
10
10
7
7
0
9
7
8
2
0
13
7
65
76
90
80
75
75
71
196
59
15
8
349
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Earnings in 1984 dollars.
b. Sample with good annual earnings data. noI5T 
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Reasons for Exit from the Career Job
The Retirement History Study asked those who left a job why they 
did so. (The question was not asked of those who became part-timers 
on the same job.) The answers appear in table 6.10, listed in order of 
frequency of response by the largest subsample, wage and salary men. 
The most popular answer was retirement benefits—precisely the answer 
that was almost never mentioned in the old days of retirement research, 
as we saw in chapter 2. Thirteen percent of those mentioning benefits 
took a new part-time job, and only 7 percent a new full-time job. This 
is consistent with workers being sensitive to Social Security benefit reduc 
tions after an exempt amount is earned.
Among the wage and salary men who claimed that they left the job 
because of age or health or simply because they wanted to, only 16 
percent remained in the labor market. But among those who were laid 
off (only 4 percent of the sample) or left for "other" reasons (another 
11 percent), more than half continued to work, primarily by embark 
ing on new full-time jobs. Here is where many of the interesting tran 
sitions occur. It is unfortunate that the reasons are unknown for most 
of these workers.
A Comparison of New and Old Jobs
About one-quarter of the men and women in our sample who left career 
jobs took other jobs within four years of the exit. Most did so very soon 
after the departure. In this section, we compare the old and the new 
jobs to see whether people were primarily continuing old careers with 
new employers, or beginning new lines of work.
Class of Worker
Table 6.11 documents some transitions that have been discussed by 
Fuchs (1982). About 10 percent of the wage and salary men who switch 
ed jobs became self-employed. The percentage was about the same 
among those coming from the private sector and those from govern 
ment. The percentages were smaller for women. What is surprising is
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Table 6.10
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Reason for Exit 
(horizontal percentage)
Group Type of transition
Part-time 
Reason on new job 
(%)
Wage and salary men
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Laid off
New job
Other
Total
Self-employed men
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Other
Total
Wage and salary women
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Laid off
Other
Total
13
11
8
8
9
13
12
11
19
9
11
22
25
17
13
10
8
5
13
16
11
Full-time 
on new job
(%)
7
6
8
8
40
87
40
13
0
9
12
0
36
17
2
3
4
5
27
30
8
Out of 
labor force Total8 
(%)
80
83
84
84
52
0
48
76
81
83
87
78
39
66
85
86
89
90
60
53
81
429 ( 31%)
325 ( 24%)
252 ( 18%)
150 ( 11%)
58 ( 4%)
16 ( 1%)
151 ( 11%)
1,381 (100%)
16 ( 9%)
23 ( 13%)
65 ( 36%)
18 ( 10%)
59 ( 33%)
181 (100%)
95 ( 29%)
86 ( 26%)
53 ( 16%)
41 ( 12%)
15 ( 5%)
43 ( 13%)
333 (100%)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 
a. Sample who left their career jobs.
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Table 6.11
Class of Career and New Jobs by Sex for Those Who Changed Jobs 
(vertical percentage)
Sex 
Class of new job
Men
Private sector
Government sector
Self-employed
Total
Women
Private sector
Government sector
Self-employed
Total
Private 
sector
87%
3%
9%
261
(67%)
82%
14%
4%
51
84%
Class of career job
Government Self- 
sector employed
71%
18%
11%
66
(17%)
a
a
a
10
16%
69%
16%
15%
62
(16%)
a
a
a
0
0%
Total
318 ( 82%)
31 ( 8%)
40 ( 10%)
389
(100%)
50 ( 82%)
8 ( 13%)
3 ( 5%)
61
(100%)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 
a. Cells with sample sizes less than 10.
that 85 percent of the former self-employed who switched jobs became 
salaried workers, most in the private sector. The net result, in this sample 
at least, was a net decrease in the number of self-employed, contrary 
to what those who studied just wage and salary workers have found. 
Of course, these figures exclude those who became part-timers on the 
career job. This is only a small proportion of the wage and salary men 
and women (5 and 10 percent, respectively), but a significant fraction 
of the self-employed (25 percent).
Occupation and Industry
Table 6.12 suggests that there are a lot of changes underway. About 
60 percent of the men who switched jobs changed occupations and an 
equal number changed industries, defined by one-digit categories. 7 Wage 
and salary workers were more likely to change industry and occupa-
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tion if they were undertaking a new part-time (as opposed to full-time) 
job. The self-employed, on the other hand, were more likely to change 
with a new full-time job. Women were slightly more stable, and only 
half of them moved to a new occupation or industry.
Table 6.12
Occupation and Industry8 Change for Those Who Changed Jobs 
(vertical percentage)
Group
Status
Wage and salary men 
Same occupation 
Different occupation
Same industry 
Different industry
Sample size
Self-employed men 
Same occupation 
Different occupation
Same industry 
Different industry
Sample size
Wage and salary women 
Same occupation 
Different occupation
Same industry 
Different industry
Sample size
Part time 
on new job
36%
64%
30% 
70%
151
29% 
71%
42% 
58%
31
47% 
53%
47% 
53%
36
Type of transition
Full time 
on new job
48% 
52%
48% 
52%
176
16%
84%
29% 
71%
31
58%
42%
65%
35%
26
Totalb
42% 
58%
40% 
60%
327
23% 
77%
35% 
65%
62
52% 
48%
55% 
45%
62
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. One-digit Census industry and occupation codes.
b. Sample with good industry and occupation data on career and new jobs.
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When we ranked jobs by white-collar and blue-collar status and by 
skill level (table 6.13), we observed job-changers moving toward blue- 
collar and toward less-skilled categories. 8 Fewer than half of the men 
in skilled white-collar career positions remained there. 9 About a quarter 
moved into sales and clerical jobs, and another quarter became blue- 
collar workers. Nearly all (92 percent) of those originally in less-skilled 
white-collar positions either remained there or moved to blue-collar 
employment. And almost none of the blue-collar workers moved up 
into white-collar jobs. A third of those in blue-collar skilled work dropped 
to less-skilled categories, and 70 percent of those in the bottom category 
remained there. Fewer than 10 percent of them became white-collar 
workers in the new job.
When we analyzed specific occupational categories, we found that 
the largest net outflow occurred in manufacturing. Of the men originally 
in durable and nondurable manufacturing, only about a third stayed there 
on their next job. Seventeen percent moved into trade, 16 percent into 
finance, insurance, and real estate, and nearly 20 percent went into other 
services. Other large percentage net outflows were found in transpor 
tation and public utilities and in public administration. The largest net 
gainers were finance, insurance and real estate, and other services.
Wage Rates
In table 6.14, we compare the wage rates before and after the job 
transition. Using four categories of hourly pay, we observed declines 
for both male and female wage and salary workers. For men, the pro 
portion of earnings less than $5 per hour rose from 10 to nearly 40 
percent; for women, from less than 30 to more than 50 percent. Although 
most workers did stay in the same category, those who moved were 
much more likely to slide down than to climb up. 10
We then disaggregated further by the type of the transition, for male 
wage and salary workers only (table 6.15). The wage changes were 
the smallest for the small minority who moved to part-time status on 
their career jobs. This is as expected, since the specific human capital 
acquired on the job remains applicable. For those who began a new 
job, especially a part-time one, the wage losses were often severe. 11
Table 6.13
Occupational Change
Wage and Salary Men Who Changed Jobs 
(vertical percentage)
New job
White-collar skilled
White-collar other
Blue-collar skilled
Blue-collar other
Total
White-collar
skilled8
47%
28%
13%
11%
89
(27%)
White-collar
other
8%
44%
13%
36%
39
(12%)
Career job
Blue-collar
skilled
7%
9%
50%
33%
152
(47%)
Blue-collar
other
0%
9%
20%
70%
45
(14%)
Total5
55 (17%)
60 (18%)
103 (32%)
107 (33%)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. See chapter 6, footnote 7 for definitions.
b. Sample with good occupation data on career and new jobs.
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Only about one in 10 of those who moved to new part-time employ 
ment was earning less than $5 per hour before the move; over half of 
them were afterwards. The decreases were significant but less severe 
for new full-time work.
In table 6.16, we show the actual wage rate losses, in dollars per 
hour, by type of transition. We have aggregated small wage rate changes 
(less than $2.50 per hour) into a central category and looked at gains 
and losses larger than that. Over 40 percent of the wage and salary men 
who remained on the same job, but reduced their hours to part-time 
status, continued to earn approximately the same wage. Of those who 
did not, more enjoyed an increase than suffered a loss.
This was very different from the experience of those who found new 
employment. Of the new part-timers, two-thirds lost more than $2.50 
per hour and 45 percent lost at least $5 per hour in the transition. Only 
one in 10 found work at a higher hourly wage. For new full-time 
workers, nearly half approximated their old wage, but among the others 
there were many more losers than gainers. These results are entirely 
consistent with those of Gustman and Steinmeier (1985a), who reported 
wage decreases among RHS respondents who described themselves as 
partially retired. The decreases were especially large for those who had 
changed jobs.
Earnings and Social Security Thresholds
Some of this loss in earnings may have been intentional. Most workers 
aged 62 and over are eligible to receive Social Security benefits. If they 
earn less than a threshold amount, they can work and receive the entire 
benefit to which they are entitled. After that exempt amount of earn 
ings, benefits are reduced by 33 percent (for those aged 65-69) or 50 
percent (for those aged 62-64) of additional earnings, until the benefits 
are reduced to zero. At this point, the individual ceases to be a Social 
Security recipient.
In tables 6.17 and 6.18, we compare each individual's earnings with 
the threshold for the appropriate year. Before the transition, nearly all 
of these respondents were earning well above the threshold. This is not
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Table 6.15
Change in Wage Rate
Wage and Salary Men Who Changed Jobs3 by Type of Transition 
(vertical percentage)
to to to
Transition 
New job wage rateb
Part time on same job
Less than $5/hour
$5-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Totalb
Part time on new job
Less than $5/hour
$5-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Totalb
Career job wage
$0-5 
per hour
71%
21%
7%
0%
14
(25%)
70%
20%
0%
10%
10
( 7%)
$5-10 
per hour
24%
33%
33%
10%
21
(37%)
57%
35%
4%
4%
51
(38%)
$10-15 
per hour
14%
43%
14%
29%
14
(25%)
48%
41%
5%
5%
58
(43%)
rateb
$15 + 
per hour
12%
12%
0%
75%
8
(14%)
47%
20%
7%
27%
15
(11%)
TotaF
18 (32%)
17 (30%)
10 (18%)
12(21%)
57
71 (53%)
47 (36%)
6( 4%)
10 ( 7%)
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Table 6.16
Absolute Change in Wage Rate
Those Who Changed Jobs8
(vertical percentage)
Group Type of transition
Change hi Part tune on 
wage rate1* career job
Wage and salary men
-$10/hr. or more 
-$5 to -$10/hr. 
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr.
+$5 to +$10/hr. 
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec
Self-employed men
-$10/hr. or more 
-$5 to -$10/hr. 
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr.
+$5 to +$10/hr. 
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec
Wage and salary women
-$10/hr. or more
-$5 to -$10/hr.
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr. 
+$5 to +$10/hr. 
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec
18 | 24 
4 3
42
11 1
9 1 36 
16 3
57
5 124
12 3
37
12
7 ^40 
21 3
43
6 y
6 J 18
6 '
69
0 J 12 
9 3
32
Part time on 
new job
11 1
34 I 68
23 3
21
2
4 J 11 
5 3
134
17 J 29 
8 3
46
13
4 | 25 
8 3
24
0 ^
28 j 41
13 3
44
\) ^
3 f 16 
13 3
32
Full tune on 
new job
11 1 
18 J 42
13 3
46
10 1
1 J 12
i 3
151
9 | 19 
5 3
50
14
18 J 32 
0 3
22
0 ^\
4 J 17
13 3
83
\J ^
0 I 0
o 3
23
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Including pan time on career job.
b. Wage rate in 1984 dollars.
c. Sample with good data on career and new job wage rates.
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226 Correlates of Career Job Transitions
surprising, since our sample included only full-time workers on career 
jobs. After the transition from full-time career work, however, many 
of the people who moved to part-time employment were earning just 
below the amount where the earnings test went into effect. 12 Among 
the male, (formerly) wage and salary workers, nearly half of those work 
ing part time earned between 50 and 100 percent of the threshold. For 
the small number of women, the proportion in this range was even higher 
(55 percent), and it was somewhat lower for the self-employed men. 
Among those who moved to new full-time work, not surprisingly, nearly 
all were above—and most considerably above—the threshold.
If this is due to a Social Security effect, we expect the behavior to 
be correlated with age. Those below age 62 suffer no Social Security 
loss with continued work; in fact, their Social Security wealth rises 
because of the effect of the additional earnings on future benefits. Those 
over 65 suffer the most when earning over the threshold, because the 
actuarial adjustment for delayed receipt of benefits after age 65 is far 
from actuarially fair. The sign and size of the penalty in the 62-to-64 
age range are matters of debate, as we discussed earlier. It depends 
on whether the adjustment to future benefits is sufficient to compen 
sate for the loss of current benefits. The effect on Social Security wealth 
of earning more than the earnings-test threshold goes from positive to 
ambiguous to negative as we consider those less than age 62, those 62 
through 64, and those 65 and over.
Table 6.18 is certainly consistent with the Social Security hypothesis. 
The proportion of wage and salary men who earned just under the 
threshold (between 0.5 and 1.0) after leaving full-time career employ 
ment rises from 9 to 27 to 36 percent as we consider the three age groups. 
If we include those earning less than half of the appropriate threshold 
(between 0.0 and 0.5), the numbers climb from 16 to 34 and 49 per 
cent. Similar patterns exist for the smaller numbers of women and self- 
employed men. Of course, this could be just an age effect—older workers 
prefer fewer hours and therefore earn less than younger workers. There 
is undoubtedly an age effect in these figures, but the dramatic differences 
between those under and over 62 and the smaller differences at the age 
65 break suggest that there is more than age at work. Many people eligi-
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Table 6.18 
Earnings/Social Security Threshold on New Jobs8
by Age at Return 
(vertical percentage)
Group 
Earnings/SS threshold
Wage and salary men
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0
Sample sizeb
Self-employed men
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0
Sample sizeb
Wage and salary women
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0
Sample sizeb
58-61
7
9
4
4
76
76
0
8
17
8
67
12
8
23
8
8
54
13
Age at exit
62-64
7
27
11
8
47
130
18
25
8
15
35
40
8
58
8
0
26
38
65 +
13
36
15
15
22
143
32
30
14
16
8
37
17
39
25
11
8
36
SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 
a. Including part time on career job. 
b. Sample with good data on the earnings/threshold ratio.
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ble for Social Security benefits seem to be designing their work careers 
late in life to avoid the high tax rate in the official Social Security earn 
ings test.
Job Characteristics
The 1969 wave of the Retirement History Study included the three- 
digit industry and occupation codes for all the employed recipients. A 
cross-classification matrix made it possible to calculate the probability 
that an individual fell into each of the approximately 14,000 jobs listed 
in the Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Each 
of these jobs, in turn, was linked to a set of specific job characteristics. 
Therefore, we could calculate the expected values of these characteristics 
for each of the three-digit Census categories.
Unfortunately, subsequent waves of the RHS included only the very 
broad one-digit categorizations. One can take another set of expected 
values and calculate the expected job characteristics for each one-digit 
occupation. We have done this and asked how the characteristics on 
the career and new jobs compared. 13 But the level of aggregation re 
quired to do this makes the conclusions suggestive at best. 14
Table 6.19 is consistent with our other evidence about the career and 
the new jobs. The new jobs, for those working both full and part time, 
generally required lower levels of specific vocational preparation (SVP) 
and general educational development (GED). 15 For example, among 
those who moved to new part-time jobs, nearly one-quarter were in 
positions requiring fewer than six months training. Only 13 percent had 
left jobs like this. At the other end of the spectrum, 27 percent had left 
jobs requiring at least four years of vocational preparation, and only 
14 percent ended up on such jobs. It is interesting to note that the quality 
of the new jobs, measured by SVP or GED, was generally higher among 
those with new full-time positions.
This table also suggests the workers had less personal discretion in 
carrying out their duties on the new jobs. They were less likely to ex 
ercise "direction, planning, and control" or perform a "variety of duties 
characterized by frequent change." Conversely, the new employment 
was more likely to involve "repetitive or short-cycle operations" or
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Table 6.19
Comparisons of Job Characteristics on Career and New Jobs 
Wage and Salary Men
Part time on
new
Career
Job characteristic
Direction, planning, 
and control
Variety of duties 
Repetitiveness 
Specific instructions
Specific vocational preparation
0-6 months
7-12 months
13-48 months
48 months +
General education development
Levels 1,2
Level 3
Level 4
Levels 5,6,7
job
32
70 
41
37
required
13
30
30
27
required
16
28
45
12
job
New
job
17
64 
59
48
24
38
24
14
23
42
25
10
Full time on
new job
Career
job
(%)
30
78 
37 
33
9
31
37
23
11
32
47
11
New
job
(%)
25
74 
44 
37
18
29
35
18
19
29
43
9
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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"doing things only under specific instructions." Because of the extreme 
level of aggregation involved in these statistics, it would be unwise to 
draw conclusions from these numbers alone. But they are useful as con 
firmation of a picture already drawn.
Summary
Nontraditional retirement transitions are common in the United States, 
even though abrupt changes from full-time work to complete labor force 
withdrawal are still more likely. The patterns of exit we observed were 
correlated with individuals' circumstances at the time of the change. 
Those in relatively poor health were more likely to drop out complete 
ly, as were those eligible for employer pensions or subject to mandatory 
retirement. There were interesting differences by industry and occupa 
tion, with intermediate stages most likely among workers in the nonu 
nion service sectors. There was weak evidence suggesting that nontradi- 
tional transitions were more common among those at the ends of the 
socioeconomic scale (the poor and the rich) than among those in the 
middle, suggesting that the motivations for partial retirement stages may 
differ.
When we compared the old and new jobs of those who changed 
employment, we found a great deal of industrial and occupational move 
ment. When the sample was analyzed by white-collar/blue-collar status 
and by skill level (skilled/other), the most common transition involved 
remaining in the same general category. But most of the movement that 
did exist was down—toward blue-collar and less-skilled positions. Rough 
estimates of job characteristics suggested that the new jobs had lower 
specific vocational and general educational requirements. They also ap 
peared to be jobs on which workers exercised less personal discretion 
in performing their duties, and were more likely (than on the career 
jobs) to be doing repetitive tasks or working under specific instructions.
Wages showed similar decline; most workers earned less, and often 
considerably less, after the transition, especially those who took new 
part-time positions. Large flows were noted out of manufacturing and 
into finance, insurance and real estate, and other services. These oc-
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cupations, we suspect, allowed more hours flexibility than did the jobs 
the individuals had left. And they did so while permitting the individuals 
to collect pension benefits, and thus avoid the wealth losses (and im 
plicit pay cuts) that would have accompanied continued work on their 
career jobs.
NOTES
1. Burtless (1987) acknowledged that the measure of health that he used (the answer to a question 
on whether health limited the respondent's capacity for work) is suspect, since some people may 
use health as a socially acceptable reason for retirement even when other factors were key. To 
diminish the importance of this phenomenon, Burtless also estimated his employment equation 
using a predetermined index of health—the answer to the same health question from the previous 
questionnaire. The estimated health effect remained strong and statistically significant.
2. See Stem (1989) for some evidence on the usefulness of these subjective health variables.
3. Filer and Petri (1988) have proposed another interpretation of the correlation between pension 
eligibility and retirement age. They contend that the causation may not be from pensions to retire 
ment, but rather from basic job characteristics to both pensions and retirement. Those in jobs 
with intense physical demands, stress, or repetitive working conditions, they hypothesize, plan 
to retire early and therefore have employment contracts (i.e., pensions) that anticipate this.
4. The self-employed are excluded from the pension tables, since so few of them had formal pen 
sion plans.
5. This is consistent with a much more detailed analysis of the impact of mandatory retirement 
and the effect of the 1983 legislation found in Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b).
6. Burtless (1987) found that "a miner aged 62 is 50 percent more likely to suffer a work limita 
tion than is the average worker . . . and he is twice as likely . . . than is a worker in a profes 
sional industry. Similarly, a worker in a professional occupation is one-third less likely to face 
a work limitation than is an average worker . . . and he is 57 percent less likely to be limited 
than a laborer."
7. This is very similar to the results reported by Fames and Less (1985b), who used data from 
the National Longitudinal Surveys. They reported that almost two-thirds of their postretiremen! 
job-changers crossed broadly defined industry lines.
8. Using the 1970 Census occupational codes, we defined our categories as follows: 
White-collar skilled:
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
Teachers
Managers and officials (excluding farm) 
White-collar, other:
Sales workers
Clerical and kindred workers 
Blue-collar skilled:
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
Operatives and kindred workers
Transportation equipment operatives
Farm managers
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Blue-collar, other:
Nonfarm laborers
Private household workers
Service workers
Farm laborers 
Omitted:
Members of the armed forces
9. These results are also consistent with those of Parnes and Less (1985b), who found the majori 
ty of NLS job-changers moved down the socioeconomic hierarchy.
10. Parnes and Less (198Sb) found that most of the NLS men they studied had lower real wages 
on the new job. Ruhm (1990), with a sample from the RHS, reported the same for those who 
switched industry or occupation or both.
11. Herz and Rones (1989) reported that hourly wages tend to decline by 30 to 40 percent when 
full-time workers become part-time employees.
12. Burtless and Moffitt (1985) and lams (1987) have also reported this clustering around (and 
primarily below) the exempt amounts. lams also showed that the earnings of benefit recipients 
aged 65 to 71 were consistently higher than the earnings of those aged 62 to 64. The median 
earnings for the younger group was $4,391, only $9 less than their (1982) exempt amount of 
$4,400. For the older recipients, with $6,000 in exempt earnings, the median earnings were about 
$5,500.
13. Holden (1988) has shown that those in physically demanding jobs in the year before they 
started receiving Social Security benefits were less likely to continue working in retirement. Since 
the analysis here includes only those who did change jobs and continue working, the distribution 
of job attributes for this sample will differ from that of the older population as a whole.
14. For the job held in 1969, we had both the one-digit and three-digit job descriptions, and therefore 
could calculate expected job characteristics for each person at the detailed or at the highly ag 
gregated level. Since the new jobs were at only the one-digit level, we used only the one-digit 
information for the career jobs in table 6.19. The conclusions drawn from an analogous table 
with the more accurate three-digit descriptions of the 1969 characteristics, however, were very 
similar to those drawn above.
15. The specific vocational preparation descriptions refer to the actual number of months of training 
time required for the worker to acquire the knowledge and abilities necessary for average perfor 
mance on the job. The general education development descriptions, on the other hand, are not 
in units of time. Rather, each gradation (1 through 7) is characterized by higher levels of 
mathematical and language development. The numbers, however, are merely ordinal.
- 7 - 
Summary and Conclusions
A major goal of this book is to summarize and discuss recent research 
by economists on individual retirement decisions and aggregate retire 
ment trends. This is a fascinating time to study these phenomena. As 
we saw in chapter 1, dramatic demographic shifts are underway in the 
United States. The population is aging and the ratio of those of tradi 
tional working age to those of traditional retirement age is falling 
significantly. In addition, the work and retirement patterns of older 
Americans, especially men, have undergone major changes. During the 
past two decades, the labor force participation rates of men aged 62 
to 70 have dropped by well over a third. Percentage declines are also 
substantial for those as young as 55. For older women, participation 
rates have remained fairly stable, but have declined relative to the labor 
supply increases of younger women.
Among the declining numbers still in the labor force, other changes 
are underway. The proportion of older employees working part time 
(and nearly all voluntarily so) has increased steadily. Older workers 
are disproportionately self-employed, and those who are have retire 
ment patterns very different from those of wage and salary workers.
What is responsible for these dramatic changes in the work behavior 
of older Americans? On what do individual retirement decisions and 
aggregate trends depend? Circumstantial evidence points to our public 
and private retirement income systems as likely influences. At the same 
time that participation rates were declining, both Social Security and 
employer pensions were growing substantially. Real Social Security ex 
penditures (excluding Medicare) have increased about fivefold since 
1960 and have more than doubled since 1970. Retirement patterns reveal 
definite spikes at ages 62 and 65—the ages of early and normal Social 
Security eligibility. In addition, since 1950, employer pension coverage
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has increased from one-quarter to nearly one-half of private sector 
workers, and the number of pension recipients has increased significant 
ly. It seems very likely that these large and growing institutions, aimed 
specifically at the labor supply decisions of older workers, would have 
had some impact on individual and aggregate retirement behavior.
On the other hand, years of surveys by the Social Security Administra 
tion and others found very little mention of these retirement programs. 
When asked why they had stopped work, most retirees named health 
or an employer-initiated separation as the primary reason and very few 
mentioned Social Security or pension benefits. Were they important or 
not?
The stage was set. Several interesting and important demographic 
phenomena were underway. Past research yielded some insights, but 
circumstantial evidence led in other intriguing directions. Two outstand 
ing new microeconomic data sets appeared with which to test alternative 
hypotheses. The result was the dramatic increase in economic research 
on retirement issues that we have discussed. What have we learned?
Work, Retirement, and Pensions: A Life-Cycle View
A major advance, we believe, is a growing consensus that the finan 
cial incentives embedded in our Social Security and employer pension 
plans influence work decisions throughout an individual's life. Social 
Security and pension plans certainly affect labor supply late in life, and 
they probably do so earlier as well.
The key to understanding these relationships is the recognition that 
retirement income eligibility—the right to a future stream of income—is 
a component of compensation. For employees covered by Social Security 
or a defined benefit pension plan, the value of these rights varies in 
nonlinear ways with continued employment with the firm. Workers can 
control both the timing and the magnitude of these benefits, subject to 
the rules of the plan. Benefits claimed later are fewer in number, but 
generally larger in size. Their total value can rise or fall with continued 
work (delayed receipt), depending on whether the future increments 
are sufficient to compensate for the earlier benefits foregone.
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Since retirement benefits are paid out over time, the entire income 
stream is best viewed in present discounted value terms—as the asset 
or stock of wealth that could generate this stream. The value of this 
asset depends on when it is first claimed. In each year of continued 
employment with a firm, an individual's pension and Social Security 
wealth changes. These changes in retirement income wealth are part 
of annual compensation. If the asset values are increasing, pension (or 
Social Security) accrual is positive, and true compensation exceeds the 
paycheck by the amount of the increase. On the other hand, if the wealth 
values are declining, true compensation is less than it appears.
An important advance in the theory of pensions is the realization that 
pensions can influence the decision to leave the firm throughout one's 
career. If one follows Richard Ippolito (1987) and makes the distinc 
tion between the "quit" and the "stay" value of a pension, then the 
penalty in foregone pension wealth for quitting "too soon" rises through 
middle age and then falls. During early years with the firm, the "quit" 
accrual—that is, the change in the present discounted value of the pen 
sion required by law—is less than the wages foregone by the worker 
to finance the eventual ("stay") value of the pension (the value receiv 
ed by a worker who remains until retirement age). The firm owes the 
worker. Around middle age, the accruals equal and then surpass the 
implicit wage reductions, as the firm begins to make up the previous 
shortfalls in compensation. After the age of eligibility for early retire 
ment, defined benefit pension accruals usually fall and often turn 
negative. The decrease in accrual is like a pay cut. It discourages con 
tinued employment with the firm.
Robert Clark and Ann McDermed (1988) and others have shown how 
much pension wealth workers can lose from job changes. The losses 
occur because pensions are backloaded—accruals rise until the age of 
early retirement eligibility. Therefore, overall compensation on a job 
already held for 20 years will exceed that on a new job with the iden 
tical wage and pension plan. Workers who switch jobs lose because 
they move from the gravy of one plan to the gruel of another and miss 
out on the pension accrual repayment they had coming.
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Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989a) have an additional 
perspective on the cost of job mobility. They agree that losses in pen 
sion wealth can occur, but disagree with the conclusion that these losses 
are significant. Rather, they argue, mobility is discouraged much more 
by the fact that wages on the new job are likely to be lower than on 
the previous job.
These various models all agree that pensions can change the pattern 
of lifetime compensation. They predict that pension incentives should 
reduce turnover at younger ages and encourage it later. The authors 
differ, however, on the magnitude of the effect and the strength of the 
evidence. Thus far, a consensus view has not emerged.
There has been a great deal of empirical research on the financial 
incentives of the Social Security system. Although the rules are com 
plicated, there is only one set of rules and researchers know them. There 
is general agreement that the Social Security system subsidizes work 
prior to age 62, since future benefits are rising and there are no benefits 
foregone, and penalizes it after age 65, often severely. Between ages 
62 and 65, the delayed retirement credit is close to actuarially fair, and 
whether Social Security provides a small subsidy or a small tax on earn 
ings depends on assumptions about life expectancies and discount rates.
The pension side is much more complicated. There are hundreds of 
thousands of employer pension plans, each with its own rules and regula 
tions, and these details are frequently unknown to the researcher. 
Economists who have chosen to use the large microeconomic data sets 
(such as the Retirement History Study and the National Longitudinal 
Surveys) must rely on assumptions rather than facts on many pension 
plan details. Industrywide averages about key parameters (for exam 
ple, the rewards for delayed receipt) are frequently used, but the rich 
variety that exists in the individual plans is lost. Fortunately, other re 
searchers have taken another tack and analyzed the complex details of 
a smaller number of actual plans. They know more about the actual 
financial incentives but are less able to discern the impact of the plans, 
because they do not have as much other information about the individuals 
in their samples.
The consensus on pensions is that defined benefit plans are rarely 
actuarially fair. Their asset values generally rise or fall with continued
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work—they are affected by the timing of initial benefit receipt. But there 
is tremendous variety among the individual plans. We now know that 
the accrual values of defined benefit pensions usually peak around the 
earliest year of benefit eligibility. Income from working exceeds in 
come from retiring, but the difference between the two declines over 
time. In other words, true compensation remains positive but diminishes 
after some age, even if simple wage growth is constant. Most workers 
can continue to work after that age, but only for smaller and smaller 
pay, and many decide to leave.
That these work incentives and disincentives exist does not necessarily 
mean that they are understood or, even if they are, that they influence 
individual behavior. This is the empirical question that has been the 
focus of much of the recent work by economists. The consensus is that 
these financial incentives do influence individual retirement decisions. 
When the changes in Social Security and pension wealth that would ac 
company another year of work are entered as explanatory variables in 
behavioral equations, they are generally statistically significant. Older 
Americans behave as though they understand and respond to these in 
centives. They are sensitive to their true compensation, and when this 
falls, as it inevitably does because of retirement income wealth losses, 
they are less likely to stay on the job.
Although these financial incentives are statistically significant, they 
are only part of the story. Individual decisions obviously depend on 
a vast number of factors, only some of which we can observe and 
measure. Physical and mental health, social networks, attitudes toward 
work and leisure, living arrangements, job characteristics, dependents, 
local labor market conditions, climate, and expectations about the future 
are all undoubtedly important. They interact with the financial incen 
tives on which we have focused to bring about the final result.
Several economists have used their empirical models to estimate the 
aggregate impact of various Social Security reforms that have been pro 
posed and, in some cases, enacted. They use simulation methods to 
predict individual decisions on the basis of the behavioral equations they 
have estimated and the new policy parameters that have been propos 
ed. In these experiments, the Social Security amendments do affect
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aggregate behavior, but only modestly. The delays in the average retire 
ment age are on the order of months, not years.
Why then do we concentrate so much attention on an issue of limited 
influence? There are several good reasons. First, unlike many of the 
factors listed above, these financial incentives are the direct product 
of specific public policy initiatives. Congress created the Social Security 
system and all of its details, and Congress can change it. This is in stark 
contrast to many of the other important factors in the retirement deci 
sion, such as attitudes, job characteristics, social networks, and expec 
tations. Even with those that are subject to public policy, such as labor 
market conditions and health, the linkages between government action 
and the eventual outcome are much more tenuous. It is much easier 
to change ages of eligibility, benefit reduction rates, or delayed retire 
ment credits than it is to improve the general level of health or expecta 
tions of older Americans.
In addition, the simulations on Social Security reform estimate first- 
round effects only. The researchers have altered Social Security rules 
but have left the employer pension environment unchanged. We are 
convinced that pension incentives, which exhibit considerably more 
variety than does Social Security, are extremely important in determining 
individual and aggregate behavior. A key variable about which little 
is known is how the employer pensions will respond to amendments 
in Social Security rules. Will pension changes augment or offset Social 
Security initiatives? Will pension changes be nullified by other com 
ponents in the compensation package? In short, how will the long-run, 
general equilibrium impacts compare to the short-run effects that have 
been studied?
This is an area of extreme uncertainty. It involves predicting both 
personal and corporate behavior. What we now know is that such deci 
sions by firms, unions, and workers will make a difference. Most peo 
ple do not retire because they can no longer find or perform work, as 
we once thought. Some do, but many others now retire voluntarily, 
when they are still able to work and there is demand for their services. 
They do so partly because of the tradeoffs they see in the market. There 
are always people at the margin, and these people will alter their behavior 
in response to changes in the choices they face.
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Exit Patterns from Career Jobs
A second goal of this book is to discuss the ways in which older 
Americans leave their career jobs. We pointed out in chapter 1 that most 
workers spend a considerable portion of their employed life with a single 
firm. The departure from this position is therefore an important event. 
We decided to concentrate on this transition, rather than on retirement 
per se, and thereby sidestep the debate on the appropriate definition 
of retirement. We defined a career job as a full-time job held for at 
least 10 years. Our primary focus was on the subset of the Retirement 
History Study sample who were still employed on career jobs in 1969, 
when they were all between 58 and 63 years of age.
Complete retirement from a career job is only one form of job exit. 
What makes transitions at older ages different from those earlier is that 
many workers do go from a full-time career job to full-time retirement— 
they leave the job and the labor force simultaneously. But this is not 
the only way to leave. The other transitions—to part-time work on the 
same job or part-time or full-time work on a new job—are very impor 
tant, but poorly understood. Policy research that has concentrated on 
labor force participation has missed the importance of Social Security 
and pensions on the paths that workers take between career work and 
complete retirement.
It is ironic that while our understanding of the determinants of retire 
ment, particularly the importance of financial incentives, has grown 
so dramatically, relatively little work was being done on describing the 
actual behavior under study. Most of the effort has concentrated on the 
right-hand side of the equation and relatively little on the left. Most 
researchers (including ourselves) described retirement as an either-or 
phenomenon. They disagreed on how retirement should be defined, but 
agreed that an individual either is or is not retired, whatever the defini 
tion. Our current analysis of the actual exit patterns chosen by career 
workers shows that this dichotomy can be misleading and will lead one 
to overlook some very interesting retirement transitions.
The traditional retirement pattern involves a one-time movement from 
full-time labor market activity to complete labor market withdrawal. We
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found that this was still the modal pattern during the 1970s—about 70 
percent of those who left their career jobs did so in this fashion. Dur 
ing the subsequent four years they did not report working again.
The other 30 percent, however, exited in nontraditional ways. Over 
20 percent of the wage and salary men found new work when they left, 
and they were evenly distributed between full-time and part-time status. 
Only a few (5 percent of the total) were able to reduce their hours to 
part-time (less than 20 hours per week) on their same career jobs. The 
experience of the (nonmarried) women in the sample was similar. About 
one-quarter did not leave the labor market completely. They were more 
able than the men to stay part time on their career jobs. The self- 
employed men were the most likely to keep working after leaving full- 
time career work. Only half of this group left the labor force during 
the decade they were observed. One-quarter found new employment, 
and the other one-quarter reduced their hours of work to part time on 
their career jobs.
We found that these intermediate jobs were not just brief way sta 
tions on the road to retirement. Although most of these workers even 
tually did leave the labor force, only one-quarter of them did so within 
the first two years after the transition. The majority of the remainder 
were still employed on their first transitional job after two years, and 
about one-fifth had moved on to yet another job.
Whether or not those who leave full-time career status but continue 
to work should be labeled as retired or not is a matter of debate. In 
some ways they do not seem retired. They are still employed, often 
for a considerable number of hours per year, and some are working 
full time, but on a new job. In other ways they do seem retired. Many 
claim pension benefits, some collect Social Security, and most earn 
significantly less than they had prior to the transition. Some describe 
themselves as retired, but many do not.
Exit patterns varied by the age at transition. The youngest and the 
oldest groups were the most likely to do something nontraditional. Nearly 
a quarter of those aged 58 to 61 found new full-time jobs, compared 
to fewer than 10 percent of those 62 to 64, and fewer than 5 percent 
of those 65 and over. The oldest category (aged 66-70) contained the 
workers least likely to leave the labor force completely. This may be
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surprising until one realizes that these people had already chosen to work 
beyond age 65, which makes them a very nonrepresentative sample of 
the population—probably individuals with a particular propensity to work 
or with insufficient resources to stop.
We saw this pattern when we looked at the wage rates, earnings, or 
wealth of our sample. For all three variables, those in the tails of the 
distributions were the least likely to leave the labor force completely. 
We suspect that those at the bottom continued to work because they 
had to; they did not have the financial means to do otherwise. They 
were also unlikely to face dramatic age-specific wage cuts, since they 
were usually not covered by employer pension plans. Those at the up 
per end could afford to retire, but had either jobs or hours flexibility 
that made continued work the more attractive alternative. It is interesting 
to note that men in the highest wealth category (more than $250,000) 
were the most likely to stay on in part-time employment on their career 
jobs.
Health and pension status were both important. Those with poor health 
were the most likely to leave the labor force. Those in good health (the 
same or better than their peers) were the most likely to move on to a 
new job. The health differences in this sample were modest and great 
ly understate the overall impact of health on the retirement decision. 
The reason is that our sample included only those still employed full 
time on their career jobs at ages 58 to 63. Most of those with severe 
health problems would have already left their career jobs by then, and 
therefore be excluded from the study.
Pension status was highly correlated with transition patterns. Those 
eligible for pension benefits when they left were much more likely to 
leave the labor force completely. Very few remained part time on the 
career job, since employer pensions rarely permit one to do so and draw 
benefits. Earnings from other jobs, however, usually do not affect 
eligibility. The fact that relatively few pension recipients took new part- 
time or full-time positions suggests that the pension benefits had the 
usual income effect, increasing the demand for leisure.
There were interesting differences by industry and occupation. Tradi 
tional retirement was most common in the unionized manufacturing
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sectors, and least likely in construction, trade, and services. By occupa 
tion, nontraditional transitions were more frequent among white-collar 
workers. This is an interesting finding since the labor market is mov 
ing toward more white-collar service employment. This may mean that 
traditional retirement will be even less common in the future.
Retirement History Study respondents were asked why they had left 
their last jobs. Since much of the earliest research was based on ques 
tions of this nature, it is interesting to note that the most frequent 
response, among wage and salary men and women, was retirement 
benefits. Age and health were the next most common reasons given. 
This is in stark contrast to the early research findings, in which health 
always dominated and retirement income sources were rarely mentioned.
We looked carefully at the subset of our sample who switched 
employers. With the exception of the self-employed, most had to do 
this in order to keep working after leaving full-time status on their career 
jobs. (Many of the self-employed just reduced the hours on their same 
jobs.) Most did so with very little time between jobs, although a few 
returned after as many as four years out of the labor force. A com 
parison of the career and new jobs reveals that most of these job-switchers 
moved to different lines of work. About three of every five wage and 
salary men moved to a new (one-digit) industry and occupation. The 
percentage was even higher for self-employed men—three-quarters began 
new occupations, as did about half of the women.
When we ranked jobs by skill level and by white-collar/blue-collar 
status, we noticed a drift down the occupational scale. Although about 
half of the job-changers stayed in the same category, many more slid 
down than climbed up. Wages told the same story. They were general 
ly lower on the new jobs, especially for those moving to part-time work 
with a new employer. Over half of the part-timers earned less than $5 
per hour, even though only 7 percent had on their previous jobs. Com 
parisons of the new earnings levels with the thresholds for the Social 
Security earnings test hinted that some of the earnings loss may have 
been intentional. Many earned just under the threshold, and this behavior 
was correlated with age. Only 9 percent of those less than age 62 (and 
therefore ineligible for Social Security retirement benefits) did so,
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compared to over a quarter of those 62 through 64 and over a third 
of those 65 and over.
The data on specific job characteristics are not very precise, because 
they are one-digit industrywide averages. These averages, however, 
indicated that job-switchers were moving from jobs in which they had 
a variety of different duties and control over the tasks performed to 
ones more likely to involve repetitive tasks under specific instructions. 
The levels of specific and general training required were noticeably lower 
in the new positions.
In summary, we find that nontraditional retirement patterns are com 
mon among older Americans. Many workers stay in the labor force 
after they leave their career jobs. Of those who remain employed, most 
take on a new position quickly and stay in it for several years. The new 
positions often represent a new line of work, lower on the socioeconomic 
scale and often at considerably lower pay. Many workers augment these 
earnings with Social Security and/or pension benefits.
This research suggests that work after retirement—after departure from 
ftill-time status on a career job—is a common occurrence. But such tran 
sitional jobs are still in the minority, and substantial changes in both 
Social Security and pension structures are required before the majority 
of workers are likely to stay at work beyond their early 60s.
What Will Future Retirement Behavior Look Like?
It is little wonder that the labor force participation rates of older 
workers have fallen dramatically over the last two decades, given the 
weak labor markets of the 1970s and the incentives embedded in our 
retirement income programs. But we have seen that despite the overall 
trend, many older workers who left their career jobs went on to work 
at new jobs, which they then held for a considerable length of time.
Very little empirical evidence exists on the influence of Social Security 
or pension policy on these nontraditional job transitions, because they 
have not been the major focus of study. What is known is that current 
attempts to increase the labor force participation of older workers by
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changing Social Security rules alone are likely to have only modest ef 
fects. Changes in the earnings-test exempt amount, the benefit reduc 
tion rate, the age of normal retirement, and the delayed retirement credit 
after age 65 will not by themselves create dramatic changes in the length 
of stay on the career job. And it is this labor market decision that primari 
ly determines work effort at older ages.
Most defined benefit pension plans continue to encourage workers 
to leave the career job at the earliest possible retirement age. It is like 
ly that changes in pensions, rather than Social Security, will have the 
greater effect on full-time career work. If employers are concerned about 
a shortage of labor early next century, as they well might be, then we 
may see substantial changes in pension policy. If they are not concern 
ed, then employers may tilt lifetime benefits even more toward those 
who leave at early retirement age in order to offset the scheduled reduc 
tions in Social Security work disincentives.
Current pension rules sometimes offset Social Security changes 
automatically. This happens when employer pension plans are "in 
tegrated"; that is, when pension benefits depend on the size of an in 
dividual's Social Security payment. If Social Security benefits decline, 
the pension increases and makes up a portion (usually half) of the loss. 
The majority of full-time participants in defined benefit plans are in 
such integrated plans (Herz and Rones 1989). A smaller percentage 
receives pension supplements if they retire early, to compensate for the 
loss in Social Security benefits (Bell and Marclay 1987). If employers 
want to buck the Social Security trend even more than these integra 
tion features already do, it will not be easy to prevent them from doing 
so. For instance, the 1986 Omnibus Budget Act requires firms with 
pension plans to continue providing service credit to those who con 
tinue with the firm past normal retirement age. 1 But this does not pre 
vent the firm from making early retirement benefits even more generous 
in order to offset this rule.
The ability to offset government policy, however, does not necessarily 
mean that employers will do so. In fact, one might well argue that private 
pensions will conform to the new Social Security incentives, even if 
they have not yet. They often have in the past. For example, age 65
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has most frequently been chosen (in domestic pension plans) as the nor 
mal retirement age because the Social Security system adopted that age 
initially. One of the original goals of Social Security policy was to en 
courage older workers out of the labor force. Until 1972, earnings above 
a small amount were taxed at 100 percent, and benefits postponed beyond 
age 65 earned no actuarial credit at all. Given these strong disincen 
tives to full-time work, it is not surprising that private firms developed 
institutions that conformed. To do otherwise would have required them 
to pay workers higher wages after age 65 to offset the losses in Social 
Security wealth.
The establishment of early Social Security benefits at age 62 may have 
encouraged private firms to do likewise, to the degree that workers 
perceived Social Security pension accrual to fall past that age. The 
changes in Social Security benefit rules scheduled for the next decade 
will reduce work disincentives and alter the institutional structure on 
which private pensions are built. How employer pensions respond will 
determine how work at older ages will change in the next century.
A final issue concerns the influence of retirement income benefit 
changes on the type of work we can expect at older ages. If pension 
rules do not adjust, we foresee increased part-time and full-time work 
on new postcareer jobs. This is because the easing of Social Security 
disincentives will make work more attractive, while pension rules con 
tinue to penalize those who stay on their career jobs. Workers will leave 
the firm, collect the career job pension while its asset value is high, 
and move to another employer. If private firms, rather than doing 
nothing, actually counter Social Security changes with even stronger 
retirement incentives of their own, then we will see even more of this 
postcareer employment. But if firms foresee labor shortages ahead and 
match the Social Security initiatives by flattening their own pension ac 
crual patterns across the life cycle, then the age at which workers leave 
career jobs will begin to rise.
An important variation on this theme is the possibility of part-time 
work on the career job, a pattern that is already common among the 
self-employed. We suspect that many workers would find this an at 
tractive alternative. 2 A gradual rather than instantaneous reduction of
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hours from full time to zero makes sense, and the option of doing so 
on the same job reduces the loss in specific human capital and the wage 
reduction that usually accompanies a job change. Current pension rules 
make this a poor choice for workers in defined benefit plans. Part-time 
employment with the firm usually prevents the receipt of any pension 
benefits, and future benefits are often a function of the last few years' 
earnings. But current pension rules are not written in stone.
Other nations have introduced programs to promote partial or gradual 
retirement. Barry Mirkin (1987) points out that many of them were in 
itially designed to encourage earlier retirement in nations with high and 
persistent levels of unemployment. But they can be used to encourage 
later retirement as well. In Norway, for example, with a normal retire 
ment age of 67, traditionally low levels of unemployment, and an age 
structure considerably older than that in the United States, workers ag 
ed 67 to 70 could claim various fractions of their old-age pensions, as 
long as the sum of pensions plus earnings did not exceed 80 percent 
of previous pay (Ginsburg 1985). Denmark (Petersen 1989) and Finland 
(Sundberg 1989) have similar plans.
In 1976, Sweden introduced a much more popular partial pension 
option designed to smooth the transition from full-time work to full- 
time retirement (Laczko 1988; Kruse and Sbderstrbm 1989). Under this 
plan, eligible workers aged 60 to 64 who reduce their hours to part- 
time have 65 percent of the loss in earnings made up by a partial pen 
sion. 3 Because of the high tax rates, the change in net pay is often small. 
Since 1977, between 12 and 27 percent of those eligible have opted 
for the plan each year. It is popular among both blue- and white-collar 
workers, and especially among women. Because it enjoys the support 
of both the unions' and the employers' confederations, the hours' reduc 
tions have proceeded smoothly. Employees usually work fewer days 
per week or alternate weeks, although shorter days are popular among 
women. Nearly all of these workers stay with the same employer and 
on the same job. Helen Ginsburg (1985) reported that both recipients 
and firms were pleased with this alternative. Workers' health and pro 
ductivity improved while absenteeism and disability declined.
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Partial retirement is possible under Social Security rules in the United 
States, although the earnings test is more restrictive for those aged 62 
to 64 than for those 65 and over. It will be even more attractive now 
that the benefit reduction rate has dropped from one-half to one-third 
for those 65 and older. But employer pensions rarely offer these op 
tions. This implies that partial retirement usually means a job change 
and, as we have seen, a significant decrease in pay.
In the United States, there is a trend away from work disincentives 
for older workers. This is good, as long as our policies do not neglect 
those who cannot continue to work. Mandatory retirement has virtual 
ly been eliminated. Social Security changes scheduled to go into effect 
over the next several decades will make the system much more age 
neutral so that the value of Social Security rights will depend much less 
on when the benefits are first claimed. In the pension world, there is 
a trend toward defined contribution plans, which do not have the kind 
of work disincentives we have emphasized. But defined benefit plans, 
which generally do, still remain the dominant form of primary coverage.
The research on the retirement decision over the past decade shows 
the power of applied microeconomics. Our society has built programs 
with strong retirement incentives, and people have responded to them 
as economic theory and common sense would predict. As pension and 
Social Security accruals, and therefore total compensation, decline with 
age, some workers decide to stop working. We now know a great deal 
about this decision, but relatively little about the many other possibilities 
that exist—options involving job changes and second careers that some 
people already use as intermediate stops on the road to complete retire 
ment. Other nations have been more imaginative than the United States 
in designing flexible programs that support workers' efforts to withdraw 
more gradually from the labor force. We are convinced that older 
Americans would respond to changed incentives in the future as they 
have in the past. What remains to be seen is whether the market—firms 
responding to labor shortages on the horizon—will introduce the ap 
propriate changes themselves, or whether a more active government 
role is required.
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NOTES
1. The law still permits caps on the total number of years of tenure that are counted in the benefit 
calculation formula and limits on the maximum benefit, so it is still possible for workers who 
stay on to get no increment to future pensions (Herz and Rones 1989). The difference is that 
this situation can no longer be a direct function of age.
2. According to Morrison (1983), Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987), and the U.S. Special 
Committee on Aging (1988, p. 90), national surveys suggest that many older workers indicate 
a strong preference for part-time work after their career jobs, and that many are interested in 
jobs the same as or similar to their preretirement employment. They conclude that many workers 
would take advantage of more flexible work policies if they were more widespread.
3. An important detail of the scheme is that these part-time earnings usually have little effect on 
the eventual state earnings-related pension, since the benefit is based on the 15 years of highest 
earnings, not the IS final years of employment. A partial retirement plan in Great Britain failed 
partially because most employees in occupational pension schemes have their benefits based on 
their final salary, whether it be full time or part time (Laczko 1988).
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